Primary students’ spatial visualization and spatial orientation : an evidence base for instruction

This paper reports on the performance of 58 11 to 12-year-olds on a spatial visualization task and a spatial orientation task. The students completed these tasks and explained their thinking during individual interviews. The qualitative data were analysed to inform pedagogical content knowledge for spatial activities. The study revealed that “matching” or “matching and eliminating” were the typical strategies that students employed on these spatial tasks. However, errors in making associations between parts of the same or different shapes were noted. Students also experienced general difficulties with visual memory and language use to explain their thinking. The students’ specific difficulties in spatial visualization related to obscured items, the perspective used, and the placement and orientation of shapes.

Gender effects in orientation on primary students’ performance on items rich in graphics

This study investigated the longitudinal performance of 378 students who completed mathematics items rich in graphics. Specifically, this study explored student performance across axis (e.g., numbers lines), opposed-position (e.g., line and column graphs) and circular (e.g., pie charts) items over a three-year period (ages 9-11 years). The results of the study revealed significant performance differences in the favour of boys on graphics items that were represented in horizontal and vertical displays. There were no gender differences on items that were represented in a circular manner.

The stewardship paradigm : an enquiry into the ethical obligation associated with being in control of resorces

The resource allocation and utilization discourse is dominated by debates about rights particularly individual property rights and ownership. This is due largely to the philosophic foundations provided by Hobbes and Locke and adopted by Bentham. In our community, though, resources come not merely with rights embedded but also obligations. The relevant laws and equitable principles which give shape to our shared rights and obligations with respect to resources take cognizance not merely of the title to the resource (the proprietary right) but the particular context in which the right is exercised. Moral philosophy regarding resource utilisation has from ancient times taken cognizance of obligations but with ascendance of modernity, the agenda of moral philosophy regarding resources, has been dominated, at least since John Locke, by a preoccupation with property rights; the ethical obligations associated with resource management have been largely ignored. The particular social context has also been ignored. Exploring this applied ethical terrain regarding resource utilisation, this thesis: (1) Revisits the justifications for modem property rights (and in that the exclusion of obligations); (2) Identifies major deficiencies in these justifications and reasons for this; (3) Traces the concept of stewardship as understood in classical Greek writing and in the New Testament, and considers its application in the Patristic period and by Medieval and reformist writers, before turning to investigate its influence on legal and equitable concepts through to the current day; 4) Discusses the nature of the stewardship obligation,maps it and offers a schematic for applying the Stewardship Paradigm to problems arising in daily life; and, (5) Discusses the way in which the Stewardship Paradigm may be applied by, and assists in resolving issues arising from within four dominant philosophic world views: (a) Rawls' social contract theory; (b) Utilitarianism as discussed by Peter Singer; (c) Christianity with particular focus on the theology of Douglas Hall; (d) Feminism particularly as expressed in the ethics of care of Carol Gilligan; and, offers some more general comments about stewardship in the context of an ethically plural community.

Richard Rorty, innovation strategies & movie inspiration

Movie innovation is a conversation between screenwriters and producers in our mixed economy – a concept of innovation supported by Richard Rorty and Aristole's Poetics. During innovation conversations, inspired writers describe fresh movie actions to empathetic producers. Some inspired actions may confuse. Writers and producers use strategies to inquire about confusing actions. This Australian study redescribes 25 writer-producer strategies in the one place for the first time. It adds a new strategy. And, with more evidence than the current literature, it investigates writer inspiration, which drives film innovation. It reports inspiration in pioneering, verifiable detail.

More light at the end of the tunnel – apixaban in atrial fibrillation

Introduction: Subjects with atrial fibrillation are at risk of thromboembolic events. The vitamin K antagonists (e.g., warfarin) are useful at preventing coagulation in atrial fibrillation, but are difficult to use. One of the FXa inhibitors, oral apixaban, has been tested as an anticoagulant in atrial fibrillation. Areas covered: In ARISTOTLE (Apixaban for reduction in stroke and other thromboembolic events in atrial fibrillation) apixaban was compared to warfarin in subjects with atrial fibrillation, and shown to cause a lower rate of stroke or systemic embolism and of major bleeding, than warfarin. In the AVERROES (Apixaban versus acetylsalicylic acid [ASA] to prevent stroke in atrial fibrillations patients who have failed or are unsuitable for vitamin K antagonist treatment) trial, stroke or systemic embolism occurred less often with apixaban than aspirin, whereas the occurrence of major bleeding was similar in the groups. Expert opinion: Apixaban is much easier for subjects with atrial fibrillation to use than warfarin, as it does not require regular monitoring by a health professional, with dosage adjustment. In addition to replacing warfarin in subjects with atrial fibrillation who are unable or not prepared to use warfarin, apixaban has the potential to replace warfarin more widely in the prevention of thromboembolism in subjects with atrial fibrillation.

