Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Rwanda Crisis and Genocide in Case Law of Rwanda Tribunal

After the Second World War the public was shocked to learn about the horrors perpetrated. As a response to the Holocaust, the newly established United Nations adopted the Genocide Convention of 1948 to prevent future genocides and to punish the perpetrators. The Convention remained, however, almost dead letter until the present day. In 1994, the long-lasted tension between the major groups of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda erupted in mass scale violence towards the Tutsi ethnic group. The purpose was to eradicate the Tutsi population of Rwanda. The international community did not halt the genocide. It stood by idle, failing to follow the swearing-in of the past. The United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the ICTR) to bring to justice persons responsible for the genocide. Ever since its creation the ICTR has delivered a wealth of judgements elucidating the legal ingredients of the crime of genocide. The case law on determining the membership of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups has gradually shifted from the objective to subjective position. The membership of a group is seen as a subjective rather than objective concept. However, a totally subjective approach is not accepted. Therefore, it is necessary to determine some objective existence of a group. The provision on the underlying offences is not so difficult to interpret compared to the corresponding one on the protected groups and the mental element of genocide. The case law examined, e.g., whether there is any difference between the words killing and meurtre, the nature of mental harm caused by the perpetrator and sexual violence in the conflict. The mental element of genocide or dolus specialis of genocide is not thoroughly examined in the case law of the ICTR. In this regard, reference in made, in addition, to the case law of the other ad hoc Tribunal. The ICTR has made a significant contribution to the law of genocide and international criminal justice in general. The corpus of procedural and substantive law constitutes a basis for subsequent trials in international and hybrid tribunals. For national jurisdictions the jurisprudence on substantive law is useful while prosecuting international crimes.

Personnel Managers and Crisis Situations. Emotion-handling Strategies

This study focuses on personnel managers in crisis situations. The interviewed personnel managers referred to emotions as a central element to be dealt with in a crisis. However, until recently, the exploration of emotions in organisational life has been de-emphasised or ignored. This study aims to bring to the surface aspects of personnel work that have so far been neglected or remained invisible. It specifically examines how personnel managers handle employees’ and their own emotions in a crisis. Based on the interviews, a number of emotional episodes were constructed. They describe the type and context of the crisis and the person(s) whose emotions are handled. The main findings of the study are the five emotion-handling strategies that could be constructed from the data. The negotiation-like manner in which personnel managers handled emotions in crisis situations proved especially interesting. They were actually negotiating emotional value for their organisations. Further, they handled their own emotions within the frame of two logics of appropriateness labelled mothering and guide-following. The episodes described also enabled identification of the values enacted by the personnel managers in handling emotions. The study provides descriptive information on emotion handling, a current and relevant feature in the practice of personnel management. It seeks to offer a frame for developing practical principles that can be helpful in a crisis. It also offers the opportunity to consider a variety of difficult situations that personnel managers may confront in their work.

Narrative, Memory and the Crisis of Mimesis: the Case of Adam Elsheimer and Giordano Bruno

The triangular space between memory, narrative and pictorial representation is the terrain on which this article is developed. Taking the art of memory developed by Giordano Bruno (1548 – 1600) and the art of painting subtly revolutionised by Adam Elsheimer (1578 – 1610) as test-cases, it is shown how both subvert the norms of mimesis and narration prevalent throughout the Renaissance, how disrupted memory creates “incoherent” narratives, and how perspective and the notion of “place” are questioned in a corollary way. Two paintings by Elsheimer are analysed and shown to include, in spite of their supposed “realism”, numerous incoherencies, aporias and strange elements – often overlooked. Thus, they do not conform to two of the basic rules governing both the classical art of memory and the humanist art of painting: well-defined places and the exhaustive translatability of words into images (and vice-versa). In the work of Bruno, both his philosophical claims and the literary devices he uses are analysed as hints for a similar (and contemporaneous) undermining of conventions about the transparency and immediacy of representation.