Physiological, perceptual and technical responses to on-court tennis training on hard and clay courts

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of court surface (clay v hard-court) on technical, physiological and perceptual responses to on-court training. Four high-performance junior male players performed two identical training sessions on hard and clay courts, respectively. Sessions included both physical conditioning and technical elements as led by the coach. Each session was filmed for later notational analysis of stroke count and error rates. Further, players wore a global positioning satellite device to measure distance covered during each session; whilst heart rate, countermovement jump distance and capillary blood measures of metabolites were measured before, during and following each session. Additionally a respective coach and athlete rating of perceived exertion (RPE) were measured following each session. Total duration and distance covered during of each session were comparable (P>0.05; d<0.20). While forehand and backhands stroke volume did not differ between sessions (P>0.05; d<0.30); large effects for increased unforced and forced errors were present on the hard court (P>0.05; d>0.90). Furthermore, large effects for increased heart rate, blood lactate and RPE values were evident on clay compared to hard courts (P>0.05; d>0.90). Additionally, while player and coach RPE on hard courts were similar, there were large effects for coaches to underrate the RPE of players on clay courts (P>0.05; d>0.90). In conclusion, training on clay courts results in trends for increased heart rate, lactate and RPE values, suggesting sessions on clay tend towards higher physiological and perceptual loads than hard courts. Further, coaches appear effective at rating player RPE on hard courts, but may underrate the perceived exertion of sessions on clay courts.

Allegations of child sexual abuse in family court cases : a qualitative analysis of psychiatric evidence

Allegations of child sexual abuse in Family Court cases have gained increasing attention. The study investigates factors involved in Family Court cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse. A qualitative methodology was employed to examine Records of Judgement and Psychiatric Reports for 20 cases distilled from the data corpus of 102 cases. A seven-stage methodology was developed utilising a thematic analysis process informed by principles of grounded theory and phenomenology. The explication of eight thematic clusters was undertaken. The findings point to complex issues and dynamics in which child sexual abuse allegations have been raised. The alleging parent’s allegations of sexual abuse against their ex-partner may be: the expression of unconscious deep fears for their children’s welfare, or an action to meet their needs for personal affirmation in the context of the painful upheaval of a relationship break-up. Implications of the findings are discussed.

Federal Court Rules O23 r 11 - offers of compromise - offer for dismissal of claim and to forego recovery of costs.

In Uniline Australia Ltd ACN 010752057 v S Briggs Pty Ltd ACN 007415518 (No 2) [2009] FCA 920 Greenwood J considered a number of principles guiding the exercise of discretion in relation to costs, particularly when offers of compromise have been made under the formal process provided by the Federal Court Rules.

Howzat! The High Court, negligence and indoor cricket

This article examines the High Court case of Woods v Multi-Sport that considers the liability of an indoor cricket centre for an injury sustained by a player. It is a good example of how the issue of breach is dealt with in a sports law context and also shows how difficult it can be to determine when a sporting body will in breach of a duty of care owed to its participants.

Court overrides costs assessment limits

This article considers the implications for Queensland practitioners of the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA 310. That decision involved the question whether the court retained a jurisdiction to examine the reasonableness of costs charged by a barrister, who had entered a costs agreement with solicitors, in circumstances where where had been no application under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) for an assessment of the costs the subject of the bill and it was no longer possible for such an application to be made.

In defence of Victoria's Children's Court : its value and role in the child protection system

Australian child protection systems have been subject to sustained and significant criticism for many decades. As a central part of that system Children’s Courts have been implicated: three recent inquiries into the child protection system in Victoria all criticised the Family Division of the Children’s Court.1 In the resulting debate two diametrically opposed points of view surfaced about the Children’s Court and the role that legal procedures and professionals should play in child protection matters. On one side bodies like the Children’s Court of Victoria, Victoria Legal Aid (‘VLA’), the Law Institute of Victoria (‘LIV’), and the Federation of Community Legal Centres (‘FCLC’) argued that the Children’s Court plays a vital role in child protection and should continue to play that role.2 On the other side a coalition of human service and child protection agencies called for major change including the removal of the Children’s Court from the child protection system. Victoria’s Department of Human Services (‘DHS’) has been critical of the Court3 as have community sector organisations like Anglicare, Berry Street, MacKillop Family Services and the Salvation Army — all agencies the DHS funds to deliver child protection services.4 Victoria’s Child Safety Commissioner has also called for major reform, publicly labelling the Court a ‘lawyers’ playground’ and recommending abolishing the Court’s involvement in child protection completely.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 – whether refusal to stay execution of costs is an order “as to costs only”

In Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2009] QCA 92 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the scope of an order “as to costs only” within the meaning of s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (‘the Act”). The Court also declined to accept submissions from one of the parties after oral hearing, and made some useful comments which serve as a reminder to practitioners of their obligations in that regard.

