Variation in the Understanding of Lutheranism and Its Implications for Religious Education : Meaning Discernment of Students and Teachers in Finnish Upper Secondary Schools

The study investigated variation in the ways in which a group of students and teachers of Evangelical Lutheran religious education in Finnish upper secondary schools understand Lutheranism and searched for educational implications for learning in religious education. The aim of understanding the qualitative variation in understanding Lutheranism was explored through the relationship between the following questions, which correspond to the results reported in the following original refereed publications: 1) How do Finnish students understand Lutheranism? 2) How do Finnish teachers of religious education constitute the meaning of Lutheranism? 3) How could phenomenography and the Variation Theory of Learning contribute to learning about and from religion in the context of Finnish Lutheran Religious Education as compared to religious education in the UK? Two empirical studies (Hella, 2007; Hella, 2008) were undertaken from a phenomenographic research perspective (e.g., Marton, 1981) and the Variation Theory of Learning (e.g., Marton & Tsui et al. 2004) that developed from it. Data was collected from 63 upper secondary students and 40 teachers of religious education through written tasks with open questions and complementary interviews with 11 students and 20 teachers for clarification of meanings. The two studies focused on the content and structure of meaning discernment in students and teachers expressed understandings of Lutheranism. Differences in understandings are due to differences in the meanings that are discerned and focused on. The key differences between the ways students understand varied from understanding Lutheranism as a religion to personal faith with its core in mercy. The logical relationships between the categories that describe variation in understanding express a hierarchy of ascending complexity, according to which more developed understandings are inclusive of less developed ones. The ways the teachers understand relate to student s understandings in a sequential manner. Phenomenography and Variation Theory were discussed in the context of religious education in Finland and the UK in relation to the theoretical notion of learning about and from religion (Hella & Wright, 2008). The thesis suggests that variation theory enables religious educators to recognise the unity of learning about and from religion, as learning is always learning about something and involves simultaneous engagement with the object of learning and development as a person. The study also suggests that phenomenography and variation theory offer a means by which it is possible for academics, policy makers, curriculum designers, teachers and students to learn to discern different ways of understanding the contested nature of religions. Keywords: Lutheranism, understanding, variation, teaching, learning, phenomenography, religious education

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.