A Hub System for Cloud-Computing Based Business-Collaboration: Automating Ontology-Enabled Electronic Business-Service Discovery

The management and coordination of business-process collaboration experiences changes because of globalization, specialization, and innovation. Service-oriented computing (SOC) is a means towards businessprocess automation and recently, many industry standards emerged to become part of the service-oriented architecture (SOA) stack. In a globalized world, organizations face new challenges for setting up and carrying out collaborations in semi-automating ecosystems for business services. For being efficient and effective, many companies express their services electronically in what we term business-process as a service (BPaaS). Companies then source BPaaS on the fly from third parties if they are not able to create all service-value inhouse because of reasons such as lack of reasoures, lack of know-how, cost- and time-reduction needs. Thus, a need emerges for BPaaS-HUBs that not only store service offers and requests together with information about their issuing organizations and assigned owners, but that also allow an evaluation of trust and reputation in an anonymized electronic service marketplace. In this paper, we analyze the requirements, design architecture and system behavior of such a BPaaS-HUB to enable a fast setup and enactment of business-process collaboration. Moving into a cloud-computing setting, the results of this paper allow system designers to quickly evaluate which services they need for instantiationg the BPaaS-HUB architecture. Furthermore, the results also show what the protocol of a backbone service bus is that allows a communication between services that implement the BPaaS-HUB. Finally, the paper analyzes where an instantiation must assign additional computing resources vor the avoidance of performance bottlenecks.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.