Regulating unilateral supermarket misconduct as customer/acquirer of goods and services

Supermarkets in Australia may have substantial market power as buyers in wholesale markets for grocery products. They may also have substantial bargaining power in negotiating contracts with their suppliers of grocery products. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) regulates misconduct by supermarkets as customer/acquirers in three ways. First, s 46(1) of the CCA prohibits the ‘taking advantage’ of buyer power for the purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring or preventing competitive conduct. Secondly, s 21 of the ACL prohibits unconscionable conduct in business–to–business transactions. Thirdly, Pt IVB of the CCA provides for the promulgation of mandatory and voluntary industry codes of conduct. Since 1 July 2015 the conduct of supermarkets as customer/acquirers has been regulated by the Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct. This article examines these three different approaches. It considers them against the background of the misconduct at issue in ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd which the ACCC chose to litigate as an unconscionable conduct case, rather than a misuse of market power case. The article also considers the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three approaches and concludes that while the three approaches address different problems there is scope for overlap and all three should be retained for compete coverage.

Union power in retail: Contrasting cases in Australia and New Zealand

Retail employees are the prototypical vulnerable, low-paid employees, and for that reason unionism and its benefits, such as collective bargaining, provide important social protection. However, the reasons that make employees vulnerable also reduce union power though that is not to say that retail unions lack agency. This article analyses the power resources and their deployment in the respective retail unions in Australia and New Zealand. The two unions’ strategies are quite different, and provide interesting contrasts in approaches and ideology. The implications for theory are that ideology matters with respect to union strategy (and should be attended to more thoroughly in studies of union renewal) and – as others have also argued – the wider institutional context has a very significant influence on outcomes for unions and their members. The implication for practice, therefore, is that both workplace and extra-workplace strategies in the political and other arenas remain central for the low-paid.