Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Kysymys esineellisyydestä : Georg Lukácsin esineellistymisteoria ja Martin Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia

Käsilläolevan tutkielman aiheena on esineellistymisen käsite. Sitä tarkastellaan yhtäältä sellaisena kuten se esitetään Georg Lukácsin (1885-1971) teoksessa Historia ja luokkatietoisuus (1923), toisaalta kuten sitä koskeva teoria on luettavissa esiin Martin Heideggerin (1889-1976) läpimurtoteoksesta Oleminen ja aika (1927). Molemmat ajattelijat pyrkivät teoksissaan rakentamaan kokonaisvaltaista tulkintaa länsimaisen ajattelun ja toiminnan taipumuksesta tulkita todellisuus esineellisenä (dinglich), so. eletystä elämästä ja toiminnasta irrallisena olioiden (Dinge) maailmana. Sekä Lukács että Heidegger pyrkivät osoittamaan, että esineellistyneen todellisuuden ontologisena perustana toimii inhimillisen praktisen toiminnan kenttä, josta käsin esineellistävät ja objektivoivat suhtautumistavat todellisuuteen voivat vasta jälkikäteisesti syntyä. Molemmille ajattelijoille esineellisyyden muodostuminen ontologiaa hallitsevaksi tulkinnaksi todellisuuden luonteesta edellyttää myös tietynlaisia sosiaalisen olemisen rakenteita. Tutkielmassa tehdään vertailevaa käsiteanalyysia Lukácsin ja Heideggerin teoreettisten diskurssien välillä. Tavoitteena on rakentaa mahdollisuutta lukea mainittuja filosofeja saman, modernille olemassaololle keskeisen ontologisen sekä eksistentiaalisen ongelman tarkastelijoina. Toisaalta vertaileva lähestymistapa pyrkii myös tuomaan esiin olennaisia ja perustavia eroja Lukácsin marxilaisen ja Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologisen orientaation välillä. Tutkielmassa pyritäänkin osoittamaan, että Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia ei tarkastele kauppatavaran rakennetta eikä sosiaalisen vaihdon prosesseja marxilaisesta näkökulmasta riittävällä tavalla, kun taas Lukácsin teoreettinen projekti tulee edellyttäneeksi tuottavaan subjektiviteettiin pohjautuvan ontologisen perusasenteen. Tämä ontologinen positio voidaan puolestaan kritisoida hedelmällisesti heideggerilaisesta näkökulmasta. Viime kädessä tutkielma pyrkii avaamaan esineellistymisteorioiden vertailun kautta kysymyksen länsimarxilaisen materialistisen dialektiikan ja Heideggerin fenomenologisen ontologian välisestä suhteesta.

Rhetoric and public speech in English republicanism, 1642-1681

The study analyses the ambivalent relationship republicanism, as a form of self-government free from domination, had with the ideal of participatory oratory and non-dominated speech on the one hand, and with the danger of unhindered demagogy and its possibly fatal consequences to that form of government on the other. Although previous scholarship has delved deeply into republicanism as well as into rhetoric and public speech, the interplay between those aspects has only gathered scattered interest, and there has been no systematic study considering the variety of republican approaches to rhetoric and public speech in 17th-century England. The rare attempts to do so have been studies in English literature, and they have not analysed the political philosophy of republicanism, as the focus has been on republicanism as a literary culture. This study connects the fields of political theory, political history as well as literature in order to make a multidisciplinary contribution to intellectual history. The study shows that, within the tradition of classical republicanism, individual authors could make different choices when addressing the problematic topics of public speech and rhetoric, and the variety of their conclusions often set the authors against each other, resulting in the development of their theories through internal debates within the republican tradition. The authors under study were chosen to reflect this variety and the connections between them: the similarities between James Harrington and John Streater, and between John Milton and John Hall of Durham are shown, as well the controversies between Harrington and Milton, and Streater and Hall, respectively. In addition, by analysing the writings of Marchamont Nedham the study will show that the choices were not limited to more, or less, democratic brands of republicanism. Most significantly, the study provides a thorough analysis of the political philosophies behind the various brands of republicanism, in addition to describing them. By means of this analysis, the study shows that previous attempts to assess the role of free speech and public debate, through the lenses of modern, rights-based liberal political theory have resulted in an inappropriate framework for understanding early modern English republicanism. By approaching the topics through concepts used by the republicans legitimate authority, leadership by oratory, and republican freedom and through the frames of reference available and familiar to them roles of education and institutions the study presents a thorough and systematic analysis of the role and function of rhetoric and public speech in English republicanism. The findings of this analysis have significant consequences to our current understanding of the history and development of republican political theory, and, more generally, of the connections between democratic theory and free speech.