85 resultados para Civil constitutional law
Resumo:
The constitutional recognition campaign has received party-wide support and its efforts have been promoted by Prime Minister Tony Abbott as being something that would ‘complete our Constitution.’ The broader rhetoric surrounding this campaign suggests that it will result in a just, albeit delayed, recognition of indigenous peoples in the Australian legal system. However, beneath the surface of this seemingly benevolent gesture, is a reaffirmation of the colonial subordination and erasure of the several hundred original nations’ peoples and ways of being.
Resumo:
This article considers the opportunity, presented by the coincidence of simultaneous charity law reviews in the two jurisdictions on the island of Ireland, for an adjustment of charity law frameworks to maximise appropriate and effective charitable activity within each jurisdiction,while also facilitating the coordination of some such activity between both. It examines the nature of civil society and charity law, and the relationship between them. The article argues that a creative legislative response to this opportunity could address themes of social inclusion common to both jurisdictions and thereby contribute to the consolidation of civil society on this island.
Resumo:
This paper considers the opportunity, presented by the forthcoming charity law review in Northern Ireland, for adjusting the charity law framework so as to focus charitable activity on the circumstances typical of societies in conflict or experiencing transition. This opportunity is one for broadening the definition of 'charitable purpose' to include activities directed towards forestalling alienation and facilitating social inclusion. It would include rehabilitating the victims of social confrontation and developing related services of advocacy, mediation and reconciliation. It argues that a creative response to this opportunity could address the current social inclusion agenda and thereby contribute to the consolidation of civil society in this jurisdiction. It suggests that the experience in Northern Ireland, as an exemplar of a society in transition, has a resonance with the experience in Australia. It further suggests that it could also have a relevance for approaching the management of tensions within or between nations where people may otherwise come to perceive themselves as alienated...
Resumo:
A new approach was taken to delivering a challenging "stewarship of land" unit to over 350 predominantly first year built environment students stewardship. The new approach involved incorporating environmental and planning law into the syllabus, exposing students to a wide range of statutes, selecting legal cases according to a et of criteria and revisiting the material using different modes of delivery and teaching resources. To evaluate the effectiveness of the new approach, the students were surveyed to elicit their learning experience and preferences. The survey found that most students perceived learning about environmental and planning law, including legal cases, worthwhile.----- Areas identified by the surcey for improvement included the perception by some students that: environmenatl and planning law is irrelevant to their discipline and future caree; studying law is dull and sometimes daunting; and the prescribed reading could be omitted.----- To address student perceptions, it is proposed to reorder the topics commencing with local, charismatic topics, while explanding international content and cases, to enlarge and enhance the repertoire of video clips to include sites of legal cawses and development projects, and to reformat the online weekly quizzes to promote reading of primary material.----- Overall, the approach to teaching environmental and planning law to built environment students, including the criteria for selecting legal cases, described in this paper, was found to be effective.
Resumo:
Cyber bullying – or bullying through the use of technology – is a growing phenomenon which is currently most commonly experienced by young people and the consequences manifested in schools. Cyber bullying shares many of the same attributes as face-to-face bullying such as a power imbalance and a sense of helplessness on the part of the target. Not surprisingly, targets of face-to-face bullying are increasingly turning to the law, and it is likely that targets of cyber bullying may also do so in an appropriate case. This article examines the various criminal, civil and vilification laws that may apply to cases of cyber bullying and assesses the likely effectiveness of these laws as a means of redressing that power imbalance between perpetrator and target.
Resumo:
There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.
Resumo:
"The 1990s saw the United Nations, the militaries of key member states, and NGOs increasingly entangled in the complex affairs of disrupted states. Whether as deliverers of humanitarian assistance or as agents of political, social, and civic reconstruction, whether in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor, these actors have had to learn ways of interacting with each other in order to optimize the benefits for the populations they seek to assist. Yet the challenges have proved daunting. Civil and military actors have different organizational cultures and standard operating procedures and are confronted with the need to work together to perform tasks to which different actors may attach quite different priorities."--BOOK JACKET.
Resumo:
This project proposes a new conceptual framework for the regulation of social networks and virtual communities. By applying a model based upon the rule of law, this thesis addresses the growing tensions that revolve around the public use of private networks. This research examines the shortcomings of traditional contractual governance models and cyberlaw theory and provides a reconstituted approach that will allow public constitutional-type interests to be recognised in the interpretation and enforcement of contractual doctrine.
Resumo:
There is a severe tendency in cyberlaw theory to delegitimize state intervention in the governance of virtual communities. Much of the existing theory makes one of two fundamental flawed assumptions: that communities will always be best governed without the intervention of the state; or that the territorial state can best encourage the development of communities by creating enforceable property rights and allowing the market to resolve any disputes. These assumptions do not ascribe sufficient weight to the value-laden support that the territorial state always provides to private governance regimes, the inefficiencies that will tend to limit the development utopian communities, and the continued role of the territorial state in limiting autonomy in accordance with communal values. In order to overcome these deterministic assumptions, this article provides a framework based upon the values of the rule of law through which to conceptualise the legitimacy of the private exercise of power in virtual communities. The rule of law provides a constitutional discourse that assists in considering appropriate limits on the exercise of private power. I argue that the private contractual framework that is used to govern relations in virtual communities ought to be informed by the values of the rule of law in order to more appropriately address the governance tensions that permeate these spaces. These values suggest three main limits to the exercise of private power: that governance is limited by community rules and that the scope of autonomy is limited by the substantive values of the territorial state; that private contractual rules should be general, equal, and certain; and that, most importantly, internal norms be predicated upon the consent of participants.
Resumo:
Although rarely referred to in litigation in the years that have followed the Ipp Review Report, there may well be some merit in more frequent judicial reference to the NHMRC guidelines for medical practitioners on providing information to patients 2004.
Resumo:
This chapter addresses the question, how can the common law concept of charity law be modernised? There are difficulties with the present jurisprudential conception. The focus of the chapter is not on those difficulties, however, but rather on the development of an alternative architecture for common law jurisprudence. The conclusion to which the chapter comes is that charity law can be modernised by a series of steps to include all civil society organisations. It is possible if the ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose is abandoned in favour of a contemporary, not technical concept of charitiable purpose. This conclusion is reached by proposing a framework, developed from the common law concept of charities, that reconciles into a cohesive jurisprudential architecture all of the laws applying to civil society organisations, not just charities. In this section, first the argument is contextualised in an idea of society and located in a gap in legal theory. An analogy is then offered to introduce the problems in the legal theory applying, not just to charities, but more broadly to civil society organisations. The substantive challenge of mapping an alternative jurisprudence is then taken in steps. The final substantive section conceptualises the changes inherent in a move beyond charities to a jurisprudence centred on civil society organisations and how this would bring legal theory into line with sectoral analysis in other disciplines.
Resumo:
At common law, a duty of care may be owed to a claimant who suffers nervous shock or pure mental harm due to witnessing, or hearing about, physical injury caused to another due to a defendant’s negligence. “Pure mental harm” is the ‘impairment of a person’s mental condition’ that is not suffered as a consequence of any other kind of personal injury to them. However, as many accidents have the potential to create a wide circle of mental suffering to bystanders, family members or others not physically injured themselves, it has traditionally been ‘thought impolitic that everybody so affected should be able to recover damages from the tortfeasor.’ ‘To allow such extended recovery would stretch liability too far.’ Nevertheless, whilst adopting a restrictive approach to liability, the common law courts have recognised that a defendant might owe a duty in relation to the pure mental harm suffered by one who foreseeably attends an accident scene to rescue another from a situation created by the defendant’s negligence.