A head-mounted display as a personal viewing device: Dimensions of subjective experiences

The use of head-mounted displays (HMDs) can produce both positive and negative experiences. In an effort increase positive experiences and avoid negative ones, researchers have identified a number of variables that may cause sickness and eyestrain, although the exact nature of the relationship to HMDs may vary, depending on the tasks and the environments. Other non-sickness-related aspects of HMDs, such as users opinions and future decisions associated with task enjoyment and interest, have attracted little attention in the research community. In this thesis, user experiences associated with the use of monocular and bi-ocular HMDs were studied. These include eyestrain and sickness caused by current HMDs, the advantages and disadvantages of adjustable HMDs, HMDs as accessories for small multimedia devices, and the impact of individual characteristics and evaluated experiences on reported outcomes and opinions. The results indicate that today s commercial HMDs do not induce serious sickness or eyestrain. Reported adverse symptoms have some influence on HMD-related opinions, but the nature of the impact depends on the tasks and the devices used. As an accessory to handheld devices and as a personal viewing device, HMDs may increase use duration and enable users to perform tasks not suitable for small screens. Well-designed and functional, adjustable HMDs, especially monocular HMDs, increase viewing comfort and usability, which in turn may have a positive effect on product-related satisfaction. The role of individual characteristics in understanding HMD-related experiences has not changed significantly. Explaining other HMD-related experiences, especially forward-looking interests, also requires understanding more stable individual traits and motivations.

Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?

We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetries between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing tends to increase the intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduces the value of informational rents in current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing that a reduction in informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic environments, where a ban on information sharing would be strictly welfare-enhancing.