Built to last or meant to end : intertemporal choice in strategic alliance portfolios

A salient but rarely explicitly studied characteristic of interfirm relationships is that they can intentionally be formed for finite periods of time. What determines firms' intertemporal choices between different alliance time horizons? Shadow of the future theorists suggest that when an alliance has an explicitly set short-term time frame, there is an increased risk that partners may behave opportunistically. This does not readily explain the high incidence of time-bound alliances being formed. Reconciling insights from the shadow of the future perspective with nascent research on the flexibility of temporary organizations, and shifting the focus from the level of individual transactions to that of strategic alliance portfolios, we argue that firms may be willing to accept a higher risk of opportunism when there are offsetting gains in strategic flexibility in managing their strategic alliance portfolio. Consequently, we hypothesize that environmental factors that increase the need for strategic flexibility—namely, dynamism and complexity in the environment—are likely to increase the relative share of time-bound alliances in strategic alliance portfolios. Our analysis of longitudinal data on the intertemporal alliance choices of a large sample of small and medium-sized enterprises provides support for this argument. Our findings fill an important gap in theory about time horizons in interfirm relationships and temporary organizations and show the importance of separating planned terminations from duration-based performance measures.

Analysing strategic alliances in building construction

Building construction is a highly competitive and risky business. This competitiveness is compounded where conflicting objectives amongst contracting and subcontracting firms sets the stage for an adversarial and potentially destructive approach. There is a need for change in the construction industry—not only to a more cooperative approach to build mutual trust, respect and good faith—but also from a confrontationist and adversarial attitude to a harmonious relationship. It is necessary to change the culture to create a win-win situation. “Strategic Alliances” is one such concept. A strategic alliance is a cooperative arrangement between two or more organisations that forms part of their overall strategies, and contributes to achieving their major goals and objectives. This paper begins with an overview of the Australian building construction industry, then reviews the literature and describes an analysis framework comprising six attributes of strategic alliances—trust, commitment, interdependence, cooperation, communication, and joint problem solving. Given the trend towards greater emphasis on broader contracting firm performance criteria, indicators are proposed as a component of the tender evaluation process for public works.

Strategic alliances in building construction : a tender evaluation tool for the public sector

Building construction is a highly competitive and risky business. This competitiveness is compounded where conflicting objectives amongst contracting and subcontracting firms set the stage for an adversarial and potentially destructive business relationship. Clients, especially those from the public sector, need broader tender evaluation criteria to complement the traditional focus on bid price. There is also a need for change in the construction industry—not only to a more cooperative approach between the constructing parties—but also from a confrontationist attitude to a more harmonious relationship between all stakeholders in providing constructed facilities. A strategic alliance is a cooperative relationship between two or more organisations that forms part of their overall strategies, and contributes to achieving their major goals and objectives. Strategic alliances in building construction may provide a useful tool to assist public sector construction managers evaluate tenders and concurrently encourage more cooperative relationships amongst construction stakeholders. This paper begins with an overview of the Australian building construction industry, then reviews the existing strategic alliance literature and describes an analysis framework comprising six attributes of strategic alliances for application to construction organisations—trust, commitment, interdependence, cooperation, communication, and joint problem solving. These attributes are currently being used to collect data from 70 building construction firms in Queensland to assess their respective levels of strategic alliance. Given the trend towards broader indicators of construction firm performance, these attributes are proposed as a tool for use in the tender evaluation process for public works.

Built to last versus meant to end : time bounds specification in strategic alliances

This article explores an important temporal aspect of the design of strategic alliances by focusing on the issue of time bounds specification. Time bounds specification refers to a choice on behalf of prospective alliance partners at the time of alliance formation to either pre-specify the duration of an alliance to a specific time window, or to keep the alliance open-ended (Reuer & Ariňo, 2007). For instance, Das (2006) mentions the example of the alliance between Telemundo Network and Mexican Argos Comunicacion (MAC). Announced in October 2000, this alliance entailed a joint production of 1200 hours of comedy, news, drama, reality and novella programs (Das, 2006). Conditioned on the projected date of completing the 1200 hours of programs, Telemundo Network and MAC pre-specified the time bounds of the alliance ex ante. Such time-bound alliances are said to be particularly prevalent in project-based industries, like movie production, construction, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals (Schwab & Miner, 2008). In many other instances, however, firms may choose to keep their alliances open-ended, not specifying a specific time bound at the time of alliance formation. The choice between designing open-ended alliances that are “built to last”, versus time bound alliances that are “meant to end” is important. Seminal works like Axelrod (1984), Heide & Miner (1992), and Parkhe (1993) demonstrated that the choice to place temporal bounds on a collaborative venture has important implications. More specifically, collaborations that have explicit, short term time bounds (i.e. what is termed a shorter “shadow of the future”) are more likely to experience opportunism (Axelrod, 1984), are more likely to focus on the immediate present (Bakker, Boros, Kenis & Oerlemans, 2012), and are less likely to develop trust (Parkhe, 1993) than alliances for which time bounds are kept indeterminate. These factors, in turn, have been shown to have important implications for the performance of alliances (e.g. Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000). Thus, there seems to be a strong incentive for organizations to form open-ended strategic alliances. And yet, Reuer & Ariňo (2007), one of few empirical studies that details the prevalence of time-bound and open-ended strategic alliances, found that about half (47%) of the alliances in their sample were time bound, the other half were open-ended. What conditions, then, determine this choice?

Determinants of knowledge transfer and learning in hybrid public private alliances

This paper uses the case study of a hybrid public-private strategic alliance as data to complement and contrast with the traditional views on knowledge transfer and learning between alliance partners. In particular, the paper explores whether the concept of competitive collaboration conceptualized by Hamel (1991) in his seminal work holds true for all forms of strategic alliances. Conceptualizing the knowledge boundaries of organisations in alliances as a ‘collaborative membrane’, we focus attention on the permeability of these boundaries rather than the actual location of the boundaries. In this vein, we present a case study of a major public sector organization that illustrates how these principles have allowed it to start rebuilding its internal capabilities adopting a more collaborative stance and ensuring their knowledge boundaries are highly porous as they move more major projects into hybrid public private alliance contracts.

To bound or not to bound: preliminary Theory of Time Bounds Specification in strategic alliances

This article augments Resource Dependence Theory with Real Options reasoning in order to explain time bounds specification in strategic alliances. Whereas prior work has found about a 50/50 split between alliances that are time bound and those that are open-ended, their substantive differences and antecedents are ill understood. To address this, we suggest that the two alliance modes present different real options trade-offs in adaptation to environmental uncertainty: ceteris paribus, time-bound alliances are likely to provide abandonment options over open-ended alliances, but require additional investments to extend the alliance when this turns out to be desirable after formation. Open-ended alliances are likely to provide growth options over open-ended alliances, but they demand additional effort to abandon the alliance if post-formation circumstances so desire. Therefore, we expect time bounds specification to be a function of environmental uncertainty: organizations in more uncertain environments will be relatively more likely to place time bounds on their strategic alliances. Longitudinal archival and survey data collected amongst 39 industry clusters provides empirical support for our claims, which contribute to the recent renaissance of resource dependence theory by specifying the conditions under which organizations choose different time windows in strategic partnering.