Seismic Tomography and Earthquake Mechanism Beneath the Central Fennoscandian Shield

The aim of this thesis was to study the seismic tomography structure of the earth s crust together with earthquake distribution and mechanism beneath the central Fennoscandian Shield, mainly in southern and central Finland. The earthquake foci and some fault plane solutions are correlated with 3-D images of the velocity tomography. The results are discussed in relation to the stress field of the Shield and with other geophysical, e.g. geomagnetic, gravimetric, tectonic, and anisotropy studies of the Shield. The earthquake data of the Fennoscandian Shield has been extracted from the Nordic earthquake parameter data base which was founded at the time of inception of the earthquake catalogue for northern Europe. Eight earlier earthquake source mechanisms are included in a pilot study on creating a novel technique for calculating an earthquake fault plane solution. Altogether, eleven source mechanisms of shallow, weak earthquakes are related in the 3-D tomography model to trace stresses of the crust in southern and central Finland. The earthquakes in the eastern part of the Fennoscandian Shield represent low-active, intraplate seismicity. Earthquake mechanisms with NW-SE oriented horizontal compression confirm that the dominant stress field originates from the ridge-push force in the North Atlantic Ocean. Earthquakes accumulate in coastal areas, in intersections of tectonic lineaments, in main fault zones or are bordered by fault lines. The majority of Fennoscandian earthquakes concentrate on the south-western Shield in southern Norway and Sweden. Onwards, epicentres spread via the ridge of the Shield along the west-coast of the Gulf of Bothnia northwards along the Tornio River - Finnmark fault system to the Barents Sea, and branch out north-eastwards via the Kuusamo region to the White Sea Kola Peninsula faults. The local seismic tomographic method was applied to find the terrane distribution within the central parts of the Shield the Svecofennian Orogen. From 300 local explosions a total of 19765 crustal Pg- and Sg-wave arrival times were inverted to create independent 3-D Vp and Vs tomographic models, from which the Vp/Vs ratio was calculated. The 3-D structure of the crust is presented as a P-wave and for the first time as an S-wave velocity model, and also as a Vp/Vs-ratio model of the SVEKALAPKO area that covers 700x800 km2 in southern and central Finland. Also, some P-wave Moho-reflection data was interpolated to image the relief of the crust-mantle boundary (i.e. Moho). In the tomography model, the seismic velocities vary smoothly. The lateral variations are larger for Vp (dVp =0.7 km/s) than for Vs (dVs =0.4 km/s). The Vp/Vs ratio varies spatially more distinctly than P- and S-wave velocities, usually from 1.70 to 1.74 in the upper crust and from 1.72 to 1.78 in the lower crust. Schist belts and their continuations at depth are associated with lower velocities and lower Vp/Vs ratios than in the granitoid areas. The tomography modelling suggests that the Svecofennian Orogen was accreted from crustal blocks ranging in size from 100x100 km2 to 200x200 km2 in cross-sectional area. The intervening sedimentary belts have ca. 0.2 km/s lower P- and S-wave velocities and ca. 0.04 lower Vp/Vs ratios. Thus, the tomographic model supports the concept that the thick Svecofennian crust was accreted from several crustal terranes, some hidden, and that the crust was later modified by intra- and underplating. In conclusion, as a novel approach the earthquake focal mechanism and focal depth distribution is discussed in relation to the 3-D tomography model. The schist belts and the transformation zones between the high- and low-velocity anomaly blocks are characterized by deeper earthquakes than the granitoid areas where shallow events dominate. Although only a few focal mechanisms were solved for southern Finland, there is a trend towards strike-slip and oblique strike-slip movements inside schist areas. The normal dip-slip type earthquakes are typical in the seismically active Kuusamo district in the NE edge of the SVEKALAPKO area, where the Archean crust is ca. 15-20 km thinner than the Proterozoic Svecofennian crust. Two near vertical dip-slip mechanism earthquakes occurred in the NE-SW junction between the Central Finland Granitoid Complex and the Vyborg rapakivi batholith, where high Vp/Vs-ratio deep-set intrusion splits the southern Finland schist belt into two parts in the tomography model.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.