Disclosure obligations on ex parte application for freezing order - duty of practitioners to the court - failure to comply with duty - serious dereliction of duty to court - supplemental order for costs against solicitors personally

The decision of Applegarth J in Heartwood Architectural & Joinery Pty Ltd v Redchip Lawyers [2009] QSC 195 (27 July 2009) involved a costs order against solicitors personally. This decision is but one of several recent decisions in which the court has been persuaded that the circumstances justified costs orders against legal practitioners on the indemnity basis. These decisions serve as a reminder to practitioners of their disclosure obligations when seeking any interlocutory relief in an ex parte application. These obligations are now clearly set out in r 14.4 of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 and r 25 of 2007 Barristers Rule. Inexperience or ignorance will not excuse breaches of the duties owed to the court.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Court-provided trial presentation technology : the way of the future?

The trial in Covecorp Constructions Pty Ltd v Indigo Projects Pty Ltd (File no BS 10157 of 2001; BS 2763 of 2002) commenced on 8 October 2007 before Fryberg J, but the matter settled on 6 November 2007 before the conclusion of the trial. This case was conducted as an “electronic trial” with the use of technology developed within the court. This was the first case in Queensland to employ this technology at trial level. The Court’s aim was to find a means to capture the key benefits which are offered by the more sophisticated trial presentation software of commercial service providers, in a way that was inexpensive for the parties and would facilitate the adoption of technology at trial much more broadly than has been the case to date.

Judicial intervention in the affairs of unincorporated religious associations in New South Wales

The leading Australian High Court case of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 confirmed that associations which are 'social, sporting, political, scientific, religious, artistic or humanitarian in character’, and not formed ‘for private gain or material advantage’, are usually formed on a basis of mutual consent. Unless there is some clear, positive indication that the members wish to relate to each other in a legal fashion, the rules of the association will not be treated as an enforceable contract in contrast to the rules of incorporated bodies. Australian unincorporated associations experiencing internal disputes, like those in most other common law jurisdictions, have found courts reluctant to provide a remedy unless there is a proprietary interest or trust to protect. This is further compounded by the judicial view that an unincorporated association has no legal recognition as a ‘juristic person’. The right to hold property and the ability to sue and be sued are incidences of this recognition. By contrast, the law recognises ‘artificial’ legal persons such as corporations, who are given rights to hold property and to sue and be sued. However, when a number of individuals associate together for a non-commercial, lawful purpose, but not by way of a corporate structure, legal recognition ‘as a group’ is denied. Since 1934, a significant number of cases have distinguished or otherwise declined to follow this precedent of the High Court. A trenchant criticism is found in McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295, 298 where Wootten J said that ‘citizens are entitled to look to the courts for the same assistance in resolving disputes about the conduct of sporting, political and social organisations as they can expect in relation to commercial institutions’. According to Wootten J at 298, if disputes are not settled by the courts, this would create a ‘legal-no-man's land, in which disputes are settled not in accordance with justice and the fulfilment of deliberately undertaken obligations, but by deceit, craftiness, and an arrogant disregard of rights’. Cameron v Hogan was decided in 1934. There is an increasing volume of first instance cases which distinguish or, in the words of Palmer J, ‘just pay lip service’ to this High Court decision. (Coleman v Liberal Party of Australia (2007) 212 FLR 271, 278). The dissenting cases seem to call for a judicial policy initiative. This would require recognition by judges that voluntary associations play a significant role in society and that members have a legitimate, enforceable expectation that the rules of the association will be observed by members and in the last resort, enforced by the courts without the need to prove contractual intention, the existence of a trust or the existence of a right of a proprietary nature. This thesis asks: what legal, as distinct from political, redress does an ordinary member have, when a rule is made or a process followed which is contrary to the underlying doctrines and philosophies embodied in the constitutional documents of an unincorporated religious association? When, if at all, will a court intervene to ensure doctrinal purity or to supervise the daily life of a large unincorporated religious association? My research objective is to examine and analyse leading cases and relevant legislation on the enforceability of the constitutions of large, unincorporated, religious associations with particular reference to the Anglican Church in New South Wales. Given its numerical size, wide geographical spread and presence since the foundation of New South Wales, the Anglican Church in New South Wales, contains a sufficient variety of ‘real life’ situations to be representative of the legal issues posed by Cameron v Hogan which may be faced by other large, unincorporated, religious associations in New South Wales. In contemporary society, large, unincorporated, religious associations play an important community role. The resolution of internal disputes in such associations should not remain captive to legal doctrines of an earlier age.

