Robbery under arms: Copyright law and the Australia-United States free trade agreement

TThis article considers the radical, sweeping changes to Australian copyright law wrought by the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement 2004 (AUSFTA). It contends that the agreement will result in a “piracy of the public domain”. Under this new regime, copyright owners will be able to obtain greater monopoly profits at the expense of Australian consumers, libraries and research institutions, as well as intermediaries, such as Internet service providers. Part One observes that the copyright term extension in Australia to life of the author plus 70 years for works will have a negative economic and cultural impact — with Australia’s net royalty payments estimated to be up to $88 million higher per year. Part Two argues that the adoption of stronger protection of technological protection measures modelled upon the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (U.S.) will override domestic policy–making processes, such as the Phillips Fox Digital Agenda Review, and judicial pronouncements such as the Stevens v Sony litigation. Part Three questions whether the new safe harbours protection for Internet service providers will adversely affect the sale of Telstra. This article concludes that there is a need for judicial restraint in interpreting the AUSFTA. There is an urgent call for the Federal Government to pass ameliorating reforms — such as an open–ended defence of fair use and a mechanism for orphan works. There is a need for caution in negotiating future bilateral trade agreements — lest the multinational system for the protection of copyright law be undermined.

The Pirate Bazaar: The Social Life of Copyright Law

This thesis provides a cultural history of Australian copyright law and related artistic controversies. It examines a number of disputes over authorship, collaboration, and appropriation across a variety of cultural fields. It considers legal controversies over the plagiarism of texts, the defacing of paintings, the sampling of musical works, the ownership of plays, the co-operation between film-makers, the sharing of MP3 files on the Internet, and the appropriation of Indigenous culture. Such narratives and stories relate to a broad range of works and subject matter that are protected by copyright law. This study offers an archive of oral histories and narratives of artistic creators about copyright law. It is founded upon interviews with creative artists and activists who have been involved in copyright litigation and policy disputes. This dialogical research provides an insight into the material and social effects of copyright law. This thesis concludes that copyright law is not just a ‘creature of statute’, but it is also a social and imaginative construct. In the lived experience of the law, questions of aesthetics and ethics are extremely important. Industry agreements are quite influential. Contracts play an important part in the operation of copyright law. The media profile of personalities involved in litigation and policy debates is pertinent. This thesis claims that copyright law can be explained by a mix of social factors such as ethical standards, legal regulations, market forces, and computer code. It can also be understood in terms of the personal stories and narratives that people tell about litigation and copyright law reform. Table of Contents Prologue 1 Introduction A Creature of Statute: Copyright Law and Legal Formalism 6 Chapter One The Demidenko Affair: Copyright Law and Literary Works 33 Chapter Two Daubism: Copyright Law and Artistic Works 67 Chapter Three The ABCs of Anarchism: Copyright Law and Musical Works 105 Chapter Four Heretic: Copyright Law and Dramatic Works 146 Chapter Five Shine: Copyright Law and Film 186 Chapter Six Napster: Infinite Digital Jukebox or Pirate Bazaar? Copyright Law and Digital Works 232 Chapter Seven Bangarra Dance Theatre: Copyright Law and Indigenous Culture 275 Chapter Eight The Cathedral and the Bazaar: The Future of Copyright Law 319

Bank guarantees and the reasonable expectations of beneficiaries

A bank guarantee has traditionally been viewed as a cash equivalent. This view is supported by the operation of the autonomy principle. However, the autonomy principle is subject to certain recognised exceptions both at common law and under statute. One of these exceptions is commonly referred to as the negative stipulation or underlying contract exception. In recent times the operation of this particular exception has given rise to a wealth of case law. This article examines whether this recent case law appropriately recognises the reasonable expectations of the beneficiary of a bank guarantee that a bank guarantee should function not only as a security but as a risk allocation device.

The doctrine of necessity and the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment: Is there any justification?

In Australia, the legal basis for the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc and unclear. There is no comprehensive legal framework that authorises and regulates the detention of, for example, older people with dementia in locked wards or in residential aged care, people with disability in residential services or people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services. This paper focuses on whether the common law doctrine of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities. Traditionally, the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a situation of imminent peril, is excused from the criminal or civil liability because of the extraordinary circumstances they find themselves in. In the United Kingdom, however, in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, the House of Lords broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for treatment, detention and restraint outside of the emergency context. This paper outlines the distinction between necessity as an excuse and as a defence, and identifies a number of concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity and safeguards. Australian courts are urged to reject the United Kingdom approach and retain an excuse-based defence, as the risks of permitting the essentially utilitarian model of necessity as a justification are too great.

