Activator Protein-1 and Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor Interplay : In Vivo & In Vitro Studies

Critical cellular decisions such as should the cell proliferate, migrate or differentiate, are regulated by stimulatory signals from the extracellular environment, like growth factors. These signals are transformed to cellular responses through their binding to specific receptors present at the surface of the recipient cell. The epidermal growth factor receptor (EGF-R/ErbB) pathway plays key roles in governing these signals to intracellular events and cell-to-cell communication. The EGF-R forms a signaling network that participates in the specification of cell fate and coordinates cell proliferation. Ligand binding triggers receptor dimerization leading to the recruitment of kinases and adaptor proteins. This step simultaneously initiates multiple signal transduction pathways, which result in activation of transcription factors and other target proteins, leading to cellular alterations. It is known that mutations of EGF-R or in the components of these pathways, such as Ras and Raf, are commonly involved in human cancer. The four best characterized signaling pathways induced by EGF-R are the mitogen-activated protein kinase cascades (MAPKs), the lipid kinase phosphatidylinositol 3 kinase (PI3K), a group of transcription factors called Signal Transducers and Activator of Transcription (STAT), and the phospholipase Cγ; (PLCγ) pathways. The activation of each cascade culminates in kinase translocation to the nucleus to stimulate various transcription factors including activator protein 1 (AP-1). AP-1 family proteins are basic leucine zipper (bZIP) transcription factors that are implicated in the regulation of a variety of cellular processes (proliferation and survival, growth, differentiation, apoptosis, cell migration, transformation). Therefore, the regulation of AP-1 activity is critical for the decision of cell fate and their deregulated expression is widely associated with many types of cancers, such as breast and prostate cancers. The aims of this study were to characterize the roles of EGF-R signaling during normal development and malignant growth in vitro and in vivo using different cell lines and tissue samples. We show here that EGF-R regulates cell proliferation but is also required for regulation of AP-1 target gene expression in fibroblasts in a MAP-kinase mediated manner. Furthermore, EGF-R signaling is essential for enterocyte proliferation and migration during intestinal maturation. EGF-R signaling network, especially PI3-K-Akt pathway mediated AP-1 activity is involved in cellular survival in response to ionizing radiation. Taken together, these results elucidate the connection of EGF-R and AP-1 in various cellular contexts and show their importance in the regulation of cellular behaviour presenting new treatment cues for intestinal perforations and cancer therapy.

Essays on Illegal Activities, Institutions and Economic Growth

In public economics, two extremist views on the functions of a government compete: one emphasizes government working for the public interest to provide value for the citizens, while another regards government mainly as a workhorse for private interests. Moreover, as the sole legitimate authority, the government has the right to define the rules and laws as well as to enforce them. With respect to regulation, two extremes arise: from too little regulation to too much of it. If the government does not function or ceases to exist, the state falls into anarchy or chaos (Somalia). If it regulates too much, it will completely suffocate private activities, which might be considered extralegal (the former Soviet Union). In this thesis I scrutinize the government s interventionist policies and evaluate the question of how to best promote economic well-being. The first two essays assume that the government s policies promote illegal activity. The first paper evaluates the interaction between the government and the mafia, and pays attention to the law enforcement of underground production. We show that the revenue-maximizing government will always monitor the shadow economy, as monitoring contributes to the government s revenue. In general, both legal and illegal firms are hurt by the entry of the mafia. It is, however, plausible that legal firms might benefit by the entry of the mafia if it competes with the government. The second paper tackles the issue of the measurement of the size of the shadow economy. To formulate policies it is essential to know what drives illegal economic activity; is it the tax burden, excess regulation, corruption or a weak legal environment? In this paper we propose an additional explanation for tax evasion and shadow production, namely cultural factors as manifested by religion as determinants of tax morality. According to our findings, Catholic and Protestant countries do not differ in their tax morale. The third paper contributes to the literature discussing the role of the government in promoting economic and productivity growth. Our main result is that, given the complex relationship between economic growth and economic freedom, marketization has not necessarily been beneficial in terms of growth. The last paper builds on traditional growth literature and revisits the debate on convergence clubs arising from demographic transition. We provide new evidence against the idea that countries within a club would converge over time. Instead, we propose that since the demographic transition is a dynamic process, one can expect countries to enter the last regime of stable, modern growth in stages.

