Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

Kirkko, Kekkonen ja kommunismi poliittisina kriisivuosina 1958-1962

This study explores the relationship of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland to communism and political power during the period of crises in Finnish foreign relations with the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1962. During this period the USSR repeatedly interfered in Finland´s domestic affairs and limited her foreign political freedom of action. The research subjects for this dissertation are the bishops of the Church of Finland and the newspaper Kotimaa, which can be regarded as the unofficial organ of the church at the time. A typical characteristic of the Church of Finland from the beginning of the twentieth century was patriotism. During the interwar years the church was strongly anti-communist and against the Soviet Union. This tendency was also evident during the Second World War. After the war the Finnish Church feared that the rise of the extreme left would jeopardize its position. The church, however, succeeded in maintaining its status as a state church throughout the critical years immediately following the war. This study indicates that, although the manner of expression altered, the political attitude of the church did not substantially change during the postwar period. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the church was still patriotic and fear of the extreme left was also evident among the leaders of the church. The victory of the Finnish People's Democratic League in the general election of 1958 was an unwelcome surprise to the church. This generated fear in the church that, with Soviet support, the Finnish communists might return to governmental power and the nation could become a people's democracy. Accordingly, the church tried to encourage other parties to set aside their disagreements and act together against the extreme left throughout the period under study. The main characteristics of the church´s political agenda during this period of crisis were to support the Finnish foreign policy led by the president of the republic, Urho Kekkonen, and to resist Finnish communism. The attitude of Finnish bishops and the newspaper Kotimaa to the Cold War in general was generally in agreement with the majority of western Christians. They feared communism, were afraid of the USSR, but supported peaceful co-existence because they did not want an open conflict with the Soviets. Because of uncertainties in Finland's international position the Finnish Church regarded it as necessary to support the Finnish policy of friendship towards the USSR. The Finnish Church considerer it unwise to openly criticize the Soviet Union, tried resist the spread of communism in Finnish domestic policy. This period of foreign policy crises was principally seen by the church as a time when there was a need to strengthen Finland's unstable national position.