Concepts of Narrative

Transposed to media like film, drama, opera, music, and the visual arts, “narrative” is no longer characterized by either temporality or an act of telling, both required by earlier narratological theories. Transposed to other disciplines, “narrative” is often a substitute for “assumption”, “hypothesis”, a disguised ideological stance, a cognitive scheme, and even life itself. The potential for broadening the concept lay dormant in narratology, both in the double use of “narrative” for the medium-free fabula and for the medium-bound sjuzet, and in changing interpretations of “event”. Some advantages of the broad use of “narrative” are an evocation of commonalities among media and disciplines, an invitation to re-think the term within the originating discipline, a constructivist challenge to positivistic and foundational views, an emphasis on a plurality of competing “truths”, and an empowerment of minority voices. Conversely, disadvantages of the broad use are an illusion of sameness whenever the term is used and the obliteration of specificity. In a Wittgensteinian spirit, the essay agrees that concepts of narrative are mutually related by “family resemblance”, but wishes to probe the resemblances further. It thus postulates two necessary features: double temporality and a transmitting (or mediating) agency, and an additional cluster of variable optional characteristics. When the necessary features are not dominant, the configuration may have “narrative elements” but is not “a narrative”.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.