The link between foreign aid, public investment and economic growth

Länsimaat ovat rahoittaneet kehitysyhteistyöhankkeita jo lähes kuuden vuosikymmenen ajan, mutta kehitysavun tehokkuudesta ei olla edelleenkään päästy yksimielisyyteen. Yksi avunantajamaiden tapa vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen, eli avun vaikutukseen vastaanottajamaan taloudellisen kasvun kiihdyttäjänä, on sitoa ne julkisen sektorin infrastruktuurihankkeisiin. Joissain tapauksissa tämä vaikuttaa avun vastaanottajan käytökseen ja asenteisiin kehitysapua kohtaan. Tutkielmassa käsitellään kehitysavun tehokkuutta tilanteessa, jossa se on sidottu julkisen sektorin investointeihin kehitysmaassa. Tutkimus pohjaa Kalaitzidakisin ja Kalyvitisin (2008) malliin, jossa osa kehitysmaan julkisen talouden investoinneista rahoitetaan kehitysavulla. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (rent- seeking) vaikutusta kehitysavun tehokkuuteen pohjaten Economidesin, Kalyvitisin ja Philippopoulosin (2008) malliin. Tutkielmassa referoidaan lisäksi tutkimuskysymystä sivuavia empiirisiä tutkimuksia, esitellään aluksi tavallisimmat kehitysyhteistyön muodot, sekä esitellään talousteoreettisia näkökulmia kehitysyhteistyön tehokkuuden määrittelylle. Tutkielma perustuu puhtaasti teoreettisiin malleihin ja niissä sovelletut menetelmät ovat matemaattisia. Tutkielmassa käsitellään ensin tapaus, jossa kehitysyhteistyöllä rahoitetaan julkisen sektorin investointihankkeita. Jossain tapauksissa kehitysavun kasvu lasku siirtää vastaanottajamaan kulutusta julkisista investoinneista kulutukseen, jolloin kehitysyhteistyövaroin osittain rahoitettujen hankkeiden koko pienenee, ja suhteellinen tehokkuus laskee. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan tilannetta, jossa kehitysyhteistyövaroista vain osa päätyy hankkeen rahoittamiseen, ja todetaan, että kehitysavun tehokkuus ja vaikutus maan kansantulon kasvuun vähenee talouden toimijoiden ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (mukaan lukien korruptio) myötä entisestään. Tämän tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että kehitysapu vaikuttaa kehittyvän maan talouden kasvuun tapauksessa, jossa julkisia infrastruktuurihankkeita rahoitetaan osittain maan omin verovaroin ja osittain kehitysyhteistyövaroin. Ylijäämää tavoitteleva käyttäytyminen vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen negatiivistesti vähentäen kehitysavun positiivisia kasvuvaikutuksia.

Appropriate Institutions and Economic Growth - one size fits no-one

Modern-day economics is increasingly biased towards believing that institutions matter for growth, an argument that has been further enforced by the recent economic crisis. There is also a wide consensus on what these growth-promoting institutions should look like, and countries are periodically ranked depending on how their institutional structure compares with the best-practice institutions, mostly in place in the developing world. In this paper, it is argued that ”non-desirable” or “second-best” institutions can be beneficial for fostering investment and thus providing a starting point for sustained growth, and that what matters is the appropriateness of institutions to the economy’s distance to the frontier or current phase of development. Anecdotal evidence from Japan and South-Korea is used as a motivation for studying the subject and a model is presented to describe this phenomenon. In the model, the rigidity or non-rigidity of the institutions is described by entrepreneurial selection. It is assumed that entrepreneurs are the ones taking part in the imitation and innovation of technologies, and that decisions on whether or not their projects are refinanced comes from capitalists. The capitalists in turn have no entrepreneurial skills and act merely as financers of projects. The model has two periods, and two kinds of entrepreneurs: those with high skills and those with low skills. The society’s choice of whether an imitation or innovation – based strategy is chosen is modeled as the trade-off between refinancing a low-skill entrepreneur or investing in the selection of the entrepreneurs resulting in a larger fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs with the ability to innovate but less total investment. Finally, a real-world example from India is presented as an initial attempt to test the theory. The data from the example is not included in this paper. It is noted that the model may be lacking explanatory power due to difficulties in testing the predictions, but that this should not be seen as a reason to disregard the theory – the solution might lie in developing better tools, not better just better theories. The conclusion presented is that institutions do matter. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution when it comes to institutional arrangements in different countries, and developing countries should be given space to develop their own institutional structures that cater to their specific needs.