Strategy as text and discursive practice: A genre-based approach to strategizing in City Administration

Despite the acknowledged importance of strategic planning in business and other organizations, there are few studies focusing on strategy texts and the related processes of their production and consumption. In this paper, we attempt to partially fill this research gap by examining the institutionalized aspects of strategy discourse: what strategy is as genre. Combining textual analysis and analysis of conversation, the article focuses on the official strategy of the City of Lahti in Finland. Our analysis shows how specific communicative purposes and lexico-grammatical features characterize the genre of strategy and how the actual negotiations over strategy text involve particular kinds of intersubjectivity and intertextuality.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Inventory Routing - A Strategic Management Accounting Perspective

This dissertation develops a strategic management accounting perspective of inventory routing. The thesis studies the drivers of cost efficiency gains by identifying the role of the underlying cost structure, demand, information sharing, forecasting accuracy, service levels, vehicle fleet, planning horizon and other strategic factors as well as the interaction effects among these factors with respect to performance outcomes. The task is to enhance the knowledge of the strategic situations that favor the implementation of inventory routing systems, understanding cause-and-effect relationships, linkages and gaining a holistic view of the value proposition of inventory routing. The thesis applies an exploratory case study design, which is based on normative quantitative empirical research using optimization, simulation and factor analysis. Data and results are drawn from a real world application to cash supply chains. The first research paper shows that performance gains require a common cost component and cannot be explained by simple linear or affine cost structures. Inventory management and distribution decisions become separable in the absence of a set-dependent cost structure, and neither economies of scope nor coordination problems are present in this case. The second research paper analyzes whether information sharing improves the overall forecasting accuracy. Analysis suggests that the potential for information sharing is limited to coordination of replenishments and that central information do not yield more accurate forecasts based on joint forecasting. The third research paper develops a novel formulation of the stochastic inventory routing model that accounts for minimal service levels and forecasting accuracy. The developed model allows studying the interaction of minimal service levels and forecasting accuracy with the underlying cost structure in inventory routing. Interestingly, results show that the factors minimal service level and forecasting accuracy are not statistically significant, and subsequently not relevant for the strategic decision problem to introduce inventory routing, or in other words, to effectively internalize inventory management and distribution decisions at the supplier. Consequently the main contribution of this thesis is the result that cost benefits of inventory routing are derived from the joint decision model that accounts for the underlying set-dependent cost structure rather than the level of information sharing. This result suggests that the value of information sharing of demand and inventory data is likely to be overstated in prior literature. In other words, cost benefits of inventory routing are primarily determined by the cost structure (i.e. level of fixed costs and transportation costs) rather than the level of information sharing, joint forecasting, forecasting accuracy or service levels.

Information Technology Development Needs in Community Pharmacies : A Strategic Approach

In the context of health care, information technology (IT) has an important role in the operational infrastructure, ranging from business management to patient care. An essential part of the system is medication management in inpatient and outpatient care. Community pharmacists strategy has been to extend practice responsibilities beyond dispensing towards patient care services. Few studies have evaluated the strategic development of IT systems to support this vision. The objectives of this study were to assess and compare independent Finnish community pharmacy owners and staff pharmacists priorities concerning the content and structure of the next generation of community pharmacy IT systems, to explore international experts visions and strategic views on IT development needs in relation to services provided in community pharmacies, to identify IT innovations facilitating patient care services and to evaluate their development and implementation processes, and to assess community pharmacists readiness to adopt innovations. This study applied both qualitative and quantitative methods. A qualitative personal interview of 14 experts in community pharmacy services and related IT from eight countries and a national survey of Finnish community pharmacy owners (mail survey, response rate 53%, n=308), and of a representative sample of staff pharmacists (online survey, response rate 22%, n=373) were conducted. Finnish independent community pharmacy owners gave priority to logistical functions but also to those related to medication information and patient care. The managers and staff pharmacists have different views of the importance of IT features, reflecting their different professional duties in the community pharmacy. This indicates the need for involving different occupation groups in planning the new IT systems for community pharmacies. A majority of the international experts shared the vision of community pharmacy adopting a patient care orientation; supported by IT-based documentation, new technological solutions, access to information, and shared patient data. Community pharmacy IT innovations were rare, which is paradoxical because owners and staff pharmacists perception of their innovativeness was seen as being high. Community pharmacy IT systems development processes usually had not undergone systematic needs assessment research beforehand or evaluation after the implementation and were most often coordinated by national governments without subsequent commercialization. Specifically, community pharmacy IT developments lack research, organization, leadership and user involvement in the process. Those responsible for IT development in the community pharmacy sector should create long-term IT development strategies that are in line with community pharmacy service development strategies. This could provide systematic guidance for future projects to ensure that potential innovations are based on a sufficient understanding of pharmacy practice problems that they are intended to solve, and to encourage strong leadership in research, development of innovations so that community pharmacists potential innovativeness is used, and that professional needs and strategic priorities will be considered even if the development process is led by those outside the profession.