Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks

This chapter presents a comparative survey of recent key management (key distribution, discovery, establishment and update) solutions for wireless sensor networks. We consider both distributed and hierarchical sensor network architectures where unicast, multicast and broadcast types of communication take place. Probabilistic, deterministic and hybrid key management solutions are presented, and we determine a set of metrics to quantify their security properties and resource usage such as processing, storage and communication overheads. We provide a taxonomy of solutions, and identify trade-offs in these schemes to conclude that there is no one-size-fits-all solution.

Combinatorial design of key distribution mechanisms for wireless sensor networks

Key distribution is one of the most challenging security issues in wireless sensor networks where sensor nodes are randomly scattered over a hostile territory. In such a sensor deployment scenario, there will be no prior knowledge of post deployment configuration. For security solutions requiring pairwise keys, it is impossible to decide how to distribute key pairs to sensor nodes before the deployment. Existing approaches to this problem are to assign more than one key, namely a key-chain, to each node. Key-chains are randomly drawn from a key-pool. Either two neighboring nodes have a key in common in their key-chains, or there is a path, called key-path, among these two nodes where each pair of neighboring nodes on this path has a key in common. Problem in such a solution is to decide on the key-chain size and key-pool size so that every pair of nodes can establish a session key directly or through a path with high probability. The size of the key-path is the key factor for the efficiency of the design. This paper presents novel, deterministic and hybrid approaches based on Combinatorial Design for key distribution. In particular, several block design techniques are considered for generating the key-chains and the key-pools.

Framework for evaluating collaborative intrusion detection systems

Securing IT infrastructures of our modern lives is a challenging task because of their increasing complexity, scale and agile nature. Monolithic approaches such as using stand-alone firewalls and IDS devices for protecting the perimeter cannot cope with complex malwares and multistep attacks. Collaborative security emerges as a promising approach. But, research results in collaborative security are not mature, yet, and they require continuous evaluation and testing. In this work, we present CIDE, a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Extension for the network security simulation platform ( NeSSi 2 ). Built-in functionalities include dynamic group formation based on node preferences, group-internal communication, group management and an approach for handling the infection process for malware-based attacks. The CIDE simulation environment provides functionalities for easy implementation of collaborating nodes in large-scale setups. We evaluate the group communication mechanism on the one hand and provide a case study and evaluate our collaborative security evaluation platform in a signature exchange scenario on the other.

Teams rather than individuals : collaborative intrusion detection

We propose CIMD (Collaborative Intrusion and Malware Detection), a scheme for the realization of collaborative intrusion detection approaches. We argue that teams, respectively detection groups with a common purpose for intrusion detection and response, improve the measures against malware. CIMD provides a collaboration model, a decentralized group formation and an anonymous communication scheme. Participating agents can convey intrusion detection related objectives and associated interests for collaboration partners. These interests are based on intrusion objectives and associated interests for collaboration partners. These interests are based on intrusion detection related ontology, incorporating network and hardware configurations and detection capabilities. Anonymous Communication provided by CIMD allows communication beyond suspicion, i.e. the adversary can not perform better than guessing an IDS to be the source of a message at random. The evaluation takes place with the help of NeSSi² (www.nessi2.de), the Network Security Simulator, a dedicated environment for analysis of attacks and countermeasures in mid-scale and large-scale networks. A CIMD prototype is being built based on the JIAC agent framework(www.jiac.de).

Background to the development of a curriculum for the history of “cyber” and “communications” security

For any discipline to be regarded as a professional undertaking by which its members may be treated as true “professionals” in a specific area, practitioners must clearly understand that discipline’s history as well as the place and significance of that history in current practice as well as its relevance to available technologies and artefacts at the time. This is common for many professional disciplines such as medicine, pharmacy, engineering, law and so on but not yet, this paper submits, in information technology. Based on twenty five elapsed years of experience in developing and delivering Cybersecurity courses at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, this paper proposes a rationale and set of differing perspectives for the planning and development of curricula relevant to the delivery of appropriate courses in the history of cybersecurity or information assurance to information and communications technology (ICT) students and thus to potential information technology professionals.

The power of hands-on exercises in SCADA cyber security education

For decades Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have used computers to monitor and control physical processes in many critical industries, including electricity generation, gas pipelines, water distribution, waste treatment, communications and transportation. Increasingly these systems are interconnected with corporate networks via the Internet, making them vulnerable and exposed to the same risks as those experiencing cyber-attacks on a conventional network. Very often SCADA networks services are viewed as a specialty subject, more relevant to engineers than standard IT personnel. Educators from two Australian universities have recognised these cultural issues and highlighted the gap between specialists with SCADA systems engineering skills and the specialists in network security with IT background. This paper describes a learning approach designed to help students to bridge this gap, gain theoretical knowledge of SCADA systems' vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks via experiential learning and acquire practical skills through actively participating in hands-on exercises.

