Fictionalising Trauma : The Aesthetics of Marguerite Duras's India Cycle

Marguerite Duras (1914−1996) was one of the most original French writers and film directors, whose cycles are renowned for a transgeneric repetition variation of human suffering in the modern condition. Her fictionalisation of Asian colonialism, the India Cycle (1964−1976), consists of three novels, Le ravissement de Lol V. Stein (1964), Le Vice-consul (1966) and L'amour (1971), a theatre play, India Song (1973), and three films, La Femme du Gange (1973), India Song (1974) and Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desért (1976). Duras’s cultural position as a colon in inter-war ‘Indochina’ was the backdrop for this “théâtre-text-film”, while its creation was provoked by the atrocities of World War II and post-war decolonisation. Fictionalising Trauma analyses the aesthetics of the India Cycle as Duras’s critical working-through of historical trauma. From an emotion-focused cognitive viewpoint, the study sheds light on trauma’s narrativisation using the renewed concept of traumatic memory developed by current social neuroscience. Duras is shown to integrate embodied memory and narrative memory into an emotionally progressing fiction. Thus the rhetoric of the India Cycle epitomises a creative symbolisation of the unsayable, which revises the concept of trauma from a semiotic failure into an imaginative metaphorical process. The India Cycle portrays the stagnated situation of a white society in Europe and British India during the thirties. The narratives of three European protagonists and one fictional Cambodian mendicant are organised as analogues mirroring the effects of rejection and loss on both sides of the colonial system. Using trauma as a conceptual prism, the study rearticulates this composition as three roles: those of witnessing writers, rejected survivors and colonial perpetrators. Three problems are analysed in turn by reading the non-verbal markers of the text: the white man as a witness, the subversive trope of the madwoman and the deadlock of the colonists’ destructive passion. The study reveals emotion and fantasy to be crucial elements in critical trauma fiction. Two devices intertwine throughout the cycle: affective images of trauma expressing the horror of life and death, and self-reflexive metafiction distancing the face-value of the melodramatic stories. This strategy dismantles racist and sexist discourses underpinning European life, thus demanding a renewal of cultural memory by an empathic listening to the ‘other’. And as solipsism and madness lead the lives of the white protagonists to tragic ends, the ‘real’ beggar in Calcutta lives in ecological harmony with Nature. This emphasises the failure of colonialism, as the Durasian phantasm ambiguously strives for a deconstruction of the exotic mythical fiction of French ‘Indochina’.

Mikä on ihme ja mitä ihmeistä voidaan tietää? : Keskustelu ihmeistä uusimmassa englanninkielisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa

What is a miracle and what can we know about miracles? A discussion of miracles in anglophone philosophy of religion literature since the late 1960s. The aim of this study is to systematically describe and philosophically examine the anglophone discussion on the subject of miracles since the latter half of the 1960s. The study focuses on two salient questions: firstly, what I will term the conceptual-ontological question of the extent to which we can understand miracles and, secondly, the epistemological question of what we can know about miracles. My main purpose in this study is to examine the various viewpoints that have been submitted in relation to these questions, how they have been argued and on what presuppositions these arguments have been based. In conducting the study, the most salient dimension of the various discussions was found to relate to epistemological questions. In this regard, there was a notable confrontation between those scholars who accept miracles and those who are sceptical of them. On the conceptual-ontological side I recognised several different ways of expressing the concept of miracle . I systematised the discussion by demonstrating the philosophical boundaries between these various opinions. The first and main boundary was related to ontological knowledge. On one side of this boundary I placed the views which were based on realism and objectivism. The proponents of this view assumed that miraculousness is a real property of a miraculous event regardless of how we can perceive it. On the other side I put the views which tried to define miraculousness in terms of subjectivity, contextuality and epistemicity. Another essential boundary which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion was drawn in relation to two main views of nature. The realistic-particularistic view regards nature as a certain part of reality. The adherents of this presupposition postulate a supernatural sphere alongside nature. Alternatively, the nominalist-universalist view understands nature without this kind of division. Nature is understood as the entire and infinite universe; the whole of reality. Other, less important boundaries which shed light on the conceptual-ontological discussion were noted in relation to views regarding the laws of nature, for example. I recognised that the most important differences between the epistemological approaches were in the different views of justification, rationality, truth and science. The epistemological discussion was divided into two sides, distinguished by their differing assumptions in relation to the need for evidence. Adherents of the first (and noticeably smaller) group did not see any epistemological need to reach a universal and common opinion about miracles. I discovered that these kinds of views, which I called non-objectivist, had subjectivist and so-called collectivist views of justification and a contextualist view of rationality. The second (and larger) group was mainly interested in discerning the grounds upon which to establish an objective and conclusive common view in relation to the epistemology of miracles. I called this kind of discussion an objectivist discussion and this kind of approach an evidentialist approach. Most of the evidentialists tried to defend miracles and the others attempted to offer evidence against miracles. Amongst both sides, there were many different variations according to emphasis and assumption over how they saw the possibilities to prove their own view. The common characteristic in all forms of evidentialism was a commitment to an objectivist notion of rationality and a universalistic notion of justification. Most evidentialists put their confidence in science in one way or another. Only a couple of philosophers represented the most moderate version of evidentialism; they tried to remove themselves from the apparent controversy and contextualised the different opinions in order to make some critical comments on them. I called this kind of approach a contextualising form of evidentialism. In the final part of the epistemological chapter, I examined the discussion about the evidential value of miracles, but nothing substantially new was discovered concerning the epistemological views of the authors.