Complicated Presence : The Unity of Being in Parmenides and Heidegger

The attempt to refer meaningful reality as a whole to a unifying ultimate principle - the quest for the unity of Being - was one of the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from its beginnings in ancient Greece up to Hegel's absolute idealism. However, the different trends of contemporary philosophy tend to regard such a speculative metaphysical quest for unity as obsolete. This study addresses this contemporary situation on the basis of the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Its methodological framework is Heidegger's phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to the history of philosophy. It seeks to understand, in terms of the metaphysical quest for unity, Heidegger's contrast between the first (Greek) beginning or "onset" (Anfang) of philosophy and another onset of thinking. This other onset is a possibility inherent in the contemporary situation in which, according to Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition has developed to its utmost limits and thereby come to an end. Part I is a detailed interpretation of the surviving fragments of the Poem of Parmenides of Elea (fl. c. 500 BC), an outstanding representative of the first philosophical beginning in Heidegger's sense. It is argued that the Poem is not a simple denial of apparent plurality and difference ("mortal acceptances," doxai) in favor of an extreme monism. Parmenides' point is rather to show in what sense the different instances of Being can be reduced to an absolute level of truth or evidence (aletheia), which is the unity of Being as such (to eon). What in prephilosophical human experience is accepted as being is referred to the source of its acceptability: intelligibility as such, the simple and undifferentiated presence to thinking that ultimately excludes unpresence and otherness. Part II interprets selected key texts from different stages in Heidegger's thinking in terms of the unity of Being. It argues that one aspect of Heidegger's sustained and gradually deepening philosophical quest was to think the unity of Being as singularity, as the instantaneous, context-specific, and differential unity of a temporally meaningful situation. In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger articulates the temporal situatedness of the human awareness of meaningful presence. His later work moves on to study the situational correlation between presence and the human awareness. Heidegger's "postmetaphysical" articulation seeks to show how presence becomes meaningful precisely as situated, in an event of differentiation from a multidimensional context of unpresence. In resigning itself to this irreducibly complicated and singular character of meaningful presence, philosophy also faces its own historically situated finitude. This resignation is an essential feature of Heidegger's "other onset" of thinking.

The One and The Many : In the works of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi

This paper concentrates on Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The focus is on their ideas on change and whether the world is essentially One or if it is composed of many entities. In the first chapter I go over some general tendences in Greek and Chinese philosophy. The differences in the cultural background have an influence in the ways philosophy is made, but the paper aims to show that two questions can be brought up when comparing the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The questions are; is the world essentially One or Many? Is change real and if it is, what is the nature of it and how does it take place? For Heraclitus change is real, and as will be shown later in the chapter, quite essential for the sustainability of the world-order (kosmos). The key-concept in the case of Heraclitus is Logos. Heraclitus uses Logos in several senses, most well known relating to his element-theory. But another important feature of the Logos, the content of real wisdom, is to be able to regard everything as one. This does not mean that world is essentially one for Heraclitus in the ontological sense, but that we should see the underlying unity of multiple phenomena. Heraclitus regards this as hen panta: All from One, One from All. I characterize Heraclitus as epistemic monist and an ontological pluralist. It is plausible that the views of Heraclitus on change were the focus of Parmenides’ severe criticism. Parmenides held the view that the world is essentially one and that to see it as consisting of many entities was the error of mortals, i.e. the common man and his philosophical predecessors. For Parmenides what-is, can be approached by two routes; The Way of Truth (Aletheia) and The Way of Seeming (Doxa). Aletheia essentially sees the world as one, where even time is an illusion. In Doxa Parmenides is giving an explanation of the world seen as consisting of many entities and this is his contribution to the line of thought of his predecessors. It should be noted that a strong emphasis is given to the Aletheia, whereas the world-view given is in Doxa is only probable. I go on to describe Parmenides as ontological monist, who gives some plausibility to pluralistic views. In the work of Lao Zi world can be seen as One or as consisting of Many entities. In my interpretation, Lao Zi uses Dao in two different senses; Dao is the totality of things or the order in change. The wu-aspect (seeing-without-form) attends the world as one, whereas the you-aspect attends the world of many entities. In wu-aspect, Dao refers to the totality of things, when in you-aspect Dao is the order or law in change. There are two insights in Lao Zi regarding the relationship between wu- and- you-apects; in ch.1 it is stated that they are two separate aspects in seeing the world, the other chapters regarding that you comes from wu. This naturally brings in the question whether the One is the peak of seeing the world as many. In other words, is there a way from pluralism to monism. All these considerations make it probable that the work attributed to Lao Zi has been added new material or is a compilation of oral sayings. In the end of the paper I will go on to give some insights on how Logos and Dao can be compared in a relevant manner. I also compare Parmenides holistic monism to Lao Zi’s Dao as nameless totality (i.e. in its wu-aspect). I briefly touch the issues of Heidegger and the future of comparative philosophy.