Pattern clustering using cooperative game theory

In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a novel algorithm DRAC (Density-Restricted Agglomerative Clustering) for clustering. With extensive experimentation on standard data sets, we compare the performance of DRAC with that of well known algorithms. We show an interesting result that four prominent solution concepts, Nucleolus, Shapley value, Gately point and \tau-value coincide for the defined characteristic form game. This vindicates the choice of the characteristic function of the clustering game and also provides strong intuitive foundation for our approach.

Game theoretic, decentralized, local information based algorithm for community detection in social graphs

Motivated by the observation that communities in real world social networks form due to actions of rational individuals in networks, we propose a novel game theory inspired algorithm to determine communities in networks. The algorithm is decentralized and only uses local information at each node. We show the efficacy of the proposed algorithm through extensive experimentation on several real world social network data sets.

Sustaining cooperation on networks: an analytical study based on evolutionary game theory

We analytically study the role played by the network topology in sustaining cooperation in a society of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting. In our model, each agent plays the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game with its neighbors, as specified by a network. Cooperation is the incumbent strategy, whereas defectors are the mutants. Starting with a population of cooperators, some agents are switched to defection. The agents then play the PD game with their neighbors and compute their fitness. After this, an evolutionary rule, or imitation dynamic is used to update the agent strategy. A defector switches back to cooperation if it has a cooperator neighbor with higher fitness. The network is said to sustain cooperation if almost all defectors switch to cooperation. Earlier work on the sustenance of cooperation has largely consisted of simulation studies, and we seek to complement this body of work by providing analytical insight for the same. We find that in order to sustain cooperation, a network should satisfy some properties such as small average diameter, densification, and irregularity. Real-world networks have been empirically shown to exhibit these properties, and are thus candidates for the sustenance of cooperation. We also analyze some specific graphs to determine whether or not they sustain cooperation. In particular, we find that scale-free graphs belonging to a certain family sustain cooperation, whereas Erdos-Renyi random graphs do not. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first analytical attempt to determine which networks sustain cooperation in a population of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting.

Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We studywhen an exclusive contract is benefcial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be benefcial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is proftable to the colluding entities.

Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory

We propose a new approach to clustering. Our idea is to map cluster formation to coalition formation in cooperative games, and to use the Shapley value of the patterns to identify clusters and cluster representatives. We show that the underlying game is convex and this leads to an efficient biobjective clustering algorithm that we call BiGC. The algorithm yields high-quality clustering with respect to average point-to-center distance (potential) as well as average intracluster point-to-point distance (scatter). We demonstrate the superiority of BiGC over state-of-the-art clustering algorithms (including the center based and the multiobjective techniques) through a detailed experimentation using standard cluster validity criteria on several benchmark data sets. We also show that BiGC satisfies key clustering properties such as order independence, scale invariance, and richness.

Two player game variant of the Erdos-Szekeres problem

The classical Erdos-Szekeres theorem states that a convex k-gon exists in every sufficiently large point set. This problem has been well studied and finding tight asymptotic bounds is considered a challenging open problem. Several variants of the Erdos-Szekeres problem have been posed and studied in the last two decades. The well studied variants include the empty convex k-gon problem, convex k-gon with specified number of interior points and the chromatic variant. In this paper, we introduce the following two player game variant of the Erdos-Szekeres problem: Consider a two player game where each player playing in alternate turns, place points in the plane. The objective of the game is to avoid the formation of the convex k-gon among the placed points. The game ends when a convex k-gon is formed and the player who placed the last point loses the game. In our paper we show a winning strategy for the player who plays second in the convex 5-gon game and the empty convex 5-gon game by considering convex layer configurations at each step. We prove that the game always ends in the 9th step by showing that the game reaches a specific set of configurations.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.