Modeling and Verification of Privacy Enhancing Protocols

Privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) are a family of protocols that allow secure exchange and management of sensitive user information. They are important in preserving users’ privacy in today’s open environment. Proof of the correctness of PEPs is necessary before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable security approach, though well established for verifying cryptographic primitives, is not applicable to PEPs. We apply the formal method of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of a representative PEP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification allow us to reason about various security properties of PIEMCP using state space analysis techniques. This investigation provides us with preliminary insights for modeling and verification of PEPs in general, demonstrating the benefit of applying the CPN-based formal approach to proving the correctness of PEPs.

A multiple-control fuzzy vault

We introduce multiple-control fuzzy vaults allowing generalised threshold, compartmented and multilevel access structure. The presented schemes enable many useful applications employing multiple users and/or multiple locking sets. Introducing the original single control fuzzy vault of Juels and Sudan we identify several similarities and differences between their vault and secret sharing schemes which influence how best to obtain working generalisations. We design multiple-control fuzzy vaults suggesting applications using biometric credentials as locking and unlocking values. Furthermore we assess the security of our obtained generalisations for insider/ outsider attacks and examine the access-complexity for legitimate vault owners.

An administrative model for UCON

UCON is an emerging access control framework that lacks an administration model. In this paper we define the problem of administration and propose a novel administrative model. At the core of this model is the concept of attribute, which is also the central component of UCON. In our model, attributes are created by the assertions of subjects, which ascribe properties/rights to other subjects or objects. Through such a treatment of attributes, administration capabilities can be delegated from one subject to another and as a consequence UCON is improved in three aspects. First, immutable attributes that are currently considered as external to the model can be incorporated and thereby treated as mutable at- tributes. Second, the current arbitrary categorisation of users (as modifiers of attributes), to system and administrator can be removed. Attributes and objects are only modifiable by those who possess administration capability over them. Third, the delegation of administration over objects and properties that is not currently expressible in UCON is made possible.

One-time-password-authenticated key exchange

To reduce the damage of phishing and spyware attacks, banks, governments, and other security-sensitive industries are deploying one-time password systems, where users have many passwords and use each password only once. If a single password is compromised, it can be only be used to impersonate the user once, limiting the damage caused. However, existing practical approaches to one-time passwords have been susceptible to sophisticated phishing attacks. ---------- We give a formal security treatment of this important practical problem. We consider the use of one-time passwords in the context of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE), which allows for mutual authentication, session key agreement, and resistance to phishing attacks. We describe a security model for the use of one-time passwords, explicitly considering the compromise of past (and future) one-time passwords, and show a general technique for building a secure one-time-PAKE protocol from any secure PAKE protocol. Our techniques also allow for the secure use of pseudorandomly generated and time-dependent passwords.

Detection and prevention of distributed denial of services attacks by collaborative effort of software agents, first prototype implementation

Distributed Denial of Services DDoS, attacks has become one of the biggest threats for resources over Internet. Purpose of these attacks is to make servers deny from providing services to legitimate users. These attacks are also used for occupying media bandwidth. Currently intrusion detection systems can just detect the attacks but cannot prevent / track the location of intruders. Some schemes also prevent the attacks by simply discarding attack packets, which saves victim from attack, but still network bandwidth is wasted. In our opinion, DDoS requires a distributed solution to save wastage of resources. The paper, presents a system that helps us not only in detecting such attacks but also helps in tracing and blocking (to save the bandwidth as well) the multiple intruders using Intelligent Software Agents. The system gives dynamic response and can be integrated with the existing network defense systems without disturbing existing Internet model. We have implemented an agent based networking monitoring system in this regard.

Monitoring and analysis of internet traffic targeting unused address spaces

Today’s evolving networks are experiencing a large number of different attacks ranging from system break-ins, infection from automatic attack tools such as worms, viruses, trojan horses and denial of service (DoS). One important aspect of such attacks is that they are often indiscriminate and target Internet addresses without regard to whether they are bona fide allocated or not. Due to the absence of any advertised host services the traffic observed on unused IP addresses is by definition unsolicited and likely to be either opportunistic or malicious. The analysis of large repositories of such traffic can be used to extract useful information about both ongoing and new attack patterns and unearth unusual attack behaviors. However, such an analysis is difficult due to the size and nature of the collected traffic on unused address spaces. In this dissertation, we present a network traffic analysis technique which uses traffic collected from unused address spaces and relies on the statistical properties of the collected traffic, in order to accurately and quickly detect new and ongoing network anomalies. Detection of network anomalies is based on the concept that an anomalous activity usually transforms the network parameters in such a way that their statistical properties no longer remain constant, resulting in abrupt changes. In this dissertation, we use sequential analysis techniques to identify changes in the behavior of network traffic targeting unused address spaces to unveil both ongoing and new attack patterns. Specifically, we have developed a dynamic sliding window based non-parametric cumulative sum change detection techniques for identification of changes in network traffic. Furthermore we have introduced dynamic thresholds to detect changes in network traffic behavior and also detect when a particular change has ended. Experimental results are presented that demonstrate the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach, using both synthetically generated datasets and real network traces collected from a dedicated block of unused IP addresses.