Law as lore

Law is saturated with stories. People tell their stories to lawyers; lawyers tell their clients’ stories to courts; legislators develop regulation to respond to their constituents’ stories of injustice or inequality. In legal education, professors devise hypothetical scenarios to test student understanding of legal doctrine; in law examinations and assignments, students construct advice to fictional clients. The common law legal system derives many of its foundational principles from case law — in effect, stories with legal solutions — that have accumulated over time. The civil law system, despite a different design centred on legal codes, also relies on judicial story-telling to interpret the code provisions and flesh out the gaps.

Legal duties following the discharge of mental health patients

In the recent decision of Hunter and New England Local Health District v McKenna; Hunter and New England Local Health District v Simon, the High Court of Australia held that a hospital and its medical staff owed no common law duty of care to third parties claiming for mental harm, against the background of statutory powers to detain mentally ill patients. This conclusion was based in part on the statutory framework and in part on the inconsistency which would arise if such a duty was imposed. If such a duty was imposed in these circumstances, the consequence may be that doctors would generally detain rather than discharge mentally ill persons to avoid the foreseeable risk of harm to others. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the policy of the mental health legislation , which favours personal liberty and discharge rather than detention unless no other care of a less restrictive kind is appropriate and reasonably available.

Copyright, fair use and the Australian Constitution

There has been much debate over recent years about whether Australian copyright law should adopt a fair use doctrine. In this chapter we argue by pointing to the historical record that the incorporation of the term 'copyrights' in the Australian Constitution embeds a notion of balance and fair use in Australian law and that this should be taken into account when interpreting the Australian Copyright Act 1968. English case law in the 18th and 19th centuries developed a principle that copyright infringement did not occur where a person had made a fair use of a work. Fair use was generally established where the defendant had made a productive use that did more than alter the original work for the purpose of evading liability, and where the defendant had made an original contribution to the resulting work. Additionally, fairness was shown by a use that did not supersede or prejudice the market for the original work. At the time of including the copyright power in the Constitution, the UK Parliament’s understanding of “copyrights” included the notion of fair use as it had been developed in U.K. precedent. In this chapter we argue that the work “copyrights” in the Australia Constitution takes its definition from copyright in 1900 and as it has evolved since. Importantly, the word “copyrights” is infused with a particular meaning that incorporates the principle of copyright balance. The constitutional notion of copyright, therefore, is not that of an unlimited power to prevent all copying. Rather, copyright distinguishes between infringing copying and non-infringing copying and grants to the copyright owner only the power to control the former. Non-infringing copying includes well-accepted limitations on the copyright owner’s rights, including the copying of ideas, the copying of public domain works and the copying of insubstantial parts of copyrighted works. In this chapter we argue that non-infringing copying also includes copying to make a fair use of a work. The sections that distinguish infringing copying from non-infringing copying in the Copyright Act 1968 are sections 36(1) and 101(1), which define infringement as the doing, without licence, of an “act comprised in the copyright”. An infringing copy is an act comprised the copyright, whereas a non-infringing copy is not. We argue that space for fair uses of copyrighted works is built into the Copyright Act 1968 through these sections, because a fair use will not produce an infringing copy and so is not an act comprised in the copyright.

‘Lemon Laws’: an inquiry into consumer protections and remedies for buyers of new motor vehicles

