Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Pietismin kuva - ikkuna yksityiseen hengellisyyteen : Johann Arndtin opetukset pietistisen embleemin perustana

The image of Pietism a window to personal spirituality. The teachings of Johann Arndt as the basis of Pietist emblems The Pietist effect on spiritual images has to be scrutinised as a continuum initiating from the teachings of Johann Arndt who created a protestant iconography that defended the status of pictures and images as the foundation of divine revelation. Pietist artworks reveal Arndtian part of secret, eternal world, and God. Even though modern scholars do not regarded him as a founding father of Pietism anymore, his works have been essential for the development of iconography, and the themes of the Pietist images are linked with his works. For Arndt, the starting point is in the affecting love for Christ who suffered for the humankind. The reading experience is personal and the words point directly at the reader and thus appear as evidence of the guilt of the reader as well as of the love of God. Arndt uses bounteous and descriptive language which has partially affected promoting and picturing of many themes. Like Arndt, Philipp Jakob Spener also emphasised the heart that believes. The Pietist movement was born to oppose detached faith and the lack of the Holy Ghost. Christians touched by the teachings of Arndt and Spener began to create images out of metaphors presented by Arndt. As those people were part of the intelligentsia, it was natural that the fashionable emblematics of the 17th century was moulded for the personal needs. For Arndt, the human heart is manifested as a symbol of soul, personal faith or unbelief as well as an allegory of the burning love for Jesus. Due to this fact, heart emblems were gradually widely used and linked with the love of Christ. In the Nordic countries, the introduction of emblems emanated from the gentry s connections to the Central Europe where emblems were exploited in order to decorate books, artefacts, interiors, and buildings as well as visual/literal trademarks of the intelligentsia. Emblematic paintings in the churches of the castles of Venngarn (1665) and Läckö (1668), owned by Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie, are one of the most central interior paintings preserved in the Nordic countries, and they emphasise personal righteous life. Nonetheless, it was the books by Arndt and the Poet s Society in Nurnberg that bound the Swedish gentry and the scholars of the Pietist movement together. The Finnish gentry had no castles or castle churches so they supported county churches, both in building and in maintenance. As the churches were not private, their iconography could not be private either. Instead, people used Pietist symbols such as Agnus Dei, Cor ardens, an open book, beams, king David, frankincense, wood themes and Virtues. In the Pietist images made for public spaces, the attention is focused on pedagogical, metaphorical, and meaningful presentation as well as concealed statements.

Kysymys esineellisyydestä : Georg Lukácsin esineellistymisteoria ja Martin Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia

Käsilläolevan tutkielman aiheena on esineellistymisen käsite. Sitä tarkastellaan yhtäältä sellaisena kuten se esitetään Georg Lukácsin (1885-1971) teoksessa Historia ja luokkatietoisuus (1923), toisaalta kuten sitä koskeva teoria on luettavissa esiin Martin Heideggerin (1889-1976) läpimurtoteoksesta Oleminen ja aika (1927). Molemmat ajattelijat pyrkivät teoksissaan rakentamaan kokonaisvaltaista tulkintaa länsimaisen ajattelun ja toiminnan taipumuksesta tulkita todellisuus esineellisenä (dinglich), so. eletystä elämästä ja toiminnasta irrallisena olioiden (Dinge) maailmana. Sekä Lukács että Heidegger pyrkivät osoittamaan, että esineellistyneen todellisuuden ontologisena perustana toimii inhimillisen praktisen toiminnan kenttä, josta käsin esineellistävät ja objektivoivat suhtautumistavat todellisuuteen voivat vasta jälkikäteisesti syntyä. Molemmille ajattelijoille esineellisyyden muodostuminen ontologiaa hallitsevaksi tulkinnaksi todellisuuden luonteesta edellyttää myös tietynlaisia sosiaalisen olemisen rakenteita. Tutkielmassa tehdään vertailevaa käsiteanalyysia Lukácsin ja Heideggerin teoreettisten diskurssien välillä. Tavoitteena on rakentaa mahdollisuutta lukea mainittuja filosofeja saman, modernille olemassaololle keskeisen ontologisen sekä eksistentiaalisen ongelman tarkastelijoina. Toisaalta vertaileva lähestymistapa pyrkii myös tuomaan esiin olennaisia ja perustavia eroja Lukácsin marxilaisen ja Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologisen orientaation välillä. Tutkielmassa pyritäänkin osoittamaan, että Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia ei tarkastele kauppatavaran rakennetta eikä sosiaalisen vaihdon prosesseja marxilaisesta näkökulmasta riittävällä tavalla, kun taas Lukácsin teoreettinen projekti tulee edellyttäneeksi tuottavaan subjektiviteettiin pohjautuvan ontologisen perusasenteen. Tämä ontologinen positio voidaan puolestaan kritisoida hedelmällisesti heideggerilaisesta näkökulmasta. Viime kädessä tutkielma pyrkii avaamaan esineellistymisteorioiden vertailun kautta kysymyksen länsimarxilaisen materialistisen dialektiikan ja Heideggerin fenomenologisen ontologian välisestä suhteesta.