A Shapley value analysis to coordinate the formation of procurement

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Recent research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

The core and shapley value analysis for cooperative formation of procurement networks

Formation of high value procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions, where suppliers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged We model the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a stable and fair manner We first investigate the stability of such networks by examining the conditions under which the core of the game is non-empty. We then present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the core, for forming such networks so that the resulting network is stable. We also mention a key result when the Shapley value is applied as a solution concept.

A Shapley Value-Based Approach to Discover Influential Nodes in Social Networks

Our study concerns an important current problem, that of diffusion of information in social networks. This problem has received significant attention from the Internet research community in the recent times, driven by many potential applications such as viral marketing and sales promotions. In this paper, we focus on the target set selection problem, which involves discovering a small subset of influential players in a given social network, to perform a certain task of information diffusion. The target set selection problem manifests in two forms: 1) top-k nodes problem and 2) lambda-coverage problem. In the top-k nodes problem, we are required to find a set of k key nodes that would maximize the number of nodes being influenced in the network. The lambda-coverage problem is concerned with finding a set of k key nodes having minimal size that can influence a given percentage lambda of the nodes in the entire network. We propose a new way of solving these problems using the concept of Shapley value which is a well known solution concept in cooperative game theory. Our approach leads to algorithms which we call the ShaPley value-based Influential Nodes (SPINs) algorithms for solving the top-k nodes problem and the lambda-coverage problem. We compare the performance of the proposed SPIN algorithms with well known algorithms in the literature. Through extensive experimentation on four synthetically generated random graphs and six real-world data sets (Celegans, Jazz, NIPS coauthorship data set, Netscience data set, High-Energy Physics data set, and Political Books data set), we show that the proposed SPIN approach is more powerful and computationally efficient. Note to Practitioners-In recent times, social networks have received a high level of attention due to their proven ability in improving the performance of web search, recommendations in collaborative filtering systems, spreading a technology in the market using viral marketing techniques, etc. It is well known that the interpersonal relationships (or ties or links) between individuals cause change or improvement in the social system because the decisions made by individuals are influenced heavily by the behavior of their neighbors. An interesting and key problem in social networks is to discover the most influential nodes in the social network which can influence other nodes in the social network in a strong and deep way. This problem is called the target set selection problem and has two variants: 1) the top-k nodes problem, where we are required to identify a set of k influential nodes that maximize the number of nodes being influenced in the network and 2) the lambda-coverage problem which involves finding a set of influential nodes having minimum size that can influence a given percentage lambda of the nodes in the entire network. There are many existing algorithms in the literature for solving these problems. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm which is based on a novel interpretation of information diffusion in a social network as a cooperative game. Using this analogy, we develop an algorithm based on the Shapley value of the underlying cooperative game. The proposed algorithm outperforms the existing algorithms in terms of generality or computational complexity or both. Our results are validated through extensive experimentation on both synthetically generated and real-world data sets.

Determining Top K Nodes in Social Networks using the Shapley Value

In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting, for any given positive integer k, the top-k nodes in a social network, based on a certain measure appropriate for the social network. This problem is relevant in many settings such as analysis of co-authorship networks, diffusion of information, viral marketing, etc. However, in most situations, this problem turns out to be NP-hard. The existing approaches for solving this problem are based on approximation algorithms and assume that the objective function is sub-modular. In this paper, we propose a novel and intuitive algorithm based on the Shapley value, for efficiently computing an approximate solution to this problem. Our proposed algorithm does not use the sub-modularity of the underlying objective function and hence it is a general approach. We demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithm using a co-authorship data set from e-print arXiv (www.arxiv.org), having 8361 authors.

A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of procurement network formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

Influence limitation in multi-campaign social networks: A Shapley value based approach

We investigate the problem of influence limitation in the presence of competing campaigns in a social network. Given a negative campaign which starts propagating from a specified source and a positive/counter campaign that is initiated, after a certain time delay, to limit the the influence or spread of misinformation by the negative campaign, we are interested in finding the top k influential nodes at which the positive campaign may be triggered. This problem has numerous applications in situations such as limiting the propagation of rumor, arresting the spread of virus through inoculation, initiating a counter-campaign against malicious propaganda, etc. The influence function for the generic influence limitation problem is non-submodular. Restricted versions of the influence limitation problem, reported in the literature, assume submodularity of the influence function and do not capture the problem in a realistic setting. In this paper, we propose a novel computational approach for the influence limitation problem based on Shapley value, a solution concept in cooperative game theory. Our approach works equally effectively for both submodular and non-submodular influence functions. Experiments on standard real world social network datasets reveal that the proposed approach outperforms existing heuristics in the literature. As a non-trivial extension, we also address the problem of influence limitation in the presence of multiple competing campaigns.

Pattern clustering using cooperative game theory

In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a novel algorithm DRAC (Density-Restricted Agglomerative Clustering) for clustering. With extensive experimentation on standard data sets, we compare the performance of DRAC with that of well known algorithms. We show an interesting result that four prominent solution concepts, Nucleolus, Shapley value, Gately point and \tau-value coincide for the defined characteristic form game. This vindicates the choice of the characteristic function of the clustering game and also provides strong intuitive foundation for our approach.

Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory

We propose a new approach to clustering. Our idea is to map cluster formation to coalition formation in cooperative games, and to use the Shapley value of the patterns to identify clusters and cluster representatives. We show that the underlying game is convex and this leads to an efficient biobjective clustering algorithm that we call BiGC. The algorithm yields high-quality clustering with respect to average point-to-center distance (potential) as well as average intracluster point-to-point distance (scatter). We demonstrate the superiority of BiGC over state-of-the-art clustering algorithms (including the center based and the multiobjective techniques) through a detailed experimentation using standard cluster validity criteria on several benchmark data sets. We also show that BiGC satisfies key clustering properties such as order independence, scale invariance, and richness.