Sport biomechanics

Biomechanics involves research and analysis of the mechanisms of living organisms. This can be conducted on multiple levels and represents a continuum from the molecular, wherein biomaterials such as collagen and elastin are considered, to the tissue, organ and whole body level. Some simple applications of Newtonian mechanics can supply correct approximations on each level, but precise details demand the use of continuum mechanics. Sport biomechanics uses the scientific methods of mechanics to study the effects of forces on the sports performer and considers aspects of the behaviour of sports implements, equipment, footwear and surfaces. There are two main aims of sport biomechanics, that is, the reduction of injury and the improvement of performance (Bartlett, 1999). Aristotle (384-322 BC) wrote the first book on biomechanics, De Motu Animalium, translated as On the Movement of Animals. He saw animals' bodies as mechanical systems, but also pursued questions that might explain the physiological difference between imagining the performance of an action and actually doing it. Some simple examples of biomechanics research include the investigation of the forces that act on limbs, the aerodynamics of animals in flight, the hydrodynamics of objects moving through water and locomotion in general across all forms of life, from individual cells to whole organisms...

A discourse on the non-method

In spite of the activism of professional bodies and researchers, empirical evidence shows that project management still does not deliver the expected benefits and promises. Hence, many have questioned the validity of the hegemonic rationalist paradigm anchored in the Enlightenment and Natural Sciences tradition supporting project management research and practice for the last 60 years and the lack of relevance to practice of the current conceptual base of project management. In order to address these limitations many authors, taking a post-modernist stance in social sciences, build on ‘pre-modern’ philosophies such as the Aristotelian one, specially emphasizing the role of praxis (activity), and phronesis (practical wisdom, prudence). Indeed, ‘Praxis … is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but is also a guide to its transformation …’ (Vazquez, 1977:. 149). Therefore, praxis offers an important focus for practitioners and researchers in social sciences, one in which theory is integrated with practice at the point of intervention. Simply stated, praxis can serve as a common ground for those interested in basic and applied research by providing knowledge of the reality in which action, informed by theory, takes place. Consequently, I suggest a ‘praxeological’ style of reasoning (praxeology being defined as study or science of human actions and conduct, including praxis, practices and phronesis) and to go beyond the ‘Theory-Practice’ divide. Moreover, I argue that we need to move away from the current dichotomy between the two classes ‘scholars experts-researchers’ and ‘managers/workers-practitioners-participants’. Considering one single class of ‘PraXitioner’, becoming a phronimos, may contribute to create new perspectives and open up new ways of thinking and acting in project situations. Thus, I call for a Perestroika in researching and acting in project management situations. My intent is to suggest a balanced praxeological view of the apparent opposition between social and natural science approaches. I explore, in this chapter, three key questions, covering the ontological, epistemological and praxeological dimensions of project management in action. 1. Are the research approaches being currently used appropriate for generating contributions that matter to both theory and practice with regards to what a ‘project’ is or to what we do when we call a specific situation ‘a project’? 2. On the basis of which intellectual virtues is the knowledge generated and what is the impact for theory and practice? 3. Are the modes of action of the practitioners ‘prudent’ and are they differentiating or reconciling formal and abstract rationality from substantive rationality and situated reasoning with regards to the mode of action they adopt in particular project situations? The investigation of the above questions leads me to debate about ‘Project Management-as-Praxis’, and to suggest ‘A’ (not ‘THE’) ‘praxeological’ style of reasoning and mode of inquiry – acknowledging a non-paradigmatic, subjective and kaleidoscopic perspective – for ‘Knowing-as-Practicing’ in project management. In short, this is about making a ‘Projects Science’ that matters.

