Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

"En plan för jämställdhet borde kanske utarbetas, men förekommer det ett behov?" : En kartläggning av 26 svenskspråkiga kommuners främjande av jämställdhet

Jämställdhetslagen från 1995 kräver att både myndigheter och arbetsgivare med aktiva och målinriktade åtgärder främjar jämställdheten, och denna pro gradu-avhandling undersöker närmare hur denna lag implementerats i de finlandssvenska kommunerna (kommuner med majoritetsspråk svenska) under en 10årsperiod. I kommunerna jobbar 80% kvinnor, och 38% av alla kvinnliga arbetstagare hittas i arbeten inom den offentliga sektorn. Kommunens skyldighet att trygga dessa kvinnors lika villkor inom kommunorganisationen ingår både som en del i arbetsgivaransvaret, men även som del i statens demokratiska utövande genom myndighetsansvaret. De tre planer som ingår i mitt material innehåller en kartläggning av jämställdhetsområdet i olika omfattning, definierade mål och åtgärder och ingen av planerna har följts upp efter att de godkänts. Planerna varierar både i utformning och omfattning men också i ansvarsspecificering och åtgärdernas konkretisering, vilken ger en varierande kvalitet och därmed även varierande förutsättning att genomdrivas och därmed uppfylla lagens ålägganden. Två av kommunerna har eller har haft en jämställdhetskommitté. I de 26 inkomna svarsformulär görs en närläsning av hur begreppet jämställdhet används och hur jämställdhetslagen tolkas och orsakerna till frånvaron av jämställdhetsåtgärder. På frågan om varför jämställdhetsarbetet inte genomförts helt eller delvis utkristalliserade sig sex olika argumentationsteman: 1. Myten om den jämställda kommunen, innebär en hänvisning till att det inte förekommit några problem med jämställdheten. 2. Den naturligt integrerade jämställdheten, är kommunens policy och sker utan planer, men en liten kritik av problematiken med frånvaron av planer framförs av några kommuner. 3. Könens komplettering, utgår jämställdhetsbegreppet ifrån i några kommuner. 4. Den matematiska jämställdheten, är argument där man genom hänvisningar till kvinnor på olika högre positioner visar på att jämställdheten är uppnådd. 5.En fråga om resurser, används som ett argument till jämställdhetsarbetets frånvaro i kommunen. 6. Avsaknad av intresse, hos personalen och allmänheten är ett annat argument för ogenomförda jämställdhetsåtgärder. Det framkommer tydligt i materialet att kommunerna anser sig följa jämställdhetslagen, samtidigt som det blir tydligt att det råder en oklarhet om vad jämställdhetslagen från 1995 egentligen innehåller. En tydlig sammanblandning mellan den lagstadgade kvoteringen och skyldigheten att aktivt främja jämställdhet träder fram i materialet. Det ofullständiga jämställdhetsarbetet strandar på olika punkter, men en avgörande anser punkt är oförståelsen inför begreppet jämställdhet och därmed också lagens syfte och innehåll. Avhandlingens slutsats är att frånvaron av en könsmaktanalys försvårar förståelsen av ojämställdhetens komplexhet, dvs. dess orsaker, mångskiftande funktion och olika uttryck i organisationens strukturer och i de handlande aktörerna.

NORDEK : A Plan for Increased Nordic Economic Co-operation and Integration 1968-1970

For the first time the attempt of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to increase Nordic economic co-operation and integration (NORDEK 1968-1970) is analysed by using records from the four governments archives and interviews with central actors participating. A dominating argument has until now been that dynamics in Nordic economic integration is different from dynamics in European integration. This archive based study disproves the myth however of ideological Nordism and of short term political developments outside Norden as most important for the NORDEK initiative. The NORDEK initiative was actually more a consequence of a long term socioeconomic and socio-political path dependant process. The study also disproves the myth that the NORDEK plan was a political and ideological symbol without socioeconomic substance. The purpose with NORDEK was to create a better basis for generating economic growth and social welfare. The proposed NORDEK institutions were therefore developed to promote economic progress. The study finally shows that the NORDEK failure in 1970 was not a result of lacking economic rationale or incompatible economic interests. The failure was a result of a power struggle in Finnish domestic policy and lacking political will in the other Nordic countries to continue without Finland.

On the force potential of strategy texts: a critical discourse analysis of a strategic plan and its power effects in a city organization

Despite increasing interest in the discursive aspects of strategy, few studies have examined strategy texts and their power effects. We draw from Critical Discourse Analysis to better understand the power of strategic plans as a directive genre. In our empirical analysis, we examined the creation of the official strategic plan of the City of Lahti in Finland. As a result of our inductive analysis, we identified five central discursive features of this plan: self-authorization, special terminology, discursive innovation, forced consensus and deonticity. We argue that these features can, with due caution, be generalized and conceived as distinctive features of the strategy genre. We maintain that these discursive features are not trivial characteristics; they have important implications for the textual agency of strategic plans, their performative effects, impact on power relations and ideological implications.

Studies on Stone Age Housepits in Fennoscandia (4000 - 2000 cal BC) : Changes in ground plan, site location and degree of sedentism

Housepits have a remarkably short research history as compared to Fennoscandian archaeological research on the Stone Age in general. The current understanding of the numbers and the distribution of Stone Age housepits in the Nordic countries has, for the most part, been shaped by archaeological studies carried out over the last twenty to thirty years. The main subjects of this research are Neolithic housepits, which are archaeological remains of semi-subterranean pithouses. This dissertation consists of five peer-reviewed articles and a synthesis paper. The articles deal with the development of housepits as seen in the data gathered from Finland (the Lake Saimaa area and south-eastern Finland) and Russia (the Karelian Isthmus). This synthesis expands the discussion of the changes observed in the Papers to include Fennoscandian housepit research as a whole. Certain changes in the size, shape, environmental location, and clustering of housepits extended into various cultures and ecological zones in northern Fennoscandia. Previously, the evolution of housepits has been interpreted to have been caused by the adaptation of Neolithic societies to prevailing environmental circumstances or to re-organization following contacts with the agrarian Corded Ware/Battle Axe Cultures spreading to North. This dissertation argues for two waves of change in the pithouse building tradition. Both waves brought with them certain changes in the pithouses themselves and in the practices of locating the dwellings in the environment/landscape. The changes in housepits do not go hand in hand with other changes in material culture, nor are the changes restricted to certain ecological environments. Based on current information, it appears that the changes relate primarily to the spread of new concepts of housing and possibly to new technology, as opposed to representing merely a local response to environmental factors. This development commenced already before the birth of the Corded Ware/Battle Axe Cultures. Therefore, the changes are argued to have resulted from the spreading of new ideas through the same networks that actively distributed commodities, exotic goods, and raw materials over vast areas between the southern Baltic Sea, the north-west Russian forest zone, and Fennoscandia.