Dealing with temporal inconsistency in automated computer forensic profiling

Computer profiling is the automated forensic examination of a computer system in order to provide a human investigator with a characterisation of the activities that have taken place on that system. As part of this process, the logical components of the computer system – components such as users, files and applications - are enumerated and the relationships between them discovered and reported. This information is enriched with traces of historical activity drawn from system logs and from evidence of events found in the computer file system. A potential problem with the use of such information is that some of it may be inconsistent and contradictory thus compromising its value. This work examines the impact of temporal inconsistency in such information and discusses two types of temporal inconsistency that may arise – inconsistency arising out of the normal errant behaviour of a computer system, and inconsistency arising out of deliberate tampering by a suspect – and techniques for dealing with inconsistencies of the latter kind. We examine the impact of deliberate tampering through experiments conducted with prototype computer profiling software. Based on the results of these experiments, we discuss techniques which can be employed in computer profiling to deal with such temporal inconsistencies.

Towards a game theoretic authorisation model

Authorised users (insiders) are behind the majority of security incidents with high financial impacts. Because authorisation is the process of controlling users’ access to resources, improving authorisation techniques may mitigate the insider threat. Current approaches to authorisation suffer from the assumption that users will (can) not depart from the expected behaviour implicit in the authorisation policy. In reality however, users can and do depart from the canonical behaviour. This paper argues that the conflict of interest between insiders and authorisation mechanisms is analogous to the subset of problems formally studied in the field of game theory. It proposes a game theoretic authorisation model that can ensure users’ potential misuse of a resource is explicitly considered while making an authorisation decision. The resulting authorisation model is dynamic in the sense that its access decisions vary according to the changes in explicit factors that influence the cost of misuse for both the authorisation mechanism and the insider.

Encryption safe harbours and data breach notification laws

Data breach notification laws require organisations to notify affected persons or regulatory authorities when an unauthorised acquisition of personal data occurs. Most laws provide a safe harbour to this obligation if acquired data has been encrypted. There are three types of safe harbour: an exemption; a rebuttable presumption and factor-based analysis. We demonstrate, using three condition-based scenarios, that the broad formulation of most encryption safe harbours is based on the flawed assumption that encryption is the silver bullet for personal information protection. We then contend that reliance upon an encryption safe harbour should be dependent upon a rigorous and competent risk-based review that is required on a case-by-case basis. Finally, we recommend the use of both an encryption safe harbour and a notification trigger as our preferred choice for a data breach notification regulatory framework.

The mobile phone as a multi OTP device using trusted computing

The rapid growth in the number of online services leads to an increasing number of different digital identities each user needs to manage. As a result, many people feel overloaded with credentials, which in turn negatively impact their ability to manage them securely. Passwords are perhaps the most common type of credential used today. To avoid the tedious task of remembering difficult passwords, users often behave less securely by using low entropy and weak passwords. Weak passwords and bad password habits represent security threats to online services. Some solutions have been developed to eliminate the need for users to create and manage passwords. A typical solution is based on giving the user a hardware token that generates one-time-passwords, i.e. passwords for single session or transaction usage. Unfortunately, most of these solutions do not satisfy scalability and/or usability requirements, or they are simply insecure. In this paper, we propose a scalable OTP solution using mobile phones and based on trusted computing technology that combines enhanced usability with strong security.

Continuous biometric authentication : can it be more practical?

Continuous biometric authentication schemes (CBAS) are built around the biometrics supplied by user behavioural characteristics and continuously check the identity of the user throughout the session. The current literature for CBAS primarily focuses on the accuracy of the system in order to reduce false alarms. However, these attempts do not consider various issues that might affect practicality in real world applications and continuous authentication scenarios. One of the main issues is that the presented CBAS are based on several samples of training data either of both intruder and valid users or only the valid users' profile. This means that historical profiles for either the legitimate users or possible attackers should be available or collected before prediction time. However, in some cases it is impractical to gain the biometric data of the user in advance (before detection time). Another issue is the variability of the behaviour of the user between the registered profile obtained during enrollment, and the profile from the testing phase. The aim of this paper is to identify the limitations in current CBAS in order to make them more practical for real world applications. Also, the paper discusses a new application for CBAS not requiring any training data either from intruders or from valid users.

