Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Historiebruk kring Nådendal : och den kommemorativa anatomin av klostrets minnesplats

This thesis examines the ruins of the medieval Bridgettine (Birgittan) monastery of Naantali (Vallis Gratiae, f. 1443) in Finland and the transformation of the site into a national heritage and a memory landscape. It was archaeologically surveyed in the 19th century by Professor Sven Gabriel Elmgren (1817 1897). His work was followed by Dr. Reinhold Hausen (1850 1942), who excavated the site in the 1870s. During this time the memories of Saint Bridget (Birgitta) in Sweden were also invented as heritage. Hausen published his results in 1922 thus forming the connection with the next generation of actors involved with the Naantali site: the magnate Amos Anderson (1878 1961), the teacher Julius Finnberg (1877 1955) and the archaeologist Juhani Rinne (1872 1950). They erected commemorative monuments etc. on the Naantali site, thus creating a memory landscape there. For them, the site represented the good homeland in connection with a western-oriented view of the history of Finland. The network of actors was connected to the Swedish researchers and so-called Birgitta Friends, such as state antiquarian Sigurd Curman (1879 1966), but also to the members of the Societas Sanctae Birgittae and the Society for the Embellishment of Pirita, among others. Historical jubilees as manifestations of the use of history were also arranged in Naantali in 1943, 1993 and 2003. It seems as if Naantali is needed in Finnish history from time to time after a period of crisis, i.e. after the Crimean War in the 1850s, the civil war of 1918, during World War II and also after the economic crisis of the early 1990s. In 2003, there was a stronger focus on the international Saint Bridget Jubilee in Sweden and all over Europe. Methodologically, the thesis belongs to the history of ideas, but also to research on the use of history, invented traditions and lieux de mémoire. The material for the work consists of public articles and scholarly texts in books or newspapers and letters produced by the actors and kept in archives in Finland, Sweden and Estonia, in addition to pictures and erected commemorative monuments in situ in the Western Finnish region. Keywords: Nådendal, Naantali monastery, Bridgettines, St. Bridget, use of history, lieux de mémoire, invented traditions, commemorative anatomy, memory landscape, Saint Bridget jubilees , S. G. Elmgren, R. Hausen, A. Anderson, J. Finnberg, J. Rinne, S. Curman, High Church Movement, Pirita, Vadstena.