From Francovich to Köbler and beyond : The evolution of a State liability regime for the EC

The aim of this paper is to present the evolution of the Francovich doctrine within the European legal order. The first part deals with the gradual development of the ECJ's case law on State liability in damages for breach of EC law. Starting from the seminal Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur, the clarification of the criteria set by the Court is attempted with reference to subsequent case law, whereas issues concerning the extent and form of the compensation owned are also mentioned. The second part concerns one of the more recent developments in the field, namely State liability for breaches of Community law attributed to national judiciary. The Court's ruling in Köbler is examined in connection with two other recent judgments, namely Commission v. Italy of 2003 and Kühne & Heitz, as an attempt of the ECJ to reframe its relationships with national supreme courts and appropriate for itself the position of the Supreme Court in the European legal order. The implications on State liability claims by the ruling in Commission v. France of 1997 constitute the theme of the third part, where it is submitted that Member States can also be held liable for disregard of Community law by private individuals within their respected territories. To this extent, Schmidberger is viewed as a manifestation of this opinion, with fundamental rights acquiring a new dimension, being invoked by the States, contra the individuals as a shield to liability claims. Finally, the third part examines the relationship between the Francovich doctrine and the principle of legal certainty and concludes that the solutions employed by the ECJ have been both predictable and acceptable by the national legal orders. Keywords: State liability, damages, Francovich, Köbler, Schmidberger

The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy under a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime

This licentiate's thesis analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy under a flexible exchange rate regime, assuming that the government spends exclusively on domestically produced goods. The motivation for this research comes from the observation that the literature on the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) has focused almost exclusively on two-country global models and the analyses of the effects of fiscal policy on small economies are almost completely ignored. This thesis aims at filling in the gap in the NOEM literature and illustrates how the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy depend on the specification of preferences. The research method is to present two theoretical model that are extensions to the model contained in the Appendix to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). The first model analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, making use of a model that exploits the idea of modelling private and government consumption as substitutes in private utility. The model offers intuitive predictions on how the effects of fiscal policy depend on the marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption. The findings illustrate that the higher the substitutability between private and government consumption, (i) the bigger is the crowding out effect on private consumption (ii) and the smaller is the positive effect on output. The welfare analysis shows that the less fiscal policy decreases welfare the higher is the marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption. The second model of this thesis studies how the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy depend on the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. This model reveals that this elasticity a key variable to explain the exchange rate, current account and output response to a permanent rise in government spending. Finally, the model demonstrates that temporary changes in government spending are an effective stabilization tool when used wisely and timely in response to undesired fluctuations in output. Undesired fluctuations in output can be perfectly offset by an opposite change in government spending without causing any side-effects.

Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of outside shareholders claims are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results show that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.