What is a good project manager? Reconceptualizing the “do” : an Aristotelian perspective

In Social Science (Organization Studies, Economics, Management Science, Strategy, International Relations, Political Science…) the quest for addressing the question “what is a good practitioner?” has been around for centuries, with the underlying assumptions that good practitioners should lead organizations to higher levels of performance. Hence to ask “what is a good “captain”?” is not a new question, we should add! (e.g. Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; Söderlund, 2004, p. 190). This interrogation leads to consider problems such as the relations between dichotomies Theory and Practice, rigor and relevance of research, ways of knowing and knowledge forms. On the one hand we face the “Enlightenment” assumptions underlying modern positivist Social science, grounded in “unity-of-science dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” and cause-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern interpretivist proposal, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20). In the project management space, this aims at addressing one of the fundamental problems in the field: projects still do not deliver their expected benefits and promises and therefore the socio-economical good (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Bredillet, 2010, Lalonde et al., 2012). The Cartesian tradition supporting projects research and practice for the last 60 years (Bredillet, 2010, p. 4) has led to the lack of relevance to practice of the current conceptual base of project management, despite the sum of research, development of standards, best & good practices and the related development of project management bodies of knowledge (Packendorff, 1995, p. 319-323; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 2–6, Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 436–7; Winter et al., 2006, p. 638). Referring to both Hodgson (2002) and Giddens (1993), we could say that “those who expect a “social-scientific Newton” to revolutionize this young field “are not only waiting for a train that will not arrive, but are in the wrong station altogether” (Hodgson, 2002, p. 809; Giddens, 1993, p. 18). While, in the postmodern stream mainly rooted in the “practice turn” (e.g. Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012), the shift from methodological individualism to social viscosity and the advocated pluralism lead to reinforce the “functional stupidity” (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1194) this postmodern stream aims at overcoming. We suggest here that addressing the question “what is a good PM?” requires a philosophy of practice perspective to complement the “usual” philosophy of science perspective. The questioning of the modern Cartesian tradition mirrors a similar one made within Social science (Say, 1964; Koontz, 1961, 1980; Menger, 1985; Warry, 1992; Rothbard, 1997a; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Boisot & McKelvey, 2010), calling for new thinking. In order to get outside the rationalist ‘box’, Toulmin (1990, p. 11), along with Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 655), suggests a possible path, summarizing the thoughts of many authors: “It can cling to the discredited research program of the purely theoretical (i.e. “modern”) philosophy, which will end up by driving it out of business: it can look for new and less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and develop the methods needed for a more practical (“post-modern”) agenda; or it can return to its pre-17th century traditions, and try to recover the lost (“pre-modern”) topics that were side-tracked by Descartes, but can be usefully taken up for the future” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11). Thus, paradoxically and interestingly, in their quest for the so-called post-modernism, many authors build on “pre-modern” philosophies such as the Aristotelian one (e.g. MacIntyre, 1985, 2007; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Lalonde et al., 2012). It is perhaps because the post-modern stream emphasizes a dialogic process restricted to reliance on voice and textual representation, it limits the meaning of communicative praxis, and weaking the practice because it turns away attention from more fundamental issues associated with problem-definition and knowledge-for-use in action (Tedlock, 1983, p. 332–4; Schrag, 1986, p. 30, 46–7; Warry, 1992, p. 157). Eikeland suggests that the Aristotelian “gnoseology allows for reconsidering and reintegrating ways of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential, intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by modernist [and post-modernist] thinking” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20—21). By contrast with the modernist one-dimensional thinking and relativist and pluralistic post-modernism, we suggest, in a turn to an Aristotelian pre-modern lens, to re-conceptualise (“re” involving here a “re”-turn to pre-modern thinking) the “do” and to shift the perspective from what a good PM is (philosophy of science lens) to what a good PM does (philosophy of practice lens) (Aristotle, 1926a). As Tsoukas & Cummings put it: “In the Aristotelian tradition to call something good is to make a factual statement. To ask, for example, ’what is a good captain’?’ is not to come up with a list of attributes that good captains share (as modem contingency theorists would have it), but to point out the things that those who are recognized as good captains do.” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) Thus, this conversation offers a dialogue and deliberation about a central question: What does a good project manager do? The conversation is organized around a critic of the underlying assumptions supporting the modern, post-modern and pre-modern relations to ways of knowing, forms of knowledge and “practice”.

Acting and knowing in temporary and project-based organizing : turning from the practice world to a liberation praxeology?

