Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Importance of COMT in the regulation of prefrontal dopamine

The prefrontal cortex (PFC), located in the anterior region of the frontal lobe, is considered to have several key roles in higher cognitive and executive functions. In general, the PFC can be seen as a coordinator of thought and action allowing subjects to behave in a goal-directed manner. Due to its anatomical connections with a variety of cortical and subcortical structures, several neurotransmitters, including dopamine, are involved in the regulation of PFC activity. In general, the majority of released dopamine is cleared by the dopamine transporter (DAT). In the PFC however, the number of presynaptic DAT is diminished, emphasizing the relative importance of catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) in dopamine metabolism. As a result, the role of COMT in the etiology of psychotic disorders is under constant debate. The present study investigated the role of COMT in prefrontal cortical dopamine metabolism by different neurochemical methods in COMT knockout (COMT-KO) mice. Pharmacological tools to inhibit other dopamine clearing mechanisms were also used for a more comprehensive and collective picture. In addition, this study investigated how a lack of the soluble (S-) COMT isoform affects the total COMT activity as well as the pharmacokinetics of orally administered L-dopa using mutant mice expressing only the membrane-bound (MB-) COMT isoform. Also the role of COMT in striatal and accumbal dopamine turnover during Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) challenge was studied. We found markedly increased basal dopamine concentrations in the PFC, but not the striatum or nucleus accumbens (NAcc), of mice lacking COMT. Pharmacological inhibition of the noradrenaline transporter (NET) and monoamine oxidase (MAO) elevated prefrontal cortical dopamine levels several-fold, whereas inhibition of DAT did not. The lack of COMT doubled the dopamine raising effects of NET and MAO inhibition. No compensatory expression of either DAT or NET was found in the COMT-KO mice. The lack of S-COMT decreased the total COMT activity by 50-70 % and modified dopamine transmission and the pharmacokinetics of exogenous Ldopa in a sex and tissue specific manner. Finally, we found that subsequent tolcapone and THC increased dopamine levels in the NAcc, but not in the striatum. Conclusively, this study presents neurochemical evidence for the important role of COMT in the PFC and shows that COMT is responsible for about half of prefrontal cortical dopamine metabolism. This study also highlights the previously underestimated proportional role of MB-COMT and supports the clinical evidence of a gene x environment interaction between COMT and cannabis.