Insights into special costs orders : WA court examines compliance and retrospectivity

In Walter v Buckeridge [No.5] [2012] WASC 495 Le Miere J considered an application by the defendants for special costs orders under the applicable legislation in Western Australia. Aspects of the decision may be of persuasive value in dealing with similar issues under Queensland legislation.

Environmental constitutional reform in the developing world : shifting the perspective of international law?

In recent years a growing number of states have chosen to recognise environmental issues in their national constitutions. Some have added declarations about the value of the environment, some have sought to restrict or regulate government’s ability to take action which would potentially harm the environment, while others have proclaimed that citizens possess a right to an environment of a particular quality. A survey of these constitutional provisions reveals that the majority of reform in this area has come from developing states, including a number of states which have been designated as among the least developed countries in the world. The increasing focus on constitutional environmental rights appears to represent a shift in the attitude of developing and emerging economies, which could in turn be influential in setting the tone of the environmental rights debate more broadly, with potential to shape the future development of international law in the area. This chapter examines constitutional environmental rights in an attempt to determine whether consistent state practice can in fact be identified in this area which might form the basis of an emerging norm. It will also analyse some of the potential contributing factors to the proliferation of a constitutional right to a good environment among developing states, and the implications for the development of customary international law.

Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments : are the rules appropriate?

The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is an aspect of private international law, and concerns situations where a successful party to litigation seeks to rely on a judgment obtained in one court, in a court in another jurisdiction. The most common example where the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may arise is where a party who has obtained a favourable judgment in one state or country may seek to recognise and enforce the judgment in another state or country. This occurs because there is no sufficient asset in the state or country where the judgment was rendered to satisfy that judgment. As technological advancements in communications over vast geographical distances have improved exponentially in recent years, there has been an increase in cross-border transactions, as well as litigation arising from these transactions. As a result, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is of increasing importance, since a party who has obtained a judgment in cross-border litigation may wish to recognise and enforce the judgment in another state or country, where the defendant’s assets may be located without having to re-litigate substantive issues that have already been resolved in another court. The purpose of the study is to examine whether the current state of laws for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Australia, the United States and the European Community are in line with modern-commercial needs. The study is conducted by weighing two competing objectives between the notion of finality of litigation, which encourages courts to recognise and enforce judgments foreign to them, on the one hand, and the adequacy of protection to safeguard the recognition and enforcement proceedings, so that there would be no injustice or unfairness if a foreign judgment is recognised and enforced, on the other. The findings of the study are as follows. In both Australia and the United States, there is a different approach concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by courts interstate or in a foreign country. In order to maintain a single and integrated nation, there are constitutional and legislative requirements authorising courts to give conclusive effects to interstate judgments. In contrast, if the recognition and enforcement actions involve judgments rendered by a foreign country’s court, an Australian or a United States court will not recognise and enforce the foreign judgment unless the judgment has satisfied a number of requirements and does not fall under any of the exceptions to justify its non-recognition and non-enforcement. In the European Community, the Brussels I Regulation which governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments among European Union Member States has created a scheme, whereby there is only a minimal requirement that needs to be satisfied for the purposes of recognition and enforcement. Moreover, a judgment that is rendered by a Member State and based on any of the jurisdictional bases set forth in the Brussels I Regulation is entitled to be recognised and enforced in another Member State without further review of its underlying jurisdictional basis. However, there are concerns as to the adequacy of protection available under the Brussels I Regulation to safeguard the judgment-enforcing Member States, as well as those against whom recognition or enforcement is sought. This dissertation concludes by making two recommendations aimed at improving the means by which foreign judgments are recognised and enforced in the selected jurisdictions. The first is for the law in both Australia and the United States to undergo reform, including: adopting the real and substantial connection test as the new jurisdictional basis for the purposes of recognition and enforcement; liberalising the existing defences to safeguard the application of the real and substantial connection test; extending the application of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) in Australia to include at least its important trading partners; and implementing a federal statutory scheme in the United States to govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The second recommendation is to introduce a convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The convention will be a convention double, which provides uniform standards for the rules of jurisdiction a court in a contracting state must exercise when rendering a judgment and a set of provisions for the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments.

Submission to expert panel on constitutional recognition of Indigenous people

Submission recommended addition of a new 'self-enacting' preamble and enacting words to the Commownealth Constitution, and replacement of the 'race power' by a series of more specific powers relating to the recognition of native title and laws of the indigenous people.