Neuro- and immunotoxic effects of fumonisin B1 in cells

Fumonisin B1 (FB1) is a mycotoxin produced by the fungus Fusarium verticillioides, which commonly infects corn and other agricultural products. Fusarium species can also be found in moisture-damaged buildings, and therefore there may also be human exposure to Fusarium mycotoxins, including FB1. FB1 affects the metabolism of sphingolipids by inhibiting the enzyme ceramide synthase. It is neuro-, hepato- and nephrotoxic, and it is classified as possibly carcinogenic to humans. This study aimed to clarify the mechanisms behind FB1-induced neuro- and immunotoxicity. Four neural and glial cell lines of human, rat and mouse origin were exposed to graded doses of FB1 and the effects on the production of reactive oxygen species, lipid peroxidation, intracellular glutathione levels, cell viability and apoptosis were investigated. Furthermore, the effects of FB1, alone or together with lipopolysaccharide (LPS), on the mRNA and protein expression levels of different cytokines and chemokines were studied in human dendritic cells (DC). FB1 induced oxidative stress and cell death in all cell lines studied. Generally, the effects were only seen after prolonged exposure at 10 and 100 µM of FB1. Signs of apoptosis were also seen in all four cell lines. The sensitivities of the cell lines used in this study towards FB1 may be classified as human U-118MG glioblastoma > mouse GT1-7 hypothalamic > rat C6 glioblastoma > human SH-SY5Y neuroblastoma cells. When comparing cell lines of human origin, it can be concluded that glial cells seem to be more sensitive towards FB1 toxicity than those of neural origin. After exposure to FB1, significantly increased levels of the cytokine interferon-γ (IFNγ) were detected in human DC. This observation was further confirmed by FB1-induced levels of the chemokine CXCL9, which is known to be regulated by IFNγ. During co-exposure of DC to both LPS and FB1, significant inhibitions of the LPS-induced levels of the pro-inflammatory cytokines interleukin-6 (IL-6) and IL-1β, and their regulatory chemokines CCL3 and CCL5 were observed. FB1 can thus affect immune responses in DC, and therefore, it is rather likely that it also affects other types of cells participating in the immune defence system. When evaluating the toxicity potential of FB1, it is important to consider the effects on different cell types and cell-cell interactions. The results of this study represent new information, especially about the mechanisms behind FB1-induced oxidative stress, apoptosis and immunotoxicity, as well as the varying sensitivities of different cell types towards FB1.

Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments : A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics

One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to be true once we expand the formal system with Alfred Tarski s semantical theory of truth, as shown by Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland in their semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. According to them, in Gödel sentences we have an explicit case of true but unprovable sentences, and hence deflationism is refuted. Against that, Neil Tennant has shown that instead of Tarskian truth we can expand the formal system with a soundness principle, according to which all provable sentences are assertable, and the assertability of Gödel sentences follows. This way, the relevant question is not whether we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences, but whether Tarskian truth is a more plausible expansion than a soundness principle. In this work I will argue that this problem is best approached once we think of mathematics as the full human phenomenon, and not just consisting of formal systems. When pre-formal mathematical thinking is included in our account, we see that Tarskian truth is in fact not an expansion at all. I claim that what proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal thinking, and the Tarskian account of semantical truth mirrors this relation accurately. However, the introduction of pre-formal mathematics is vulnerable to the deflationist counterargument that while existing in practice, pre-formal thinking could still be philosophically superfluous if it does not refer to anything objective. Against this, I argue that all truly deflationist philosophical theories lead to arbitrariness of mathematics. In all other philosophical accounts of mathematics there is room for a reference of the pre-formal mathematics, and the expansion of Tarkian truth can be made naturally. Hence, if we reject the arbitrariness of mathematics, I argue in this work, we must accept the substantiality of truth. Related subjects such as neo-Fregeanism will also be covered, and shown not to change the need for Tarskian truth. The only remaining route for the deflationist is to change the underlying logic so that our formal languages can include their own truth predicates, which Tarski showed to be impossible for classical first-order languages. With such logics we would have no need to expand the formal systems, and the above argument would fail. From the alternative approaches, in this work I focus mostly on the Independence Friendly (IF) logic of Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu. Hintikka has claimed that an IF language can include its own adequate truth predicate. I argue that while this is indeed the case, we cannot recognize the truth predicate as such within the same IF language, and the need for Tarskian truth remains. In addition to IF logic, also second-order logic and Saul Kripke s approach using Kleenean logic will be shown to fail in a similar fashion.