Complete and interpretable conformance checking of business processes

This article presents a method for checking the conformance between an event log capturing the actual execution of a business process, and a model capturing its expected or normative execution. Given a business process model and an event log, the method returns a set of statements in natural language describing the behavior allowed by the process model but not observed in the log and vice versa. The method relies on a unified representation of process models and event logs based on a well-known model of concurrency, namely event structures. Specifically, the problem of conformance checking is approached by folding the input event log into an event structure, unfolding the process model into another event structure, and comparing the two event structures via an error-correcting synchronized product. Each behavioral difference detected in the synchronized product is then verbalized as a natural language statement. An empirical evaluation shows that the proposed method scales up to real-life datasets while producing more concise and higher-level difference descriptions than state-of-the-art conformance checking methods.

Water bottles from China: Decoding visual grammar

On the ALEA Study Tour to China, Beryl Exley and her roomie Kathryn O’Sullivan pondered over their first night dilemma whilst staying at a hotel in Beijing. They read the room service guide (in English) which advised against drinking the tap water and confirming the supply of one bottle of complementary water per guest per day. The room service guide listed ‘special’ bottled water was the equivalent of $AUS7 per bottle. However the dilemma was this: sitting on the shelf above the fridge were three different kinds of water-like bottles. Each had a different label, written mainly in Chinese characters. Not wanting to mistake the bottles, Beryl and Kathryn set about decoding the text of the three bottles in question.

Formal network behaviour analysis using model checking

In this research we modelled computer network devices to ensure their communication behaviours meet various network standards. By modelling devices as finite-state machines and examining their properties in a range of configurations, we discovered a flaw in a common network protocol and produced a technique to improve organisations' network security against data theft.