Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Balancing Social Citizenship and New Paternalism : Finnish activation policy and street-level practice in a comparative perspective

The study examines the origin and development of the Finnish activation policy since the mid-1990s by using the 2001 activation reform as a benchmark. The notion behind activation is to link work obligations to welfare benefits for the unemployed. The focus of the thesis is policy learning and the impact of ideas on the reform of the welfare state. The broader research interests of the thesis are summarized by two groups of questions. First, how was the Finnish activation policy developed and what specific form did it receive in the 2001 activation reform? Second, how does the Finnish activation policy compare to the welfare reforms in the EU and in the US? What kinds of ideas and instruments informed the Finnish policy? To what extent can we talk about a restructuring or transformation of the Nordic welfare policy? Theoretically, the thesis is embedded in the comparative welfare state research and the concepts used in the contemporary welfare state discourse. Activation policy is analysed against the backdrop of the theories about the welfare state, welfare state governance and citizenship. Activation policies are also analysed in the context of the overall modernization and individualization of lifestyles and its implications for the individual citizen. Further, the different perspectives of the policy analysis are applied to determine the role of implementation and street-level practice within the whole. Empirically, the policy design, its implementation and the experiences of the welfare staff and recipients in Finland are examined. The policy development, goals and instruments of the activation policies have followed astonishingly similar paths in the different welfare states and regimes over the last two decades. In Finland, the policy change has been manifested through several successive reforms that have been introduced since the mid-1990s. The 2001 activation reform the Act on Rehabilitative Work Experience illustrates the broader trend towards stricter work requirements and draws its inspiration from the ideas of new paternalism. The ideas, goals and instruments of the international activation trend are clearly visible in the reform. Similarly, the reform has implications for the traditional Nordic social policies, which incorporate institutionalised social rights and the provision of services.