1. Under the Terms of Reference for the Committee’s Inquiry, ‘lemons’ are defined as ‘new motor vehicles with numerous, severe defects that re-occur despite multiple repair attempts or where defects have caused a new motor vehicle to be out of service for a prolonged period of time’. Consumers are currently protected in relation to lemon purchases by the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) located in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). The ACL applies as a law of Queensland pursuant to the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld). The voluntary recall and consumer guarantees law took effect on 1 January 2011. 2. In 2006, the Government of Victoria made a commitment to introduce a lemon law into the provisions of the then Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). The public consultation process on the proposal to introduce a lemon law for motor vehicle purchases in Victoria was conducted by Ms Janice Munt MP, with the assistance of Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV). CAV released an Issues Paper to canvas with industry and the community options for the development and introduction of a motor vehicle lemon law.(Consumer Affairs Victoria, Introducing Victorian motor vehicle lemon laws, Issues Paper, (September, 2007). 3. A CAV report prepared by Janice Munt MP was released in July, 2008 (Consumer Affairs Victoria, Motor Cars: A report on the motor vehicle lemon law consultations (July 2008) (Victorian Lemon Law Report). However, the Victorian proposal was overtaken by events leading to the adoption of a uniform consumer protection law in all Australian jurisdictions, the ACL. 4. The structure of this submission is to consider first the three different bases upon which consumers can obtain relief for economic loss arising from defects in motor vehicles. The second part of the submission considers the difficulties encountered by consumers in litigating motor vehicle disputes in the courts and tribunals. The third part of the submission examines the approach taken in other jurisdictions to resolving motor vehicle disputes. The final part of the submission considers a number of possible reforms that could be made to the existing law and its enforcement to reduce consumer detriment arising from the purchase of ‘lemon’ motor vehicles. 5. There are three principal bases upon which a consumer can obtain redress for defects in new motor vehicles under the ACL. The first is where the manufacturer admits liability and initiates the voluntary recall procedure provided for in s 128 of the ACL. Under this basis the manufacturer generally repairs or replaces the part subject to the recall free of charge. The second basis is where the manufacturer or dealer denies liability and the consumer is initiates proceedings in the court or tribunal seeking a statutory remedy under the ACL, the nature of which will depend on whether the failure to comply with the consumer guarantee was major or not. The third basis upon which a consumer can obtain redress is pursuant to public enforcement by the ACCC. Each basis will be considered in this part. What all three bases have in common is the need to conduct an investigation to identify the nature of the defect and how it arose.

The implication of a term of good faith in commercial leases

Much has been written in the past decade on the subject of the implication of a term of good faith in contracts in Australia, particularly since the judgment Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. Except for an early article by Rachael Mulheron, 'Good Faith and Commercial Leases: New Opportunities for the Tenant' (1996) 4 APLJ 223, very little else has been written with respect to the possible application of the doctrine to the commercial leases.With the advent of two later New South Wales Supreme Court decisions Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 and, more recently, Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264, the question of the application of the doctrine in the commercial leasing context has been examined. This article briefly considers the nature and substance of the doctrine against the background of the relationship of lessor and lessee and examines in some depth the Australian decisions on commercial leases where it has been sought, unsuccessfully, to apply the doctrine. The article concludes by suggesting that as a standard commercial lease usually covers the field of agreement between lessor and lessee and as a lessee has a high degree of statutory protection derived from equitable principles, there may be little room for the operation of the doctrine in this legal environment.

The implication of a term of good faith in commercial leases — A brief response

By way of response to Professor Duncan's article,1 this article examines the theoretical basis for the implication of contractual terms, particularly the implication of a term at law. In this regard the recent decision of Barrett J in Overlook v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17 is considered, to the extent that it provides guidance concerning the implication of an obligation of good faith in the context of a commercial contract. A number of observations are made which may be considered likely to have application to the relationship of commercial landlord and tenant. The conclusion reached is that although the commercial landlord and tenant contractual relationship is highly regulated, this may not deny a remedy to a tenant who is the victim of a landlord's 'bad faith'. Finally, the article concludes by considering the extent to which it may be possible to contractually exclude the implied obligation of good faith.

Regulating Multi-National Corporations Through State-Based Laws : Problems with Enforcing Human Rights Under The Alien Tort Statute

Under the Alien Tort Statute United States of America (“America”) Federal Courts have the jurisdiction to hear claims for civil wrongs, committed against non-American citizens, which were perpetrated outside America’s national borders. The operation of this law has confronted American Federal Courts with difficulties on how to manage conflicts between American executive foreign policy and judicial interpretations of international law. Courts began to pass judgment over conduct which was approved by foreign governments. Then in 2005 the American Supreme Court wound back the scope of the Alien Tort Statute. This article will review the problems with the expansion of the Alien Tort Statute and the reasons for its subsequent narrowing.