Coalition Formation With Communication Ranges and Moving Targets

A team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with limited communication ranges and limited resources are deployed in a region to search and destroy stationary and moving targets. When a UAV detects a target, depending on the target resource requirement, it is tasked to form a coalition over the dynamic network formed by the UAVs. In this paper, we develop a mechanism to find potential coalition members over the network using principles from internet protocol and introduce an algorithm using Particle Swarm Optimization to generate a coalition that destroys the target is minimum time. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out to study how coalition are formed and the effects of coalition process delays.

A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Search Strategies for Multiple UAV Search and Destroy Missions

Multiple UAVs are deployed to carry out a search and destroy mission in a bounded region. The UAVs have limited sensor range and can carry limited resources which reduce with use. The UAVs perform a search task to detect targets. When a target is detected which requires different type and quantities of resources to completely destroy, then a team of UAVs called as a coalition is formed to attack the target. The coalition members have to modify their route to attack the target, in the process, the search task is affected, as search and destroy tasks are coupled. The performance of the mission is a function of the search and the task allocation strategies. Therefore, for a given task allocation strategy, we need to devise search strategies that are efficient. In this paper, we propose three different search strategies namely; random search strategy, lanes based search strategy and grid based search strategy and analyze their performance through Monte-Carlo simulations. The results show that the grid based search strategy performs the best but with high information overhead.

Multiple UAV Coalitions for a Search and Prosecute Mission

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have the potential to carry resources in support of search and prosecute operations. Often to completely prosecute a target, UAVs may have to simultaneously attack the target with various resources with different capacities. However, the UAVs are capable of carrying only limited resources in small quantities, hence, a group of UAVs (coalition) needs to be assigned that satisfies the target resource requirement. The assigned coalition must be such that it minimizes the target prosecution delay and the size of the coalition. The problem of forming coalitions is computationally intensive due to the combinatorial nature of the problem, but for real-time applications computationally cheap solutions are required. In this paper, we propose decentralized sub-optimal (polynomial time) and decentralized optimal coalition formation algorithms that generate coalitions for a single target with low computational complexity. We compare the performance of the proposed algorithms to that of a global optimal solution for which we need to solve a centralized combinatorial optimization problem. This problem is computationally intensive because the solution has to (a) provide a coalition for each target, (b) design a sequence in which targets need to be prosecuted, and (c) take into account reduction of UAV resources with usage. To solve this problem we use the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) technique. Through simulations, we study the performance of the proposed algorithms in terms of mission performance, complexity of the algorithms and the time taken to form the coalition. The simulation results show that the solution provided by the proposed algorithms is close to the global optimal solution and requires far less computational resources.

A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access

We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.

Advances in base- and mobile-station aided cooperative wireless communications : An overview

In recent years, there has been an upsurge of research interest in cooperative wireless communications in both academia and industry. This article presents a simple overview of the pivotal topics in both mobile station (MS)- and base station (BS)- assisted cooperation in the context of cellular radio systems. Owing to the ever-increasing amount of literature in this particular field, this article is by no means exhaustive, but is intended to serve as a roadmap by assembling a representative sample of recent results and to stimulate further research. The emphasis is initially on relay-base cooperation, relying on network coding, followed by the design of cross-layer cooperative protocols conceived for MS cooperation and the concept of coalition network element (CNE)-assisted BS cooperation. Then, a range of complexity and backhaul traffic reduction techniques that have been proposed for BS cooperation are reviewed. A more detailed discussion is provided in the context of MS cooperation concerning the pros and cons of dispensing with high-complexity, power-hungry channel estimation. Finally, generalized design guidelines, conceived for cooperative wireless communications, are presented.

Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory

We propose a new approach to clustering. Our idea is to map cluster formation to coalition formation in cooperative games, and to use the Shapley value of the patterns to identify clusters and cluster representatives. We show that the underlying game is convex and this leads to an efficient biobjective clustering algorithm that we call BiGC. The algorithm yields high-quality clustering with respect to average point-to-center distance (potential) as well as average intracluster point-to-point distance (scatter). We demonstrate the superiority of BiGC over state-of-the-art clustering algorithms (including the center based and the multiobjective techniques) through a detailed experimentation using standard cluster validity criteria on several benchmark data sets. We also show that BiGC satisfies key clustering properties such as order independence, scale invariance, and richness.