Analysis of authenticated encryption stream ciphers

Authenticated Encryption (AE) is the cryptographic process of providing simultaneous confidentiality and integrity protection to messages. AE is potentially more efficient than applying a two-step process of providing confidentiality for a message by encrypting the message and in a separate pass, providing integrity protection by generating a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag. This paper presents results on the analysis of three AE stream ciphers submitted to the recently completed eSTREAM competition. We classify the ciphers based on the methods the ciphers use to provide authenticated encryption and discuss possible methods for mounting attacks on these ciphers.

Analysis of stream cipher based authenticated encryption schemes

Authenticated Encryption (AE) is the cryptographic process of providing simultaneous confidentiality and integrity protection to messages. This approach is more efficient than applying a two-step process of providing confidentiality for a message by encrypting the message, and in a separate pass providing integrity protection by generating a Message Authentication Code (MAC). AE using symmetric ciphers can be provided by either stream ciphers with built in authentication mechanisms or block ciphers using appropriate modes of operation. However, stream ciphers have the potential for higher performance and smaller footprint in hardware and/or software than block ciphers. This property makes stream ciphers suitable for resource constrained environments, where storage and computational power are limited. There have been several recent stream cipher proposals that claim to provide AE. These ciphers can be analysed using existing techniques that consider confidentiality or integrity separately; however currently there is no existing framework for the analysis of AE stream ciphers that analyses these two properties simultaneously. This thesis introduces a novel framework for the analysis of AE using stream cipher algorithms. This thesis analyzes the mechanisms for providing confidentiality and for providing integrity in AE algorithms using stream ciphers. There is a greater emphasis on the analysis of the integrity mechanisms, as there is little in the public literature on this, in the context of authenticated encryption. The thesis has four main contributions as follows. The first contribution is the design of a framework that can be used to classify AE stream ciphers based on three characteristics. The first classification applies Bellare and Namprempre's work on the the order in which encryption and authentication processes take place. The second classification is based on the method used for accumulating the input message (either directly or indirectly) into the into the internal states of the cipher to generate a MAC. The third classification is based on whether the sequence that is used to provide encryption and authentication is generated using a single key and initial vector, or two keys and two initial vectors. The second contribution is the application of an existing algebraic method to analyse the confidentiality algorithms of two AE stream ciphers; namely SSS and ZUC. The algebraic method is based on considering the nonlinear filter (NLF) of these ciphers as a combiner with memory. This method enables us to construct equations for the NLF that relate the (inputs, outputs and memory of the combiner) to the output keystream. We show that both of these ciphers are secure from this type of algebraic attack. We conclude that using a keydependent SBox in the NLF twice, and using two different SBoxes in the NLF of ZUC, prevents this type of algebraic attack. The third contribution is a new general matrix based model for MAC generation where the input message is injected directly into the internal state. This model describes the accumulation process when the input message is injected directly into the internal state of a nonlinear filter generator. We show that three recently proposed AE stream ciphers can be considered as instances of this model; namely SSS, NLSv2 and SOBER-128. Our model is more general than a previous investigations into direct injection. Possible forgery attacks against this model are investigated. It is shown that using a nonlinear filter in the accumulation process of the input message when either the input message or the initial states of the register is unknown prevents forgery attacks based on collisions. The last contribution is a new general matrix based model for MAC generation where the input message is injected indirectly into the internal state. This model uses the input message as a controller to accumulate a keystream sequence into an accumulation register. We show that three current AE stream ciphers can be considered as instances of this model; namely ZUC, Grain-128a and Sfinks. We establish the conditions under which the model is susceptible to forgery and side-channel attacks.

ICEPOLE: High-speed, hardware-oriented authenticated encryption

This paper introduces our dedicated authenticated encryption scheme ICEPOLE. ICEPOLE is a high-speed hardware-oriented scheme, suitable for high-throughput network nodes or generally any environment where specialized hardware (such as FPGAs or ASICs) can be used to provide high data processing rates. ICEPOLE-128 (the primary ICEPOLE variant) is very fast. On the modern FPGA device Virtex 6, a basic iterative architecture of ICEPOLE reaches 41 Gbits/s, which is over 10 times faster than the equivalent implementation of AES-128-GCM. The throughput-to-area ratio is also substantially better when compared to AES-128-GCM. We have carefully examined the security of the algorithm through a range of cryptanalytic techniques and our findings indicate that ICEPOLE offers high security level.

Analysis of one-pass block cipher based authenticated encryption schemes

This project analyses and evaluates the integrity assurance mechanisms used in four Authenticated Encryption schemes based on symmetric block ciphers. These schemes are all cross chaining block cipher modes that claim to provide both confidentiality and integrity assurance simultaneously, in one pass over the data. The investigations include assessing the validity of an existing forgery attack on certain schemes, applying the attack approach to other schemes and implementing the attacks to verify claimed probabilities of successful forgeries. For these schemes, the theoretical basis of the attack was developed, the attack algorithm implemented and computer simulations performed for experimental verification.