Mutual protection in a cloud computing environment

The term “cloud computing” has emerged as a major ICT trend and has been acknowledged by respected industry survey organizations as a key technology and market development theme for the industry and ICT users in 2010. However, one of the major challenges that faces the cloud computing concept and its global acceptance is how to secure and protect the data and processes that are the property of the user. The security of the cloud computing environment is a new research area requiring further development by both the academic and industrial research communities. Today, there are many diverse and uncoordinated efforts underway to address security issues in cloud computing and, especially, the identity management issues. This paper introduces an architecture for a new approach to necessary “mutual protection” in the cloud computing environment, based upon a concept of mutual trust and the specification of definable profiles in vector matrix form. The architecture aims to achieve better, more generic and flexible authentication, authorization and control, based on a concept of mutuality, within that cloud computing environment.

Strengthening and formally verifying privacy in identity management systems

In a digital world, users’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is normally managed with a system called an Identity Management System (IMS). There are many types of IMSs. There are situations when two or more IMSs need to communicate with each other (such as when a service provider needs to obtain some identity information about a user from a trusted identity provider). There could be interoperability issues when communicating parties use different types of IMS. To facilitate interoperability between different IMSs, an Identity Meta System (IMetS) is normally used. An IMetS can, at least theoretically, join various types of IMSs to make them interoperable and give users the illusion that they are interacting with just one IMS. However, due to the complexity of an IMS, attempting to join various types of IMSs is a technically challenging task, let alone assessing how well an IMetS manages to integrate these IMSs. The first contribution of this thesis is the development of a generic IMS model called the Layered Identity Infrastructure Model (LIIM). Using this model, we develop a set of properties that an ideal IMetS should provide. This idealized form is then used as a benchmark to evaluate existing IMetSs. Different types of IMS provide varying levels of privacy protection support. Unfortunately, as observed by Jøsang et al (2007), there is insufficient privacy protection in many of the existing IMSs. In this thesis, we study and extend a type of privacy enhancing technology known as an Anonymous Credential System (ACS). In particular, we extend the ACS which is built on the cryptographic primitives proposed by Camenisch, Lysyanskaya, and Shoup. We call this system the Camenisch, Lysyanskaya, Shoup - Anonymous Credential System (CLS-ACS). The goal of CLS-ACS is to let users be as anonymous as possible. Unfortunately, CLS-ACS has problems, including (1) the concentration of power to a single entity - known as the Anonymity Revocation Manager (ARM) - who, if malicious, can trivially reveal a user’s PII (resulting in an illegal revocation of the user’s anonymity), and (2) poor performance due to the resource-intensive cryptographic operations required. The second and third contributions of this thesis are the proposal of two protocols that reduce the trust dependencies on the ARM during users’ anonymity revocation. Both protocols distribute trust from the ARM to a set of n referees (n > 1), resulting in a significant reduction of the probability of an anonymity revocation being performed illegally. The first protocol, called the User Centric Anonymity Revocation Protocol (UCARP), allows a user’s anonymity to be revoked in a user-centric manner (that is, the user is aware that his/her anonymity is about to be revoked). The second protocol, called the Anonymity Revocation Protocol with Re-encryption (ARPR), allows a user’s anonymity to be revoked by a service provider in an accountable manner (that is, there is a clear mechanism to determine which entity who can eventually learn - and possibly misuse - the identity of the user). The fourth contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a protocol called the Private Information Escrow bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). This protocol is designed to address the performance issue of CLS-ACS by applying the CLS-ACS in a federated single sign-on (FSSO) environment. Our analysis shows that PIEMCP can both reduce the amount of expensive modular exponentiation operations required and lower the risk of illegal revocation of users’ anonymity. Finally, the protocols proposed in this thesis are complex and need to be formally evaluated to ensure that their required security properties are satisfied. In this thesis, we use Coloured Petri nets (CPNs) and its corresponding state space analysis techniques. All of the protocols proposed in this thesis have been formally modeled and verified using these formal techniques. Therefore, the fifth contribution of this thesis is a demonstration of the applicability of CPN and its corresponding analysis techniques in modeling and verifying privacy enhancing protocols. To our knowledge, this is the first time that CPN has been comprehensively applied to model and verify privacy enhancing protocols. From our experience, we also propose several CPN modeling approaches, including complex cryptographic primitives (such as zero-knowledge proof protocol) modeling, attack parameterization, and others. The proposed approaches can be applied to other security protocols, not just privacy enhancing protocols.