Empirical Analysis of Competition in Procurement Auctions

A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize public revenue. Maximizing public revenue means minimizing the costs of procurement. Both of these goals are important from the welfare point of view. In this thesis, I analyze field data from procurement auctions and show how empirical analysis can be used to help design the auctions to maximize public revenue. In particular, I concentrate on how competition, which means the number of bidders, should be taken into account in the design of auctions. In the first chapter, the main policy question is whether the auctioneer should spend resources to induce more competition. The information paradigm is essential in analyzing the effects of competition. We talk of a private values information paradigm when the bidders know their valuations exactly. In a common value information paradigm, the information about the value of the object is dispersed among the bidders. With private values more competition always increases the public revenue but with common values the effect of competition is uncertain. I study the effects of competition in the City of Helsinki bus transit market by conducting tests for common values. I also extend an existing test by allowing bidder asymmetry. The information paradigm seems to be that of common values. The bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common value elements than those whose garages are further away. Therefore, attracting more bidders does not necessarily lower procurement costs, and thus the City should not implement costly policies to induce more competition. In the second chapter, I ask how the auctioneer can increase its revenue by changing contract characteristics like contract sizes and durations. I find that the City of Helsinki should shorten the contract duration in the bus transit auctions because that would decrease the importance of common value components and cheaply increase entry which now would have a more beneficial impact on the public revenue. Typically, cartels decrease the public revenue in a significant way. In the third chapter, I propose a new statistical method for detecting collusion and compare it with an existing test. I argue that my test is robust to unobserved heterogeneity unlike the existing test. I apply both methods to procurement auctions that contract snow removal in schools of Helsinki. According to these tests, the bidding behavior of two of the bidders seems consistent with a contract allocation scheme.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Essays on Market Microstructure: Price Discovery and Informed Trading

Market microstructure is “the study of the trading mechanisms used for financial securities” (Hasbrouck (2007)). It seeks to understand the sources of value and reasons for trade, in a setting with different types of traders, and different private and public information sets. The actual mechanisms of trade are a continually changing object of study. These include continuous markets, auctions, limit order books, dealer markets, or combinations of these operating as a hybrid market. Microstructure also has to allow for the possibility of multiple prices. At any given time an investor may be faced with a multitude of different prices, depending on whether he or she is buying or selling, the quantity he or she wishes to trade, and the required speed for the trade. The price may also depend on the relationship that the trader has with potential counterparties. In this research, I touch upon all of the above issues. I do this by studying three specific areas, all of which have both practical and policy implications. First, I study the role of information in trading and pricing securities in markets with a heterogeneous population of traders, some of whom are informed and some not, and who trade for different private or public reasons. Second, I study the price discovery of stocks in a setting where they are simultaneously traded in more than one market. Third, I make a contribution to the ongoing discussion about market design, i.e. the question of which trading systems and ways of organizing trading are most efficient. A common characteristic throughout my thesis is the use of high frequency datasets, i.e. tick data. These datasets include all trades and quotes in a given security, rather than just the daily closing prices, as in traditional asset pricing literature. This thesis consists of four separate essays. In the first essay I study price discovery for European companies cross-listed in the United States. I also study explanatory variables for differences in price discovery. In my second essay I contribute to earlier research on two issues of broad interest in market microstructure: market transparency and informed trading. I examine the effects of a change to an anonymous market at the OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange. I broaden my focus slightly in the third essay, to include releases of macroeconomic data in the United States. I analyze the effect of these releases on European cross-listed stocks. The fourth and last essay examines the uses of standard methodologies of price discovery analysis in a novel way. Specifically, I study price discovery within one market, between local and foreign traders.

The Value of Being on the Net- the effects of Web sites of companies on consumer decision making

The unique characteristics of marketspace in combination with the fast growing number of consumers interested in e-commerce have created new research areas of interest to both marketing and consumer behaviour researchers. Consumer behaviour researchers interested in the decision making processes of consumers have two new sets of questions to answer. The first set of questions is related to how useful theories developed for a marketplace are in a marketspace context. Cyber auctions, Internet communities and the possibilities for consumers to establish dialogues not only with companies but also with other consumers make marketspace unique. The effects of these distinctive characteristics on the behaviour of consumers have not been systematically analysed and therefore constitute the second set of questions which have to be studied. Most companies feel that they have to be online even though the effects of being on the Net are not unambiguously positive. The relevance of the relationship marketing paradigm in a marketspace context have to be studied. The relationship enhancement effects of websites from the customers’ point of view are therefore emphasized in this research paper. Representatives of the Net-generation were analysed and the results show that companies should develop marketspace strategies while Net presence has a value-added effect on consumers. The results indicate that the decision making processes of the consumers are also changing as a result of the progress of marketspace