Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhtinaskunnan väliset sotatoimet vuosina 1259-83 : Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta sodankäynnistä

In my master thesis I analyse Byzantine warfare in the late period of the empire. I use military operations between Byzantines and crusader Principality of Achaia (1259–83) as a case study. Byzantine strategy was based (in “oriental manner”) on using ambushes, diplomacy, surprise attacks, deception etc. Open field battles that were risky in comparison with their benefits were usually avoided, but the Byzantines were sometimes forced to seek open encounter because their limited ability to keep strong armies in field for long periods of time. Foreign mercenaries had important place in Byzantine armies and they could simply change sides if their paymasters ran out of resources. The use of mercenaries with short contracts made it possible that the composition of an army was flexible but on the other hand heterogeneous – in result Byzantine armies were sometimes ineffective and prone to confusion. In open field battles Byzantines used formation that was made out from several lines placed one after another. This formation was especially suitable for cavalry battles. Byzantines might have also used other kinds of formations. The Byzantines were not considered equal to Latins in close combat. West-Europeans saw mainly horse archers and Latin mercenaries on Byzantine service as threats to themselves in battle. The legitimacy of rulers surrounding the Aegean sea was weak and in many cases political intrigues and personal relationships can have resolved the battles. Especially in sieges the loyalty of population was decisive. In sieges the Byzantines used plenty of siege machines and archers. This made fast conquests possible, but it was expensive. The Byzantines protected their frontiers by building castles. Military operations against the Principality of Achaia were mostly small scale raids following an intensive beginning. Byzantine raids were mostly made by privateers and mountaineers. This does not fit to the traditional picture that warfare belonged to the imperial professional army. It’s unlikely that military operations in war against the Principality of Achaia caused great demographic or economic catastrophe and some regions in the warzone might even have flourished. On the other hand people started to concentrate into villages which (with growing risks for trade) probably caused disturbance in economic development and in result birth rates might have decreased. Both sides of war sought to exchange their prisoners of war. These were treated according to conventional manners that were accepted by both sides. It was possible to sell prisoners, especially women and children, to slavery, but the scale of this trade does not seem to be great in military operations treated in this theses.