Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?
Contribuinte(s) |
Svenska handelshögskolan, Institutionen för nationalekonomi, nationalekonomi Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Economics, Economics |
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Data(s) |
2000
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Resumo |
We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetries between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing tends to increase the intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduces the value of informational rents in current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing that a reduction in informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic environments, where a ban on information sharing would be strictly welfare-enhancing. |
Formato |
1837 bytes 93731 bytes application/pdf text/plain |
Identificador |
http://hdl.handle.net/10227/134 URN:ISBN:951-555-648-1 951-555-648-1 0357-4598 |
Idioma(s) |
en |
Publicador |
Svenska handelshögskolan Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration |
Relação |
Working Papers 429 |
Direitos |
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Palavras-Chave | #information sharing #collusion #imperfectly competitive credit markets #Economics |
Tipo |
Text |