A Submission to the Inquiry into the Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Bill 2008 (Cth)

A right of resale, or droit de suite (a right to follow), is a legislative instrument under intellectual property law, which enables artists to receive a percentage of the sale price whenever artistic works are resold. A French legal scholar, Albert Vaunois, first articulated the need for a 'droit de suite' in connection with fine art back in 1893. The French Government introduced a scheme to protect the right of resale in 1920, after controversy over artists living in poverty, while public auction houses were profiting from the resale of their artistic creations. In the United States, there has been less support for a right of resale amongst legislatures. After lobbying from artists such as the king of pop art, Robert Rauschenberg, the state of California passed the Resale Royalties Act in 1977. At a Federal level, the United States Congress has shown some reluctance in providing national recognition for a right of resale in the United States. A number of other European countries have established a right of resale. In 2001, the European Council adopted the Artists' Resale directive and recognised that the 'artist's resale right forms an integral part of copyright and is an essential prerogative for authors.' In 2006, the United Kingdom promulgated regulations, giving effect to a right of resale in that jurisdiction. However, a number of Latin American and African countries have established a right of resale. The New Zealand Parliament has debated a bill on a right of resale.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

Spontaneous and episodic volunteers: The legislative, insurance and risk management framework

Baby Boomers are a generation of life long association joiners, but following generations prefer spontaneous and episodic volunteering. This trend is apparent not only during natural disasters, but in most other spheres of volunteering. Legal liability for such volunteers is a growing concern, which unresolved, may dampen civic participation. We critically examine the current treatment of these liabilities through legislation, insurance and risk management.

From council dog catcher to critical scholar

Carol and I just missed each other in the early 1990s: Carol left Manchester for Australia in 1990, while I an·iv·ed in Manchester from Australia in 1993. Sixteen years later and on the very opposite side of the world, we found ourselves sharing an adjacent room during the 2009 Agri-Food Research Network conference in Auckland. Carol was already an accomplished sociologist; I was a newbie PhD student, presenting on a thesis topic that was only just starting to take shape...

A Story of Organized Crime: Constructing Criminality and Building Institutions

This is a narrative about the way in which a category of crime-to-be-combated is constructed through the discipline of criminology and the agents of discipline in criminal justice. The aim was to examine organized crime through the eyes of those whose job it is to fight it (and define it), and in doing so investigate the ways social problems surface as sites for state intervention. A genealogy of organized crime within criminological thought was completed, demonstrating that there are a range of different ways organized crime has been constructed within the social scientific discipline, and each of these were influenced by the social context, political winds and intellectual climate of the time. Following this first finding, in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with individuals who had worked at the apex of the policing of organized crime in Australia, in order to trace their understandings of organized crime across recent history. It was found that organized crime can be understood as an object of the discourse of the politics of law and order, the discourse of international securitization, new public management in policing business, and involves the forging of outlaw identities. Therefore, there are multiple meanings of organized crime that have arisen from an interconnected set of social, political, moral and bureaucratic discourses. The institutional response to organized crime, including law and policing, was subsequently examined. An extensive legislative framework has been enacted at multiple jurisdictional levels, and the problem of organized crime was found to be deserving of unique institutional powers and configurations to deal with it. The social problem of organized crime, as constituted by the discourses mapped out in this research, has led to a new generation of increasingly preemptive and punitive laws, and the creation of new state agencies with amplified powers. That is, the response to organized crime, with a focus on criminalization and enforcement, has been driven and shaped by the four discourses and the way in which the phenomenon is constructed within them. An appreciation of the nexus between the emergence of the social problem, and the formation of institutions in response to it, is important in developing a more complete understanding of the various dimensions of organized crime.

Assessing taxpayer response to legislative changes: A case study of ‘in-house’ fringe benefits rules

On 22 October 2012, the Australian Federal Government announced the removal of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession when used as part of a salary packaging arrangement. At the time of the announcement, the Federal Government predicted that the removal of the concession would contribute additional tax revenue of $445 million over the following four years as well as an increase of GST payments to the States and Territories. However, anecdotal evidence at the same time indicated that the Australian employer response was to immediately stop providing employees with such in-house fringe benefits via salary sacrificing arrangements. Data presented in this article, collected from a combination of interviews with tax managers of four Australian entities as well as a review of the published archival data, confirms that the abolition of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession was perceived as a negative change, whereby employees were considered the ‘big losers’ despite assertions by the Federal Government to the contrary. Using a conceptual map of tax rule change developed by Oats and Sadler, this article seeks to understand the reasons for this fringe benefits tax change and taxpayer response. In particular, the economic and political factors, and the responses of the relevant taxpayers (employers) are explored. Drawing on behavioural economic concepts, the actions, attitudes and response of employers to the rule change are also examined. The research findings suggest that the decision by Australian employers to cease providing the in-house fringe benefits as part of a salary-packaging arrangement after the legislative amendment was impacted by more than simple rational behaviour.

Trade wars in the TRIPS Council: Intellectual property, technology transfer, and climate change

This Chapter considers the geopolitical conflicts in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, it focuses upon debates in the TRIPS Council on the topic of patent law and clean energy in 2013 and 2014. The chapter highlights the development agenda of a number of developing countries who are keen for access to clean energy to combat climate change and global warming. It also considers the mixed contributions of members of the BRICS/ BASIC group – including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. This chapter highlights the intellectual property maximalist position of a number of developed countries on intellectual property, climate change, and trade. Seeking to overcome this conflict and stalemate, this Chapter puts forward both procedural and substantial reform options in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Council and the WTO. It also flags that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 could well be displaced by the rise of mega-regional trade agreements – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Should we extend 'Care' or 'care'?

A discursive article examining the proposition that provisions for young people in care should be formally extended beyond their 18th birthday when care normally ends. Debate exists as to whether this should include a legislative extension to Care as has happened in some overseas jurisdictions or whether it is more appropriate to simply extend access to dedicated support provisions. The article concludes that both may have a place as long as the complexity of young people's situations is adequately responded to.