Forgery attacks on ++AE authenticated encryption mode

In this paper, we analyse a block cipher mode of operation submitted in 2014 to the cryptographic competition for authenticated encryption (CAESAR). This mode is designed by Recacha and called ++AE (plus-plus-ae). We propose a chosen plaintext forgery attack on ++AE that requires only a single chosen message query to allow an attacker to construct multiple forged messages. Our attack is deterministic and guaranteed to pass ++AE integrity check. We demonstrate the forgery attack using 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher. Hence, ++AE is insecure as an authenticated encryption mode of operation.

Indirect message injection for MAC generation

This paper presents a model for the generation of a MAC tag using a stream cipher. The input message is used indirectly to control segments of the keystream that form the MAC tag. Several recent proposals can be considered as instances of this general model, as they all perform message accumulation in this way. However, they use slightly different processes in the message preparation and finalisation phases. We examine the security of this model for different options and against different types of attack, and conclude that the indirect injection model can be used to generate MAC tags securely for certain combinations of options. Careful consideration is required at the design stage to avoid combinations of options that result in susceptibility to forgery attacks. Additionally, some implementations may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks if used in Authenticated Encryption (AE) algorithms. We give design recommendations to provide resistance to these attacks for proposals following this model.

Cryptology and network security

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, CANS 2012, held in Darmstadt, Germany, in December 2012. The 22 revised full papers, presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 99 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on cryptanalysis; network security; cryptographic protocols; encryption; and s-box theory.

Correcting flaws in Mitchell’s analysis of EPBC

Efficient error-Propagating Block Chaining (EPBC) is a block cipher mode intended to simultaneously provide both confidentiality and integrity protection for messages. Mitchell’s analysis pointed out a weakness in the EPBC integrity mechanism that can be used in a forgery attack. This paper identifies and corrects a flaw in Mitchell’s analysis of EPBC, and presents other attacks on the EPBC integrity mechanism.

Multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange

We consider a new form of authenticated key exchange which we call multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange, where session establishment depends on successful authentication of multiple short secrets that are complementary in nature, such as a long-term password and a one-time response, allowing the client and server to be mutually assured of each other's identity without directly disclosing private information to the other party. Multi-factor authentication can provide an enhanced level of assurance in higher-security scenarios such as online banking, virtual private network access, and physical access because a multi-factor protocol is designed to remain secure even if all but one of the factors has been compromised. We introduce a security model for multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange protocols, propose an efficient and secure protocol called MFPAK, and provide a security argument to show that our protocol is secure in this model. Our security model is an extension of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway security model for password-authenticated key exchange and accommodates an arbitrary number of symmetric and asymmetric authentication factors.

One-time-password-authenticated key exchange

To reduce the damage of phishing and spyware attacks, banks, governments, and other security-sensitive industries are deploying one-time password systems, where users have many passwords and use each password only once. If a single password is compromised, it can be only be used to impersonate the user once, limiting the damage caused. However, existing practical approaches to one-time passwords have been susceptible to sophisticated phishing attacks. ---------- We give a formal security treatment of this important practical problem. We consider the use of one-time passwords in the context of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE), which allows for mutual authentication, session key agreement, and resistance to phishing attacks. We describe a security model for the use of one-time passwords, explicitly considering the compromise of past (and future) one-time passwords, and show a general technique for building a secure one-time-PAKE protocol from any secure PAKE protocol. Our techniques also allow for the secure use of pseudorandomly generated and time-dependent passwords.

Attribute-based authenticated key exchange

We introduce the concept of attribute-based authenticated key exchange (AB-AKE) within the framework of ciphertext policy attribute-based systems. A notion of AKE-security for AB-AKE is presented based on the security models for group key exchange protocols and also taking into account the security requirements generally considered in the ciphertext policy attribute-based setting. We also extend the paradigm of hybrid encryption to the ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption schemes. A new primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism (EP-AB-KEM) is introduced and a notion of chosen ciphertext security is de�ned for EP-AB-KEMs. We propose an EP-AB-KEM from an existing attribute-based encryption scheme and show that it achieves chosen ciphertext security in the generic group and random oracle models. We present a generic one-round AB-AKE protocol that satis�es our AKE-security notion. The protocol is generically constructed from any EP-AB-KEM that satis�es chosen ciphertext security. Instantiating the generic AB-AKE protocol with our EP-AB-KEM will result in a concrete one-round AB-AKE protocol also secure in the generic group and random oracle models.

A Multiplicative Homomorphic Sealed-Bid Auction-Based on Goldwasser-Micali Encryption

Instead of the costly encryption algorithms traditionally employed in auction schemes, efficient Goldwasser-Micali encryption is used to design a new sealed-bid auction. Multiplicative homomorphism instead of the traditional additive homomorphism is exploited to achieve security and high efficiency in the auction. The new scheme is the currently known most efficient non-interactive sealed-bid auction with bid privacy.