The purpose of this article is to offer a critical discussion about the “practice” lens and its weaknesses in addressing acting and knowledge & competence development in the context of temporary and project-based organizing. I demonstrate that “practice turn” and “phronetic proposal” are dual and opposite perspectives within the “practice” world, none of them being fully relevant to grasp project organizing and that each of them maintain the opposition between the “observer” and the “natives “of the practices. I suggest an alternate style of reasoning in order to address the dissatisfaction in face of problems, antinomies, perplexities and contradictions generated by the dichotomous thinking: a liberation praxeology rooted in Aristotle philosophy aiming, through praxis & phronesis and practical acquired experience & perfecting actualization, at reconciling facts & values and means & ends, and Ethics & Politics in the quest for human happiness and social good through project organizing.

Homeostatic epistemology : reliability, coherence and coordination in a Bayesian virtue epistemology

How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of ignorance are managed in an uncertain world. Perhaps decision-making in the shadow of knowledge best explains human wellbeing—a Bayesian approach? In this dissertation I argue that a hybrid of virtue and Bayesian epistemologies explains human flourishing—what I term homeostatic epistemology. Homeostatic epistemology supposes that an agent has a rational credence p when p is the product of reliable processes aligned with the norms of probability theory; whereas an agent knows that p when a rational credence p is the product of reliable processes such that: 1) p meets some relevant threshold for belief (such that the agent acts as though p were true and indeed p is true), 2) p coheres with a satisficing set of relevant beliefs and, 3) the relevant set of beliefs is coordinated appropriately to meet the integrated aims of the agent. Homeostatic epistemology recognizes that justificatory relationships between beliefs are constantly changing to combat uncertainties and to take advantage of predictable circumstances. Contrary to holism, justification is built up and broken down across limited sets like the anabolic and catabolic processes that maintain homeostasis in the cells, organs and systems of the body. It is the coordination of choristic sets of reliably produced beliefs that create the greatest flourishing given the limitations inherent in the situated agent.

A little learning is a dangerous thing? The ethics of teaching accidental tourists in higher education

This paper raises questions about the ethical issues that arise for academics and universities when under-graduate students enrol in classes outside of their discipline - classes that are not designed to be multi-disciplinary or introductory. We term these students ‘accidental tourists'. Differences between disciplines in terms of pedagogy, norms, language and understanding may pose challenges for accidental tourists in achieving desired learning outcomes. This paper begins a discussion about whether lecturers and universities have any ethical obligations towards supporting the learning of these students. Recognising that engaging with only one ethical theory leads to a fragmented moral vision, this paper employs a variety of ethical theories to examine any possible moral obligations that may fall upon lecturers and/or universities. In regards to lecturers, the paper critically engages with the ethical theories of utilitarianism, Kantianism and virtue ethics (Aristotle) to determine the extent of any academic duty to accidental tourists. In relation to universities, this paper employs the emerging ethical theory of organisational ethics as a lens through which to critically examine any possible obligations. Organisational ethics stems from the recognition that moral demands also exist for organisations so organisations must be reconceptualised as ethical actors and their policies and practices subject to ethical scrutiny. The analysis in this paper illustrates the challenges faced by lecturers some of whom, we theorise, may experience a form of moral distress facing a conflict between personal beliefs and organisational requirements. It also critically examines the role and responsibilities of universities towards students and towards their staff and the inherent moral tensions between a market model and demands for ‘good' learning experiences. This paper highlights the tensions for academics, between academics and universities and within university policy and indicates the need for greater reflection about this issue, especially given the many constraints facing lecturers and universities.

What is a good project manager? An Aristotelian perspective

The purpose of this paper is to take a critical look at the question “what is a competent project manager?” and bring some fresh added-value insights. This leads us to analyze the definitions, and assessment approaches of project manager competence. Three major standards as prescribed by PMI, IPMA, and GAPPS are considered for review from an attribute-based and performance-based approach and from a deontological and consequentialist ethics perspectives. Two fundamental tensions are identified: an ethical tension between the standards and the related competence assessment frameworks and a tension between attribute and performance-based approaches. Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy is brought in to reconcile these differences. Considering ethics of character that rises beyond the normative deontological and consequentialist perspectives is suggested. Taking the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis between theory and practice into consideration is advocated to resolve the tension between performance and attribute-based approaches to competence assessment.