Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Salaiset aseveljet : Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933-1944

Salaiset aseveljet deals with the relations and co-operation between Finnish and German security police authorities, the Finnish valtiollinen poliisi and the German Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) and its predecessors. The timeframe for the research stretches from the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 to the end of German-Finnish co-belligerency in 1944. The Finnish Security Police was founded in 1919 to protect the young Finnish Republic from the Communists both in Finland and in Soviet Russia. Professional ties to German colleagues were maintained during the 1920 s, and quickly re-established after the Nazis rose to power in Germany. Typical forms of co-operation concentrated on the fight against both domestic and international Communism, a concern particularly acute in Finland because of her exposed position as a neighbour to the Soviet Union. The common enemy proved to be a powerful unifying concept. During the 1930 s the forms of co-operation developed from regular and routine exchanges of information into personal acquaintancies between the Finnish Security Police top personnel and the highest SS-leadership. The critical period of German-Finnish security police co-operation began in 1941, as Finland joined the German assault on the Soviet Union. Together with the Finnish Security Police, the RSHA set up a previously unknown special unit, the Einsatzkommando Finnland, entrusted with the destruction of the perceived ideological and racial enemies on the northernmost part of the German Eastern Front. Joint actions in northern Finland led also members of the Finnish Security Police to become participants in mass murders of Communists and Jews. Post-war criminal investigations into war crimes cases involving former security police personnel were invariably stymied because of the absence of usually both the suspects and the evidence. In my research I have sought to combine the evidence gathered through an exhaustive study of Finnish Security Police archival material with a wide selection of foreign sources. Important new evidence has been gathered from archives in Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and the United States. Piece by piece, it has become possible to draw a comprehensive picture of the ultimately fateful relationship of the Finnish Security Police to its mighty German colleague.

Investigations of Noise-Related Tinnitus

Tinnitus is a frequent consequence of noise trauma. Usually, however, the main focus regarding the consequences of noise trauma is placed on hearing loss, instead of tinnitus. The objectives of the present study were to assess various aspects of noise-related tinnitus in Finland, such as to determine the main causes of conscript acute acoustic traumas (AAT) in the military, assess tinnitus prevalence after noise trauma, characterize long-term AAT-related tinnitus prevalence and characteristics, assess occupational tinnitus, and evaluate the efficacy of hearing protection regulations in preventing hearing loss and tinnitus. The study comprised several independent noise-exposed groups: conscripts performing their military duty, former conscripts who suffered an AAT over a decade earlier, bomb explosion victims, and retired army personnel. Tinnitus questionnaires were used to assess tinnitus prevalence and characteristics. For occupational tinnitus, occupational noise-induced hearing loss (NIHL) reports to the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health were reviewed. Tinnitus is a common result of AAT, blast exposure and long-term noise exposure. Despite hearing protection regulations, up to hundreds of AATs occur annually among conscripts in the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). The most common cause is an accidental shot, accounting for approximately half of the cases. Conscript AATs are mainly due to accidental shots, while the ear is unprotected. Only seldom is an AAT due to negligence. The most common causative weapon of conscript AATs is the assault rifle, accounting for 81% of conscript AATs. After AAT, the majority of tinnitus cases resolve during military service and become asymptomatic. However, in one-fifth of the cases, tinnitus persists, causing problems such as sleeping and concentration difficulties in many. In Finland, occupational tinnitus often remains unreported in conjunction with NIHL reports. In a survey of occupational NIHL cases, tinnitus was mentioned in only four per cent. However, a subsequent inquiry revealed that almost 90% in fact had tinnitus, indicating that most cases remained undetected and unreported. The best way to prevent noise-related tinnitus is prevention of noise trauma. In the military, hearing protection guidelines have been revised several times over the years. These regulations have been effective in reducing hearing loss of professional soldiers. There has also been a reduction in cases with tinnitus, but the decrease was not significant. However, with improved hearing protection regulations, a significant reduction in the risk of more serious, disturbing tinnitus was observed.