Society by Numbers : Studies on Model-Based Explanations in the Social Sciences

The aim of this dissertation is to provide conceptual tools for the social scientist for clarifying, evaluating and comparing explanations of social phenomena based on formal mathematical models. The focus is on relatively simple theoretical models and simulations, not statistical models. These studies apply a theory of explanation according to which explanation is about tracing objective relations of dependence, knowledge of which enables answers to contrastive why and how-questions. This theory is developed further by delineating criteria for evaluating competing explanations and by applying the theory to social scientific modelling practices and to the key concepts of equilibrium and mechanism. The dissertation is comprised of an introductory essay and six published original research articles. The main theses about model-based explanations in the social sciences argued for in the articles are the following. 1) The concept of explanatory power, often used to argue for the superiority of one explanation over another, compasses five dimensions which are partially independent and involve some systematic trade-offs. 2) All equilibrium explanations do not causally explain the obtaining of the end equilibrium state with the multiple possible initial states. Instead, they often constitutively explain the macro property of the system with the micro properties of the parts (together with their organization). 3) There is an important ambivalence in the concept mechanism used in many model-based explanations and this difference corresponds to a difference between two alternative research heuristics. 4) Whether unrealistic assumptions in a model (such as a rational choice model) are detrimental to an explanation provided by the model depends on whether the representation of the explanatory dependency in the model is itself dependent on the particular unrealistic assumptions. Thus evaluating whether a literally false assumption in a model is problematic requires specifying exactly what is supposed to be explained and by what. 5) The question of whether an explanatory relationship depends on particular false assumptions can be explored with the process of derivational robustness analysis and the importance of robustness analysis accounts for some of the puzzling features of the tradition of model-building in economics. 6) The fact that economists have been relatively reluctant to use true agent-based simulations to formulate explanations can partially be explained by the specific ideal of scientific understanding implicit in the practise of orthodox economics.

From Habits to Social Structures : Pragmatism and Contemporary Social Theory

Pragmatism has sometimes been taken as a catchphrase for epistemological stances in which anything goes. However, other authors argue that the real novelty and contribution of this tradition has to do with its view of action as the context in which all things human take place. Thus, it is action rather than, for example, discourses that should be our starting point in social theory. The introductory section of the book situates pragmatism (especially the ideas of G. H. Mead and John Dewey) within the field and tradition of social theory. This introductory also contextualizes the main core of the book which consists of four chapters. Two of these chapters have been published as articles in scientific journals and one in an edited book. All of them discuss the core problem of social theory: how is action related to social structures (and vice versa)? The argument is that habitual action is the explanation for the emergence of social structures from our action. Action produces structures and social reproduction takes place when action is habitualized; that is, when we develop social dispositions to act in a certain manner in familiar environments. This also means that even though the physical environment is the same for all of us, our habits structure it into different kinds of action possibilities. Each chapter highlights these general insights from different angles. Practice theory has gained momentum in recent years and it has many commonalities with pragmatism because both highlight the situated and corporeal character of human activity. One famous proponent of practice theory is Margaret Archer who has argued that the pragmatism of G. H. Mead leads to an oversocialized conception of selfhood. Mead does indeed present a socialized view of selfhood but this is a meta-sociological argument rather than a substantial sociological claim. Accordingly, one can argue that in this general sense intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity and not the other way around. Such a view does not indicate that our social relation would necessarily "colonize" individual action because there is a place for internal conversations (in Archer s terminology); it is especially in those phases of action where it meets obstacles due to the changes of the environment. The second issue discussed has the background assumption that social structures can fruitfully be conceptualized as institutions. A general classification of different institution theories is presented and it is argued that there is a need for a habitual theory of institutions due to the problems associated with these other theories. So-called habitual institutionalism accounts for institutions in terms of established and prevalent social dispositions that structure our social interactions. The germs of this institution theory can be found in the work of Thorstein Veblen. Since Veblen s times, these ideas have been discussed for example, by the economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson. His ideas on the evolution of institutions are presented but a critical stance is taken towards his tendency of defining institutions with the help of rules because rules are not always present in institutions. Accordingly, habitual action is the most basic but by no means the only aspect of institutional reproduction. The third chapter deals with theme of action and structures in the context of Pierre Bourdieu s thought. Bourdieu s term habitus refers to a system of dispositions which structure social fields. It is argued that habits come close to the concept of habitus in the sense that the latter consists of particular kinds of habits; those that are related to the reproduction of socioeconomic positions. Habits are thus constituents of a general theory of societal reproduction whereas habitus is a systematic combination of socioeconomic habits. The fourth theme relates to issues of social change and development. The capabilities approach has been associated with the name of Amartya Sen, for example, and it underscores problems inhering in economistic ways of evaluating social development. However, Sen s argument has some theoretical problems. For example, his theory cannot adequately confront the problem of relativism. In addition, Sen s discussion lacks also a theory of the role of the public. With the help of arguments derived from pragmatism, one gets an action-based, socially constituted view of freedom in which the role of the public is essential. In general, it is argued that a socially constituted view of agency does not necessarily to lead to pessimistic conclusions about the freedom of action.