Academics in the policy process : engagement with Australian media policy inquiries 2011-2013

This paper critically evaluates the series of inquires that the Australian Labor government undertook during 2011-2013 into reform of Australian media, communications and copyright laws. One important driver of policy reform was the government’s commitment to building a National Broadband Network (NBN), and the implications this had for existing broadcasting and telecommunications policy, as it would constitute a major driver of convergence of media and communications access devices and content platforms. These inquiries included: the Convergence Review of media and communications legislation; the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) review of the National Classification Scheme; and the Independent Media Inquiry (Finkelstein Review) into Media and Media Regulation. One unusual feature of this review process was the degree to which academics were involved in the process, not simply as providers of expert opinion, but as review chairs seconded from their universities. This paper considers the role played by activist groups in all of these inquiries and their relationship to the various participants in the inquiries, as well as the implications of academics being engaged in such inquiries, not simply as activist-scholars, but as those primarily responsible for delivering policy review outcomes. The paper draws upon the concept of "policy windows" in order to better understand the context in which the inquiries took place, and their relative lack of legislative impact.

Polly Pocket

Comprised of ten 3 minute and two 12 minutes animated episodes, featuring Polly Pockets and her friend in numerous adventures.

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

Regulating Multi-National Corporations Through State-Based Laws : Problems with Enforcing Human Rights Under The Alien Tort Statute

Under the Alien Tort Statute United States of America (“America”) Federal Courts have the jurisdiction to hear claims for civil wrongs, committed against non-American citizens, which were perpetrated outside America’s national borders. The operation of this law has confronted American Federal Courts with difficulties on how to manage conflicts between American executive foreign policy and judicial interpretations of international law. Courts began to pass judgment over conduct which was approved by foreign governments. Then in 2005 the American Supreme Court wound back the scope of the Alien Tort Statute. This article will review the problems with the expansion of the Alien Tort Statute and the reasons for its subsequent narrowing.

Privacy invasive geo-mashups : privacy 2.0 and the limits of first generation information privacy laws

Online technological advances are pioneering the wider distribution of geospatial information for general mapping purposes. The use of popular web-based applications, such as Google Maps, is ensuring that mapping based applications are becoming commonplace amongst Internet users which has facilitated the rapid growth of geo-mashups. These user generated creations enable Internet users to aggregate and publish information over specific geographical points. This article identifies privacy invasive geo-mashups that involve the unauthorized use of personal information, the inadvertent disclosure of personal information and invasion of privacy issues. Building on Zittrain’s Privacy 2.0, the author contends that first generation information privacy laws, founded on the notions of fair information practices or information privacy principles, may have a limited impact regarding the resolution of privacy problems arising from privacy invasive geo-mashups. Principally because geo-mashups have different patterns of personal information provision, collection, storage and use that reflect fundamental changes in the Web 2.0 environment. The author concludes by recommending embedded technical and social solutions to minimize the risks arising from privacy invasive geo-mashups that could lead to the establishment of guidelines for the general protection of privacy in geo-mashups.

Driving and licensing experiences of learner drivers in two Australian states prior to major changes in the licensing laws

The learner licence is an important component of the graduated driver licensing system. This research describes the driving and licensing experiences of learner drivers in Queensland and New South Wales licensed prior to the changes made to the system in mid-2007. The sample consisted of 392 participants who completed a telephone interview just after they obtained their provisional licence. The results suggest that learner drivers in the two states had many similar experiences when they were obtaining a learner licence. However, once a learner licence was obtained, there were differences in the amount of practice, the supervisor learners practised with, the type of vehicle they used and the amount of unlicensed driving. This paper provides important baseline descriptive data that can be used to measure the impact of the changes that were introduced to the learner licence phase in mid-2007 in both of these states.

National consumer credit laws, financial exclusion and interest rate caps : The case for diversity within a centralised framework

Australia is going through a major reform of consumer credit regulation, with the implementation of a proposal to transfer regulatory responsibility from the State and Territory Governments to the Commonwealth Government. While the broad policy approach is supported, the reform process has missed a significant opportunity to engage directly with issues of financial exclusion and with the potential role of regulation to reduce financial exclusion. The imposition of an interest rate cap can limit the impact of financial exclusion. However, the future of the existing interest rate caps is uncertain, given the diversity of approaches, and the heated debate that surrounds this issue. In the absence of support for regulatory initiatives to increase the availability of low cost, small loans, permitting regulatory diversity on this issue of interest rate caps, within an otherwise centralised regulatory framework., can minimise the impact of financial exclusion on consumers.

