Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Kymmenen teollisesti merkittävän puulajin kuoriuutteiden mahdollisuudet tuholaistorjunnassa

Metsäteollisuudesta kertyy vuosittain suuria määriä ylijäämämateriaalia, kuten puun kuorta ja oksia.Ylimääräinen aines käytetään pääasiassa energiantuotantoon, mutta uusia soveltamismahdollisuuksia kaivataan. Kuoren on havaittu olevan potentiaalinen lähde monille bioaktiivisille yhdisteille, joille olisi käyttöä esimerkiksi lääke- ja kemianteollisuudessa sekä maa-, metsä- ja puutarhatuotannon tuholaistorjunnassa. Tutkimus on osa Euroopan Unionin rahoittamaa ForestSpeCs-projektia, jonka tarkoituksena on selvittää metsäteollisuuden ylijäämämateriaalien vaihtoehtoisia käyttötapoja. Valittujen kymmenen teollisesti merkittävän pohjoisen puulajin (Abies nephrolepis, Betula pendula, Larix decidua, L. gmelinii, L. sibirica, Picea abies, P. ajanensis, P. pumila, Pinus sylvestris, Populus tremula) kuoresta uutettujen aineiden soveltuvuutta syönninestoaineeksi testattiin kaaliperhosen (Pieris brassicae L.) ja krysanteemiyökkösen (Spodoptera littoralis Boisduval) toukilla sekä osittain sinappikuoriaisella (Phaedon cochloreae Fabricius) ja idänlehtikuoriaisella (Agelastica alni L.). Uutteet valmistettiin yhteistyössä projektin ryhmien avulla tai itsenäisesti erilaisin menetelmin. Testaukset tehtiin laboratorio-oloissa käyttäen lehtikiekkojen valintabiotestiä sekä karkeilla uutteilla että niistä erotelluilla yksittäisillä yhdisteillä. Tehdyistä mittauksista laskettiin syönninestoindeksit (FDI). Tulosten perusteella lähes kaikki testatut uutteet vaikuttivat ainakin jossain määrin kohdehyönteisen syöntikäyttäytymiseen. Hieman yli puolet kaaliperhosella testatuista 46 uutteesta aiheuttivat yli 50 % syönnineston eli kaaliperhonen suosi kontrollilehtiä uutteella käsiteltyjä todennäköisemmin. Krysanteemiyökkösellä yli 50 %:n syönnineston aiheuttivat vain seitsemän testatuista 56 uutteesta. Lisäksi kolme uutetta lisäsi käsiteltyjen kiekkojen syöntiä merkittävästi. Idänlehtikuoriaistoukat ja -aikuiset karttoivat erityisesti abietiinihapolla käsiteltyjä lehtiä. Sinappikuoriaisella testatut uutteet toimivat myös lupaavasti. Testattujen puulajien kuoresta on mahdollista uuttaa biologisesti aktiivisia yhdisteitä, mutta tuholaistorjunnan kannalta oikeiden pitoisuuksien ja tehokkaiden uuttomenetelmien löytäminen vaatii jatkotutkimuksia. Kuoren sisältämien yhdisteiden laatu ja määrä vaihtelevat monien tekijöiden, kuten ympäristön ja genetiikan vaikutuksesta. Hyönteisten sietokyky vaihtelee myös paljon lajeittain ja yksilöidenkin välillä on eroja. Uutteista valmistettavia torjunta-aineita olisi kuitenkin mahdollista sisällyttää esimerkiksi integroituun torjuntaan muiden menetelmien rinnalle tulevaisuudessa.