Juutalaisvastaisuus suomalaisissa aikakauslehdissä ja kirjallisuudessa 1918-1944

Anti-Semitism existed in Finland during the whole period covered by this study. The immoral acts associated with Jews in the articles were mostly regarded as universal habits, qualities and/or modes of action, that is, unconnected with any particular Finnish Jew. Researchers have tried to explain anti-Semitism in several ways. The theory of Jews as outsiders has been a popular explanation as well as xenophobia, chimerical anti-Semitism and the socio-economic models. The main sources of this study have been over 400 Finnish periodicals and magazines, literature and text books published between 1918 and 1944. This vast number of magazines includes those of the army and the civil guard, religion, humour and the papers of the Finnish extreme right. One can see a distinct foreign and especially German influence in the subjects and phraseology of Finnish anti-Semitic writings between 1918 and 1944. Several known Finnish anti-Semitic writers had some kind of link with Germany. Some Finnish organisations and societies were openly anti-Semitic during this period. There had been cycles in the activity of anti-Semitic writing in Finland, obvious peaks appearing in 1918 1919, 1929 1931, 1933 1938 and 1942 1944. The reason for the 1918 1919 activity was the civil rights which were granted to the Jews in Finland, and the Russian Bolshevik revolution. The worldwide depression from 1929 to 1932 seem to be the reason for new anti-Semitic writing activity. The rise of National Socialism in Germany and the influence this phenomenon had in Finland was the reason for the peak during 1933 1938. During the continuation war 1942 1944 National Socialist Germany was fighting side-by-side with Finland and their anti-Semitic propaganda found easier access to Finland. Of the 433 magazines, journals and newspapers which were used in this study, 71 or 16.4 per cent had at least one article that can be identified as anti-Semitic; especially the magazines of national socialists and other extreme right parties were making anti-Semitic annotations. There were about 50 people known to have written anti-Semitic articles. At least half of these known writers had studied at the university, including as many as 10 priests. Over and above these, there was an even larger number of people who wrote under a pseudonym. The material used suggested that anti-Semitism was not very popular in Finland between 1918 and 1944. Anti-Semitic articles appeared mostly in the magazines of the extreme right, but their circulation was not very large. A proof of the slight influence of these extreme right anti-Semitic ideas is that, beside the tightening of policy towards Jewish immigrants in 1938 and the handing over of eight of these refugees to Germany in 1942, the official policy of Finland never became anti-Semitic. As was stated before, despite the cycles in the number of writings, there does not appear to have been any noticeable change in public opinion. One must also remember that most Finns had not at that period actually met a Jew. The material used suggests that between 1918 and 1944 the so-called Jewish question was seemingly unimportant for most Finns and their attitude to Jews and Jewishness can be described as neutral.

The Vexing Case of Igor Shafarevich, a Russian Political Thinker

The Russian mathematician, academician and former dissident Igor Shafarevich (b. 1923) is commonly mentioned in Western scholarly studies on perestroika and post-perestroika-era Russian politics as one of the most notable anti-Semites and extreme nationalists of the country. This notoriety owes to Shafarevich’s old samizdat article Russophobia, which was published in 1988. The scandal surrounding Russophobia came to a head when the president of The National Academy of Sciences in the United States asked Shafarevich, its honorary member, to resign. Nothing like this had ever happened in the academy’s history. The present dissertation discusses Shafarevich’s political activities, his texts and ideas as well as their reception. Particular attention is given to Russophobia, whose detailed examination proves very clearly that its reputation as an anti-Semitic text is groundless. The reasons for Russophobia’s hasty but fierce condemnation were many, but only one was that when the Soviet system began to tumble, it was commonly assumed that a vigorous rise in anti-Semitism and extreme nationalism in the Soviet Union/Russia would be just a matter of time. Many observers were highly sensitised to detecting its signs and symptoms. The dissertation also shows that most of those to write the first criticisms of Russophobia and to liken Shafarevich to the ideologues of Nazi Germany were the same people he had criticised in Russophobia for their deterministic view of history and irrational manner of connecting things for the purpose of fanning the flames of distrust between Russia’s Jews and Russians. In retrospect, it is fairly evident that Shafarevich actually managed to effectively “neutralise” the message of many of those obsessed with the Jews among his Russian contemporaries and contributed to the fact that anti-Jewish sentiments have been a great deal less popular in post-communist Russia than so many had feared and expected. The thesis also thoroughly discusses Shafarevich’s other texts and activities before Russophobia’s appearance and after it. In the 1970s, Shafarevich was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He worked together with academician Andrei Sakharov in a dissidents’ unofficial human rights committee and co-operated closely with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn before Solzhenitsyn’s exile. Then, during the chaotic years of perestroika, Shafarevich defended the basic rights of ordinary citizens and warned that the hype concerning democracy could become counterproductive if the most palpable result of the reforms was the disappearance of citizens’ basic security and elementary social justice. One of the conclusions of the thesis is that even if the world around Shafarevich has changed considerably, his views have remained essentially the same since the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Itämafia : Uhkakuvapolitiikka, rikosilmiöt ja kulttuuriset merkitykset