"There's no way in hell I would pull up" : Deterrent and other effects of vehicle impoundment laws for hooning

Traffic law enforcement is based on deterrence principles, whereby drivers control their behaviour in order to avoid an undesirable sanction. For “hooning”-related driving behaviours in Queensland, the driver’s vehicle can be impounded for 48 hours, 3 months, or permanently depending on the number of previous hooning offences. It is assumed that the threat of losing something of value, their vehicle, will discourage drivers from hooning. While official data shows that the rate of repeat offending is low, an in-depth understanding of the deterrent effects of these laws should involve qualitative research with targeted drivers. A sample of 22 drivers who reported engaging in hooning behaviours participated in focus group discussions about the vehicle impoundment laws as applied to hooning offences in Queensland. The findings suggested that deterrence theory alone cannot fully explain hooning behaviour, as participants reported hooning frequently, and intended to continue doing so, despite reporting that it is likely that they will be caught, and perceiving the vehicle impoundment laws to be extremely severe. The punishment avoidance aspect of deterrence theory appears important, as well as factors over and above legal issues, particularly social influences. A concerning finding was drivers’ willingness to flee from police in order to avoid losing their vehicle permanently for a third offence, despite acknowledging risks to their own safety and that of others. This paper discusses the study findings in terms of the implications for future research directions, enforcement practices and policy development for hooning and other traffic offences for which vehicle impoundment is applied.

Competition laws and policies in China and Hong Kong : a tale of two regulatory journeys

Reviews the background to China's enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 2007 and compares the debate surrounding the proposed introduction of similar legislation in Hong Kong. Examines the main issues arising during the Law's 13 year drafting stage, its key provisions and the remaining areas of uncertainty concerning its enforcement. Discusses ongoing efforts to introduce competition law regulations in Hong Kong, the main features of the draft General Competition Law and the shortcomings of its approach to penalties and exemptions.

Behavioural biases and information disclosure laws relating to residential property sales : narrowing the gap between existing laws and calls for future reforms

Market failures involving the sale of complex merchandise, such as residential property, financial products and credit, have principally been attributed to information asymmetries. Existing legislative and regulatory responses were developed having regard to consumer protection policies based on traditional economic theories that focus on the notion of the ‘rational consumer’. Governmental responses therefore seek to impose disclosure obligations on sellers of complex goods or products to ensure that consumers have sufficient information upon which to make a decision. Emergent research, based on behavioural economics, challenges traditional ideas and instead focuses on the actual behaviour of consumers. This approach suggests that consumers as a whole do not necessarily benefit from mandatory disclosure because some, if not most, consumers do not pay attention to the disclosed information before they make a decision to purchase. The need for consumer policies to take consumer characteristics and behaviour into account is being increasingly recognised by governments, and most recently in the policy framework suggested by the Australian Productivity Commission

Post-WTO China : competition and technology transfer laws in the 'new' socialist market economy

China has been the focus of much academic and business scrutiny of late. Its economic climate is changing and its huge new market opportunities seem quite tantalizing to the would-be 'technology entrepreneur'. But China's market is a relatively immature one; it is still in the process of being opened up to real competition. The corollary of this is that, at this stage of the transitional process, there is still significant State control of market function. This article discusses Chinese competition law, the technology transfer system, how the laws are being reformed and how the technology entrepreneur fares under them. The bottom line is that while opportunities beckon, the wise entrepreneur will nevertheless continue to exercise caution.

Encryption safe harbours and data breach notification laws

Data breach notification laws require organisations to notify affected persons or regulatory authorities when an unauthorised acquisition of personal data occurs. Most laws provide a safe harbour to this obligation if acquired data has been encrypted. There are three types of safe harbour: an exemption; a rebuttable presumption and factor-based analysis. We demonstrate, using three condition-based scenarios, that the broad formulation of most encryption safe harbours is based on the flawed assumption that encryption is the silver bullet for personal information protection. We then contend that reliance upon an encryption safe harbour should be dependent upon a rigorous and competent risk-based review that is required on a case-by-case basis. Finally, we recommend the use of both an encryption safe harbour and a notification trigger as our preferred choice for a data breach notification regulatory framework.