Cyber security of networked critical infrastructures [Guest Editorial]

A new era of cyber warfare has appeared on the horizon with the discovery and detection of Stuxnet. Allegedly planned, designed, and created by the United States and Israel, Stuxnet is considered the first known cyber weapon to attack an adversary state. Stuxnet's discovery put a lot of attention on the outdated and obsolete security of critical infrastructure. It became very apparent that electronic devices that are used to control and operate critical infrastructure like programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems lack very basic security and protection measures. Part of that is due to the fact that when these devices were designed, the idea of exposing them to the Internet was not in mind. However, now with this exposure, these devices and systems are considered easy prey to adversaries.

Information Security and Privacy : Proceedings of the 9th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2004, Sydney, Australia, July 13-15, 2004.

Preface The 9th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2004) was held in Sydney, 13–15 July, 2004. The conference was sponsored by the Centre for Advanced Computing – Algorithms and Cryptography (ACAC), Information and Networked Security Systems Research (INSS), Macquarie University and the Australian Computer Society. The aims of the conference are to bring together researchers and practitioners working in areas of information security and privacy from universities, industry and government sectors. The conference program covered a range of aspects including cryptography, cryptanalysis, systems and network security. The program committee accepted 41 papers from 195 submissions. The reviewing process took six weeks and each paper was carefully evaluated by at least three members of the program committee. We appreciate the hard work of the members of the program committee and external referees who gave many hours of their valuable time. Of the accepted papers, there were nine from Korea, six from Australia, five each from Japan and the USA, three each from China and Singapore, two each from Canada and Switzerland, and one each from Belgium, France, Germany, Taiwan, The Netherlands and the UK. All the authors, whether or not their papers were accepted, made valued contributions to the conference. In addition to the contributed papers, Dr Arjen Lenstra gave an invited talk, entitled Likely and Unlikely Progress in Factoring. This year the program committee introduced the Best Student Paper Award. The winner of the prize for the Best Student Paper was Yan-Cheng Chang from Harvard University for his paper Single Database Private Information Retrieval with Logarithmic Communication. We would like to thank all the people involved in organizing this conference. In particular we would like to thank members of the organizing committee for their time and efforts, Andrina Brennan, Vijayakrishnan Pasupathinathan, Hartono Kurnio, Cecily Lenton, and members from ACAC and INSS.

Formal network behaviour analysis using model checking

In this research we modelled computer network devices to ensure their communication behaviours meet various network standards. By modelling devices as finite-state machines and examining their properties in a range of configurations, we discovered a flaw in a common network protocol and produced a technique to improve organisations' network security against data theft.

Automated feature engineering for HTTP tunnel detection

Generating discriminative input features is a key requirement for achieving highly accurate classifiers. The process of generating features from raw data is known as feature engineering and it can take significant manual effort. In this paper we propose automated feature engineering to derive a suite of additional features from a given set of basic features with the aim of both improving classifier accuracy through discriminative features, and to assist data scientists through automation. Our implementation is specific to HTTP computer network traffic. To measure the effectiveness of our proposal, we compare the performance of a supervised machine learning classifier built with automated feature engineering versus one using human-guided features. The classifier addresses a problem in computer network security, namely the detection of HTTP tunnels. We use Bro to process network traffic into base features and then apply automated feature engineering to calculate a larger set of derived features. The derived features are calculated without favour to any base feature and include entropy, length and N-grams for all string features, and counts and averages over time for all numeric features. Feature selection is then used to find the most relevant subset of these features. Testing showed that both classifiers achieved a detection rate above 99.93% at a false positive rate below 0.01%. For our datasets, we conclude that automated feature engineering can provide the advantages of increasing classifier development speed and reducing development technical difficulties through the removal of manual feature engineering. These are achieved while also maintaining classification accuracy.

A survey and analysis of the GNSS spoofing threat and countermeasures

Detection and prevention of global network satellite system (GNSS) “spoofing” attacks, or the broadcast of false global navigation satellite system services, has recently attracted much research interest. This survey aims to fill three gaps in the literature: first, to assess in detail the exact nature of threat scenarios posed by spoofing against the most commonly cited targets; second, to investigate the many practical impediments, often underplayed, to carrying out GNSS spoofing attacks in the field; and third, to survey and assess the effectiveness of a wide range of proposed defences against GNSS spoofing. Our conclusion lists promising areas of future research.

Password Based Server Aided Key Exchange

We propose a new password-based 3-party protocol with a formal security proof in the standard model. Under reasonable assumptions we show that our new protocol is more efficient than the recent protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval (FC 2005), proven in the random oracle model. We also observe some limitations in the model due to Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval (PKC 2005) for proving security of such protocols.