The Eastern Mafia Threat policy, crime phenomena, and cultural meanings An interdisciplinary research on the crime phenomena and the threat policy relating to the organized crime and the mafia of Russia and Estonia is based on 151 expert interviews, statistics, documents, research literature, and press material. The main part of the material consists of interviews of the Finnish, Estonian and Russian police authorities specialized in the problem of organized crime, and the reports on the crime situation drawn up in the Finnish diplomatic representations in Tallinn and St Petersburg. The interviews have been gathered in the years 1996-2001. The main theoretical tools of the research are constructivist research on social problems, and political psychology. Definitional processes of social problems and cultural semantic structures behind them are identified in the analysis and connected to the analysis of the crime cases. Both in the Anglo-American and Russian cultural frames there appears an inflated and exaggerated talk, according to which the mafia rules everything in Russia and is spreading everywhere. There is the traditional anti-Semitic paranoia in the core of this cultural symbiosis produced by Russian legal nihilism, the theory of totalitarianism of Sovietology, and the inertia of Russian anti-capitalism. To equate the Sicilian Mafia with Russia is an anachronism, since no empirical proof of systematic uncontrolled violence or absolute power vacuum in Russia can be found. In the Anglo-American policy of threat images, "the Russian mafia" was seen as a commodified conspiracy theory, which the police, the media, and the research took advantage of, blurring the line between fact and fiction. In Finland, the evolution of the policy of threat images proceeded in three phases: Initially, extensive rolling of refugees and criminals from Russia to Finland was emphasized in the beginning of the 1990's. In the second phase, the eastern mafia was said to infiltrate all over Finnish society and administration. Finland was, however, found immune to this kind of spreading. In the third phase, in the 21st century, the organized crime of Finland was said to be lead from abroad. In Finland, the policy of threat images was especially canalised to moral panics connected to "eastern prostitution". In Estonia, the policy of threat images emphasized the crime organized by the Russian authorities and politicians in order to weaken Estonia. In Russia, the policy of threat images emphasized the total criminalizing of society caused by criminal capitalism. In every country, the policy of threat images was affected by a so-called large-group identity, a term by Vamik Volkan, in which a so-called chosen trauma caused a political paranoia of an outer and inner danger. In Finland, procuring, car theft, and narcotics crimes were at their widest arranged by the Finnish often with the help of the Estonians. The Russians had no influence in the most serious violent crimes in Finland, although the number of assassinations were at least 5, 000 in Russia in the 1990's. In Russia, the assassinations were on one hand connected to marital problems, on the other hand to the pursuit of public attention and a hoped-for effect by the aid of the murder of an influential person. In the white-collar crime phenomena between Finland and Russia, the Finnish state and Finnish corporations gained remarkable benefit of the frauds aimed at the states of the Soviet Union and Russia in 1980's-21st century. The situation of Estonia was very difficult compared to that of Russia in the 1990's, which was manifested in the stagnation of the Estonian police and judicial authorities, the crimes of the police and the voluntary paramilitary organization, bomb explosions, the rebellion called "the jaeger crisis" in the voluntary paramilitary organization, and the "blood autumn" of Eastern Virumaa, in other words terror. The situation of Estonia had a powerful effect on the crime situation of Finland and on the security of the Finnish diplomats. In the continuum of the Finnish policy of threat images, Russia and the Russians were, however, presented as a source of a marked danger.