Essays on Illegal Activities, Institutions and Economic Growth

In public economics, two extremist views on the functions of a government compete: one emphasizes government working for the public interest to provide value for the citizens, while another regards government mainly as a workhorse for private interests. Moreover, as the sole legitimate authority, the government has the right to define the rules and laws as well as to enforce them. With respect to regulation, two extremes arise: from too little regulation to too much of it. If the government does not function or ceases to exist, the state falls into anarchy or chaos (Somalia). If it regulates too much, it will completely suffocate private activities, which might be considered extralegal (the former Soviet Union). In this thesis I scrutinize the government s interventionist policies and evaluate the question of how to best promote economic well-being. The first two essays assume that the government s policies promote illegal activity. The first paper evaluates the interaction between the government and the mafia, and pays attention to the law enforcement of underground production. We show that the revenue-maximizing government will always monitor the shadow economy, as monitoring contributes to the government s revenue. In general, both legal and illegal firms are hurt by the entry of the mafia. It is, however, plausible that legal firms might benefit by the entry of the mafia if it competes with the government. The second paper tackles the issue of the measurement of the size of the shadow economy. To formulate policies it is essential to know what drives illegal economic activity; is it the tax burden, excess regulation, corruption or a weak legal environment? In this paper we propose an additional explanation for tax evasion and shadow production, namely cultural factors as manifested by religion as determinants of tax morality. According to our findings, Catholic and Protestant countries do not differ in their tax morale. The third paper contributes to the literature discussing the role of the government in promoting economic and productivity growth. Our main result is that, given the complex relationship between economic growth and economic freedom, marketization has not necessarily been beneficial in terms of growth. The last paper builds on traditional growth literature and revisits the debate on convergence clubs arising from demographic transition. We provide new evidence against the idea that countries within a club would converge over time. Instead, we propose that since the demographic transition is a dynamic process, one can expect countries to enter the last regime of stable, modern growth in stages.

Somali State Failure: Players, Incentives and Institutions

In Somalia the central government collapsed in 1991 and since then state failure became a widespread phenomenon and one of the greatest political and humanitarian problems facing the world in this century. Thus, the main objective of this research is to answer the following question: What went wrong? Most of the existing literature on the political economy of conflict starts from the assumption that state in Africa is predatory by nature. Unlike these studies, the present research, although it uses predation theory, starts from the social contract approach of state definition. Therefore, rather than contemplating actions and policies of the rulers alone, this approach allows us to deliberately bring the role of the society – as citizens – and other players into the analyses. In Chapter 1, after introducing the study, a simple principal-agent model will be developed to check the logical consistence of the argument and to make the identification of causal mechanism easier. I also identify three main actors in the process of state failure in Somalia: the Somali state, Somali society and the superpowers. In Chapter 2, so as to understand the incentives, preferences and constraints of each player in the state failure game, I in some depth analyse the evolution and structure of three central informal institutions: identity based patronage system of leadership, political tribalism, and the Cold War. These three institutions are considered as the rules of the game in the Somali state failure. Chapter 3 summarises the successive civilian governments’ achievements and failures (1960-69) concerning the main national goals, national unification and socio-economic development. Chapter 4 shows that the military regime, although it assumed power through extralegal means, served to some extent the developmental interest of the citizens in the first five years of its rule. Chapter 5 shows the process, and the factors involved, of the military regime’s self-transformation from being an agent for the developmental interests of the society to a predatory state that not only undermines the interests of the society but that also destroys the state itself. Chapter 6 addresses the process of disintegration of the post-colonial state of Somalia. The chapter shows how the regime’s merciless reactions to political ventures by power-seeking opposition leaders shattered the entire country and wrecked the state institutions. Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarising the main findings: due to the incentive structures generated by the informal institutions, the formal state institutions fell apart.

The Impact of New Capital Requirements on the Portfolio Decisions of Finnish Pension Institutions

This paper examines the potential impact of new capital requirements on asset allocations of Finnish pension institutions. We describe the new requirements and consider portfolio construction to minimize regulatory capital, given the investor’s preferred level of expected return. Results identify portfolio transactions that enhance expected return without increasing capital needs. Regulation calls for portfolio diversification and prudence in management, but this paper shows that market participants can exploit inconsistencies in regulation. Possible future consequences include capital outflows from the pension system and an unintended decrease in pre-funding of old-age pensions.

Appropriate Institutions and Economic Growth - one size fits no-one

Modern-day economics is increasingly biased towards believing that institutions matter for growth, an argument that has been further enforced by the recent economic crisis. There is also a wide consensus on what these growth-promoting institutions should look like, and countries are periodically ranked depending on how their institutional structure compares with the best-practice institutions, mostly in place in the developing world. In this paper, it is argued that ”non-desirable” or “second-best” institutions can be beneficial for fostering investment and thus providing a starting point for sustained growth, and that what matters is the appropriateness of institutions to the economy’s distance to the frontier or current phase of development. Anecdotal evidence from Japan and South-Korea is used as a motivation for studying the subject and a model is presented to describe this phenomenon. In the model, the rigidity or non-rigidity of the institutions is described by entrepreneurial selection. It is assumed that entrepreneurs are the ones taking part in the imitation and innovation of technologies, and that decisions on whether or not their projects are refinanced comes from capitalists. The capitalists in turn have no entrepreneurial skills and act merely as financers of projects. The model has two periods, and two kinds of entrepreneurs: those with high skills and those with low skills. The society’s choice of whether an imitation or innovation – based strategy is chosen is modeled as the trade-off between refinancing a low-skill entrepreneur or investing in the selection of the entrepreneurs resulting in a larger fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs with the ability to innovate but less total investment. Finally, a real-world example from India is presented as an initial attempt to test the theory. The data from the example is not included in this paper. It is noted that the model may be lacking explanatory power due to difficulties in testing the predictions, but that this should not be seen as a reason to disregard the theory – the solution might lie in developing better tools, not better just better theories. The conclusion presented is that institutions do matter. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution when it comes to institutional arrangements in different countries, and developing countries should be given space to develop their own institutional structures that cater to their specific needs.