216 resultados para Criminal law (Greek law)
Resumo:
The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.
Resumo:
In this Part 2 attention is turned towards the legal arrangements in nation states for managing wetlands. These national arrangements have effect within the international arrangements already mentioned and any regional arrangements that are relevant. However, each national system is a reflection of its own historical, cultural, political and constitutional background. It is the purpose of this Part 2 to review and assess the national approaches to wetlands management. This involves an analysis of a range of instruments. These are: constitutional rules; strategic rules; regulatory rules; and management rules. Each of these sets of rules performs different functions, assumes different forms and is differentially capable of enforcement.
Resumo:
In Australia, trials conducted as 'electronic trials' have ordinarily run with the assistance of commercial service providers, with the associated costs being borne by the parties. However, an innovative approach has been taken by the courts in Queensland. In October 2007 Queensland became the first Australian jurisdiction to develop its own court-provided technology, to facilitate the conduct of an electronic trial. This technology was first used in the conduct of civil trials. The use of the technology in the civil sphere highlighted its benefits and, more significantly, demonstrated the potential to achieve much greater efficiencies. The Queensland courts have now gone further, using the court-provided technology in the high proffle criminal trial of R v Hargraves, Hargraves and Stoten, in which the three accused were tried for conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth of Australia of about $3.7 million in tax. This paper explains the technology employed in this case and reports on the perspectives of all of the participants in the process. The representatives for all parties involved in this trial acknowledged, without reservation, that the use of the technology at trial produced considerable overall efficiencies and costs savings. The experience in this trial also demonstrates that the benefits of trial technology for the criminal justice process are greater than those for civil litigation. It shows that, when skilfully employed, trial technology presents opportunities to enhance the fairness of trials for accused persons. The paper urges governments, courts and the judiciary in all jurisdictions to continue their efforts to promote change, and to introduce mechanisms to facilitate more broadly a shift from the entrenched paper-based approach to both criminal and civil procedure to one which embraces more broadly the enormous benefits trial technology has to offer.
Resumo:
The emergence of strong sovereign states after the Treaty of Westphalia turned two of the most cosmopolitan professions (law and arms) into two of the least cosmopolitan. Sovereign states determined the content of the law within their borders – including which, if any, ecclesiastical law was to be applied; what form of economic regulation was adopted; and what, if any, international law applied. Similarly, states sought to ensure that all military force was at their disposal in national armies. The erosion of sovereignty in a post-Westphalian world may significantly reverse these processes. The erosion of sovereignty is likely to have profound consequences for the legal profession and the ethics of how, and for what ends, it is practised. Lawyers have played a major role in the civilization of sovereign states through the articulation and institutionalisation of key governance values – starting with the rule of law. An increasingly global profession must take on similar tasks. The same could be said of the military. This essay will review the concept of an international rule of law and its relationship to domestic conceptions and outline the task of building the international rule of law and the role that lawyers can and should play in it.
Resumo:
In this paper, I would like to outline the approach we have taken to mapping and assessing integrity systems and how this has led us to see integrity systems in a new light. Indeed, it has led us to a new visual metaphor for integrity systems – a bird’s nest rather than a Greek temple. This was the result of a pair of major research projects completed in partnership with Transparency International (TI). One worked on refining and extending the measurement of corruption. This, the second, looked at what was then the emerging institutional means for reducing corruption – ‘national integrity systems’