Corporate social responsibility and sport event sponsorship

Demonstrating socially responsible behaviour has become increasingly important for corporations. Using the Psychological Continuum Model (PCM) as its theoretical framework, this paper examines the meditational role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the relationship between sport participation motivation, event attachment and purchase intent of a sport event’s sponsors’ products. A questionnaire was distributed to a sample of sport event participants (N=689) to measure sport participation motivation (recreation and charity), attachment to the event, CSR, and purchase intent of sponsors’ products. Results reveal that CSR fully mediates the link between purchase intent and sport participation motivation and partially mediates the influence of attachment on purchase intent. The authors propose that corporations strategically align with sport events in which participants are attached to allow for CSR and the meaning elicited by the event to work jointly.

The reputation of the corporate social responsibility industry in Australia

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly seen as an imperative for sustainable business and there is a growing literature on the effect of CSR on corporate reputation. Despite this, a pall of ambiguity and uncertainty remains around what CSR means and how it should be practiced. This paper offers a unique addition to the body of literature to date by revealing that CSR is an emerging industry in Australia, which is in the process of developing its own reputation as a set of business practices. The paper is based on exploratory qualitative research using a case study methodology. Interviews were conducted with key actors within the industry to investigate shared understandings of what CSR means, perceptions of CSR practice and of the industry as a whole, and who is involved in shaping these perceptions. The research revealed that the CSR industry in Australia is in its early stages of development and is therefore in need of increased internal cooperation if it is to develop a strong reputation.

How do other people influence your driving speed? Exploring the 'who' and the 'how' of social influences on speeding from a qualitative perspective

Using only legal sanctions to manage the speed at which people drive ignores the potential benefits of harnessing social factors such as the influence of others. Social influences on driver speeds were explored in this qualitative examination of 67 Australian drivers. Focus group interviews with 8 driver types (young, mid-age and older males and females, and self-identified Excessive and Rare speeders) were guided by Akers’ social learning theory (Akers, 1998). Findings revealed two types of influential others: people known to the driver (passengers and parents), and unknown other drivers. Passengers were generally described as having a slowing influence on drivers: responsibility for the safety of people in the car and consideration for passenger comfort were key themes. In contrast, all but the Rare speeders reported increasing their speed when driving alone. Parental role modelling was also described. In relation to other drivers, key themes included speeding to keep up with traffic flow and perceived pressure to drive faster. This ‘pressure’ from others to ‘speed up’ was expressed in all groups and reported strategies for managing this varied. Encouragingly, examples of actual or anticipated social rewards for speeding were less common than examples of social punishments. Three main themes relating to social punishments were embarrassment, breaching the trust of others, and presenting an image of a responsible driver. Impression management and self-presentation are discussed in light of these findings. Overall, our findings indicate scope to exploit the use of social sanctions for speeding and social praise for speed limit compliance to enhance speed management strategies.

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.

Setting limits to teacher responsibility

The purpose of this article is to raise some concerns over ongoing changes to the nature and scope of the teaching profession. Teaching is a responsible profession, and teachers have always been charged with the job of turning out the next generation of citizens—educated, healthy in mind, and healthy in body. The question is: how far should this responsibility extend? Just what should schools be responsible for? This article proposes some limits to teacher responsibility.

The moment of exchange : risk, vulnerability, responsibility

Any cycle of production and exchange – be it economic, cultural or aesthetic – involves an element of risk. It involves uncertainty, unpredictability, and a potential for new insight and innovation (the boom) as well as blockages, crises and breakdown (the bust). In performance, the risks are plentiful – economic, political, social, physical and psychological. The risks people are willing to take depend on their position in the exchange (performer, producer, venue manager or spectator), and their aesthetic preferences. This paper considers the often uncertain, confronting or ‘risky’ moment of exchange between performer, spectator and culture in Live Art practices. Encompassing body art, autobiographical art, site-specific art and other sorts of performative intervention in the public sphere, Live Art eschews the artifice of theatre, breaking down barriers between art and life, artist and spectator, to speak back to the public sphere, and challenge assumptions about bodies, identities, memories, relationships and histories. In the process, Live Art frequently privileges an uncertain, confrontational or ‘risky’ mode of exchange between performer, spectator and culture, as a way of challenging power structures. This paper examines the moment of exchange in terms of risk, vulnerability, responsibility and ethics. Why the romance with ‘risky’ behaviours and exchanges? Who is really taking a risk? What risk? With whose permission (or lack thereof)? What potential does a ‘risky’ exchange hold to destabilise aesthetic, social or political norms? Where lies the fine line between subversive intervention in the public sphere and sheer self-indulgence? What are the social and ethical implications of a moment of exchange that puts bodies, beliefs or social boundaries at ‘risk’? In this paper, these questions are addressed with reference to historical and contemporary practices under the broadly defined banner of Live Art, from the early work of Abrovamic and Burden, through to contemporary Australian practitioners like Fiona McGregor.