8 resultados para Strike insurance
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.
Resumo:
The aim of the present study was to determine relationships between insurance status and utilization of oral health care and its characteristics and to identify factors related to insured patients’ selection of dental clinic or dentist. The study was based on cross-sectional data obtained through phone interviews. The target population included adults in the city of Tehran. Using a two-stage stratified random technique, 3,200 seven-digit numbers resembling real phone numbers were drawn; when calling, 1,669 numbers were unavailable (busy, no answer, fax, line blocked). Of the 1,531 subjects who answered the phone call, 224 were outside the target age (under 18), and 221 refused to respond, leaving 1,086 subjects in the final sample. The interviews were carried out using a structured questionnaire and covered characteristics of dental visits, the respondent’s reason for selecting a particular dentist or clinic and demographic and socio-economic background (gender, age, level of education, income, and insurance status). Data analysis included the Chi-square test, ANOVA, and logistic regression and the corresponding odds ratios (OR). Of all the 1,086 respondents, 57% were women, 62% were under age 35, 46% had a medium and 34% a high level of education, 13% were under the poverty line, and 70% had insurance coverage; 64% with the public, and 6% with a commercial insurance. Having insurance coverage was more likely for women (OR=1.5), for those in the oldest age group (OR=2.0), and for those with a high level of education (OR=2.5). Of those with dental insurance, 54% reported having had a dental visit within the past 12 months ; more often by those with commercial insurance in comparison with public (65% vs. 53% p<0.001). Check-up as the reason for the most recent visit occurred most frequently among those with commercial insurance (28%) compared with those having public insurance (16%) or being non-insured (13%) (p<0.001). Having had two or more dental visits within the past 12 months was most common among insured respondents, when compared with the non-insured (31% vs. 22% p=0.01). The non-insured respondents reported tooth extractions almost twice as frequently as did the insured ones (p<0.001). Of the 726 insured subjects, 60% selected fully out-of-pocket-paid services (FOP), and 53% were unaware of their insurance benefits. Of those who selected FOP, good interpersonal aspects (OR=4.6), being unaware of dental insurance benefits (OR=4.6), and good technical aspects (OR=2.3) as a reason had greater odds of selecting FOP. The present study revealed that dental insurance was positively related to demand for oral health care as well as to utilization of services, but to the latter with a minor extent. Among insured respondents, despite their opportunity to use fully or highly subsidized oral health care services, good interpersonal relationship and high quality of services were the most important factors when an insured patient selected a dentist or a clinic. The present findings indicate a clear need to modify dental insurance systems in Iran to facilitate optimal use of oral health care services to maximize the oral health of the population. A special emphasis in the insurance schemes should be focused on preventive care.
Resumo:
The aim of the study was to explore the importance of evaluating leadership criteria in Finland at leader/subordinate levels of the insurance industry. The overall purpose of the thesis is tackled and analyzed from two different perspectives: - by examining the importance of the leadership criteria and style of Finnish insurance business leaders and their subordinates - by examining the opinions of insurance business leaders regarding leadership criteria in two culturally different countries: the US and Finland. This thesis consists of three published articles that scrutinise the focal phenomena both theoretically and empirically. The main results of the study do not lend support to the existence of a universal model of leadership criteria in the insurance business. As a matter of fact, the possible model seems to be based more on the special organizational and cultural circumstances of the country in question. The leadership criteria seem to be quite stable irrespective of the comparatively short research time period (3–5 years) and hierarchical level (subordinate/leader). Leaders have major difficulties in changing their leadership style. In fact, in order to bring about an efficient organizational change in the company you have to alternate the leader. The cultural dimensions (cooperation and monitoring) identified by Finnish subordinates were mostly in line with those of their managers, whilst emphasizing more the aspect of monitoring employees, which could be seen from their point of view as another element of managers’ optimizing/efficiency requirements. In Finnish surveys the strong emphasis on cooperation and mutual trust become apparent by both subordinates and managers. The basic problem is still how to emphasize and balance them in real life in such a way that both parties are happy to work together on a common basis. The American surveys suggests hypothetically that in a soft market period (buyer’s market) managers employ a more relationship-oriented leadership style and correspondingly adapt their leadership style to a more task-oriented approach in a hard market phase (seller’s market). In making business better Finnish insurance managers could probably concentrate more on task-oriented items such as reviewing, budgeting, monitoring and goal-orientation. The study also suggests that the social safety net of the European welfare state ideology has so far shielded the culture-specific sense of social responsibility of Finnish managers from the hazards of free competition and globalization.
Resumo:
Little attention has been given to the possibility that CDS transactions might be construed as insurance contracts in English law. This article challenges the widespread “Potts opinion”, which states that CDSs are not insurance, because they do not require the protection buyer to sustain a loss or to have an insurable interest in the subject matter. CDSs often do provide protection against loss that the buyer is exposed to; loss indemnity is not a necessary characterisation of an insurance contract; insurable interest does not form part of the definition of insurance, but is an additional requirement of valid insurance; and what matters is the substance not the form of the contract. The situation in the US and Australia is also briefly considered.