Luce Irigaray's Philosophy of Feminine Being : Body, Desire and Wisdom

Luce Irigaray is a Belgian-born philosopher, psychoanalyst and linguist. Irigaray s concept of woman is crucial for understanding her own work but also for examining and developing the theoretical and methodological basis of feminist theory. This thesis argues that, ultimately, Irigaray s exploration of woman s being challenges our traditional notion of philosophy as a neutral discourse and the traditional notion of ourselves as philosophizing persons or human beings. However, despite its crucial role, Irigaray s idea of woman still lacks a comprehensive explication. This is because the discourse of sexual difference is blurred by the ideas of essentialism and biologism. --- Irigaray s concept of woman has been interpreted and criticized from the perspectives of metaphysical essentialism, strategic essentialism, realist essentialism and deconstructionism. This thesis argues that a reinterpretation is necessary to account for Irigaray s claims about the the traditional woman , mimesis, the specificity of the feminine body, feminine expression and sexual difference. Moreover, any reading should account for the differences between women and avoid giving a prescriptive function to the essence of woman. --- My thesis develops a new interpretation of Irigaray s concept of woman on the basis of the phenomenology of the body. It argues that Irigaray s discourse on woman can and must be understood by an idea of existential style. Existential style is embodied, affective and spiritual and it is constituted in relation to oneself, to others and to the world. It is temporal, it evolves and changes but preserves its open unity in its transformations. Stylistic unities, such as femininity or philosophy, are constituted in and by the singulars. -- This study discusses and analyses feminine existential style as a central theme and topic of Irigaray s works and shows how her work operates as a primary and paradigmatic example of the feminine style. These tasks are performed by studying the mimetic positions available for women and by explicating the phenomenological background of Irigaray s conceptions of the philosophical method, and the lived, expressive and affective body. The critical occupation and transformation of these mimetic positions, the inquiry into the first-person pre-discursive experience, and the cultivation of feminine expressivity open up the possibility of becoming a woman writer, a woman lover and a woman philosopher. The appearance of these new feminine figures is a precondition for the realization of sexual difference. So Irigaray opens up the possibility of sexual difference by instituting and constituting a feminine subject of love and wisdom, and by problematizing the idea of a neutral and absolute subject.

The One and The Many : In the works of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi

This paper concentrates on Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The focus is on their ideas on change and whether the world is essentially One or if it is composed of many entities. In the first chapter I go over some general tendences in Greek and Chinese philosophy. The differences in the cultural background have an influence in the ways philosophy is made, but the paper aims to show that two questions can be brought up when comparing the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The questions are; is the world essentially One or Many? Is change real and if it is, what is the nature of it and how does it take place? For Heraclitus change is real, and as will be shown later in the chapter, quite essential for the sustainability of the world-order (kosmos). The key-concept in the case of Heraclitus is Logos. Heraclitus uses Logos in several senses, most well known relating to his element-theory. But another important feature of the Logos, the content of real wisdom, is to be able to regard everything as one. This does not mean that world is essentially one for Heraclitus in the ontological sense, but that we should see the underlying unity of multiple phenomena. Heraclitus regards this as hen panta: All from One, One from All. I characterize Heraclitus as epistemic monist and an ontological pluralist. It is plausible that the views of Heraclitus on change were the focus of Parmenides’ severe criticism. Parmenides held the view that the world is essentially one and that to see it as consisting of many entities was the error of mortals, i.e. the common man and his philosophical predecessors. For Parmenides what-is, can be approached by two routes; The Way of Truth (Aletheia) and The Way of Seeming (Doxa). Aletheia essentially sees the world as one, where even time is an illusion. In Doxa Parmenides is giving an explanation of the world seen as consisting of many entities and this is his contribution to the line of thought of his predecessors. It should be noted that a strong emphasis is given to the Aletheia, whereas the world-view given is in Doxa is only probable. I go on to describe Parmenides as ontological monist, who gives some plausibility to pluralistic views. In the work of Lao Zi world can be seen as One or as consisting of Many entities. In my interpretation, Lao Zi uses Dao in two different senses; Dao is the totality of things or the order in change. The wu-aspect (seeing-without-form) attends the world as one, whereas the you-aspect attends the world of many entities. In wu-aspect, Dao refers to the totality of things, when in you-aspect Dao is the order or law in change. There are two insights in Lao Zi regarding the relationship between wu- and- you-apects; in ch.1 it is stated that they are two separate aspects in seeing the world, the other chapters regarding that you comes from wu. This naturally brings in the question whether the One is the peak of seeing the world as many. In other words, is there a way from pluralism to monism. All these considerations make it probable that the work attributed to Lao Zi has been added new material or is a compilation of oral sayings. In the end of the paper I will go on to give some insights on how Logos and Dao can be compared in a relevant manner. I also compare Parmenides holistic monism to Lao Zi’s Dao as nameless totality (i.e. in its wu-aspect). I briefly touch the issues of Heidegger and the future of comparative philosophy.