4 resultados para Hurricane Camille, 1969.
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
Tutkielmani käsittelee Kokoomuksen suhdetta presidentti Urho Kekkoseen ja Neuvostoliiton Kommunistiseen puolueeseen NKP:hen. Tutkielmassa selvitetään, mitä kokoomuslaiset poliitikot tekivät näiden suhteiden kehittämiseksi ja puolueensa hallitusaseman saavuttamiseksi vuosina 1969-1981. Suomi solmi toisen maailmansodan jälkeen yya-sopimuksen Neuvostoliiton kanssa ja sitoutui noudattamaan ystävällismielistä politiikkaa Neuvostoliittoa kohtaan. Presidentti J. K. Paasikiven kaudella (1946-56) aloitettu ystävyyspolitiikka oli kehittynyt varsin pitkälle 1960-luvun loppuun mennessä. Vuonna 1956 presidentiksi valitun Urho Kekkosen johdolla hyvistä neuvostosuhteista muodostui Suomessa huipputason politiikan teon edellytys. Kekkonen vaati ehdotonta kuuliaisuutta Paasikivi-Kekkosen ulkopoliittiselle linjalle, niin puolueilta kuin yksittäisiltä poliitikoiltakin. Tämän linjan noudattaminen merkitsi Neuvostoliiton arvostelusta pidättäytymistä ja sitä kautta luottamusta Kekkosen ja NKP:n piirissä. Suomettumisen kaudeksi kutsuttuna aikana 1960-70-luvuilla Kokoomuksen asema oli erityisen vaikea, sillä tietyt puolueen poliitikot jatkoivat Kekkosen ja NL:n arvostelua. Muut keskeiset puolueet olivat päässeet Kekkosen ja Neuvostoliiton suosioon, mutta Kokoomusta ei näiden taholta hyväksytty hallituspuolueeksi vuoden 1966 jälkeen. Suurista puolueista SDP lunasti ulkopoliittisen luottamuksen Kekkoselta ja NKP:ltä 1966, eikä Kokoomusta enää välttämättä tarvittu enemmistöhallituksiin Keskustapuolueen pariksi. Kokoomuksen nuorempi polvi ymmärsi, että vaalimenestyksestä riippumatta hallitusasemaa ei enää saavuteta ilman Kekkosen ja NKP:n luottamusta. Vanhempi polvi puolestaan vastusti Urho Kekkosta ja hänen johdollaan kehittynyttä poliittista kulttuuria. Kokoomuksessa alkoi vuonna 1969 taistelu suhtautumisesta Kekkosen presidenttiyteen ja toiminta puolueen neuvostosuhteiden parantamiseksi. Tutkielma perustuu Porvarillisen Työn Arkiston lähdemateriaaliin, aiheesta julkaistuun kirjallisuuteen, Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjoihin ja arkistomateriaaliin sekä henkilöhaastatteluihin.
Resumo:
The birth of the Modern Consumer Society in Finnish short films 1920-1969 The main subject of this research is Finnish short films in 1920-1969. These short films were produced by film studios for private enterprises, banks, advisory organizations, communities and the state. The evolution of short films on consumer affairs was greatly influenced by a special tax reduction system that was introduced in 1933 and lasted until 1964. The tax reduction system increased the production volumes of educational short films significantly. This study covers 342 Finnish short films, more than any other study in the field before this. The aim of this research is to examine how short films introduced Finns to modern consumer society. The cinemagoers were an excellent target group for different advisory groups as well as advertisers. Short films were used by organizations and private enterprises from very early on. In the 1920's Finns were still living in rural areas and agriculture was the dominant industry. Consumer society was still in its infancy, and the prevalent attitude to industrially produced goods was that of suspicion. From the cultural and ideological point of view the evolution of trust was one of the first steps towards the birth of the consumer society. Short films were an excellent means for helping to transform public attitudes. During the war period short films were an important means of propaganda. Short films were produced in abundance and shown for big audiences. They guided people how to survive shortages caused by the war. Even though the idea of rationalization was presented in short films somewhat in the 1920's and 1930's it became a national virtue during the war period. The idea of rationalization widened from the industry to households expecially in the late 1940's and the 1950's. New household apparati and the way in which daily chores were taken care of were presented not as luxury consumption but as a way of rationalization and saving money and effort. Banks and the advisory organizations guided the public to save their money for a specific target. Short films were use to help the public to acceps industrial goods and the notions of planning and saving. The ideological change from an agrarian society to consumer society was based on old acricultural ideas and self-sufficiency was evolved into rational and economizing consumerism. This made Finnish consumer society to value durable consumer goods and own homes. The public was also encouraged to consider their own decisions in the national context - especially after the second world war Finland laced capital, and personal savings were strongly presented as a way to help the whole nation. Modern hedonistic values were not dominant in Finland in the1950's and 1960's. Initial traces of modern hedonism can be seen in the films, but they were only marginal paths in the bigger.
Resumo:
Julkaistu Silva Fennica Vol. 4(1) -numeron liitteenä.
Resumo:
The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.