Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Copper Diffusion Barrier Deposition on Integrated Circuit Devices by Atomic Layer Deposition Technique

Transfer from aluminum to copper metallization and decreasing feature size of integrated circuit devices generated a need for new diffusion barrier process. Copper metallization comprised entirely new process flow with new materials such as low-k insulators and etch stoppers, which made the diffusion barrier integration demanding. Atomic Layer Deposition technique was seen as one of the most promising techniques to deposit copper diffusion barrier for future devices. Atomic Layer Deposition technique was utilized to deposit titanium nitride, tungsten nitride, and tungsten nitride carbide diffusion barriers. Titanium nitride was deposited with a conventional process, and also with new in situ reduction process where titanium metal was used as a reducing agent. Tungsten nitride was deposited with a well-known process from tungsten hexafluoride and ammonia, but tungsten nitride carbide as a new material required a new process chemistry. In addition to material properties, the process integration for the copper metallization was studied making compatibility experiments on different surface materials. Based on these studies, titanium nitride and tungsten nitride processes were found to be incompatible with copper metal. However, tungsten nitride carbide film was compatible with copper and exhibited the most promising properties to be integrated for the copper metallization scheme. The process scale-up on 300 mm wafer comprised extensive film uniformity studies, which improved understanding of non-uniformity sources of the ALD growth and the process-specific requirements for the ALD reactor design. Based on these studies, it was discovered that the TiN process from titanium tetrachloride and ammonia required the reactor design of perpendicular flow for successful scale-up. The copper metallization scheme also includes process steps of the copper oxide reduction prior to the barrier deposition and the copper seed deposition prior to the copper metal deposition. Easy and simple copper oxide reduction process was developed, where the substrate was exposed gaseous reducing agent under vacuum and at elevated temperature. Because the reduction was observed efficient enough to reduce thick copper oxide film, the process was considered also as an alternative method to make the copper seed film via copper oxide reduction.

Data mining for telecommunications network log analysis

Telecommunications network management is based on huge amounts of data that are continuously collected from elements and devices from all around the network. The data is monitored and analysed to provide information for decision making in all operation functions. Knowledge discovery and data mining methods can support fast-pace decision making in network operations. In this thesis, I analyse decision making on different levels of network operations. I identify the requirements decision-making sets for knowledge discovery and data mining tools and methods, and I study resources that are available to them. I then propose two methods for augmenting and applying frequent sets to support everyday decision making. The proposed methods are Comprehensive Log Compression for log data summarisation and Queryable Log Compression for semantic compression of log data. Finally I suggest a model for a continuous knowledge discovery process and outline how it can be implemented and integrated to the existing network operations infrastructure.

The Art of Adaptation : A study on the Europeanization of Finland's foreign and security policy

This study examines how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. It points to a growing interplay and misfit between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. It is concluded that the deepening European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy has played a significant role in a number of transformations in the Finnish policies since 1995. New, more European, meanings have been attached to the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy. Neutrality and traditional peacekeeping have been replaced by a minimalist reading of military non-alignment and participation in crisis management operations and EU battle groups. Traditional small state identity has been recast more and more as small member stateness . At the same time Finland has entered an era of post-consensus in national foreign and security policy. A key theoretical argument in the background of the study is that collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptation pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This means that Europeanization is principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the study builds on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory on state identity. Foreign and security policy is defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and security policy concepts are seen as the vehicles of identity production. It is concluded that for Finland, participation in the EU s foreign, security and defence policies represents not only a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment but also a new means of self-identification. Concerning the Finnish attempts of projecting national interests on the European security policy agenda, it is concluded that they mainly relate to the compatibility of the potential development of EU s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-alignment. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security policy when Finland joined the EU, the analysis shows that its impact has continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers. The primary research material includes official Finnish foreign and security policy documentation and the related parliamentary debates from 1994 to 2007. This study serves also as a comprehensive empirical overview on Finland s reactions and contributions to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The RATAS-project, in the Light of 25 Years of Development Towards Computer-Integrated Construction

In smaller countries where the key players in construction IT development tend to know each other personally and where public R&D funding is concentrated to a few channels, IT roadmaps and strategies would seem to have a better chance of influencing development than in the bigger industrial countries. In this paper Finland and the RATAS-project is presented as a historical case illustrating such impact. RATAS was initiated as a construction IT roadmap project in 1985, involving many of the key organisations and companies active in construction sector development. Several of the individuals who took an active part in the project have played an important role in later developments both in Finland and on the international scene. The central result of RATAS was the identification of what is nowadays called Building Information Modelling (BIM) technology as the central issue in getting IT into efficient use in the construction sector. BIM, which earlier was referred to as building product modelling, has been a key ingredient in many roadmaps since and the subject of international standardisation efforts such as STEP and IAI/IFCs. The RATAS project can in hindsight be seen as a forerunner with an impact which also transcended national borders.

The German Military Entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld and His Conduct of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Thirty Years War

The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.