Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Agricultural expansion and climate change in the Taita Hills, Kenya: an assessment of potential environmental impacts

The indigenous cloud forests in the Taita Hills have suffered substantial degradation for several centuries due to agricultural expansion. Currently, only 1% of the original forested area remains preserved in this region. Furthermore, climate change imposes an imminent threat for local economy and environmental sustainability. In such circumstances, elaborating tools to conciliate socioeconomic growth and natural resources conservation is an enormous challenge. This dissertation tackles essential aspects for understanding the ongoing agricultural activities in the Taita Hills and their potential environmental consequences in the future. Initially, alternative methods were designed to improve our understanding of the ongoing agricultural activities. Namely, methods for agricultural survey planning and to estimate evapotranspiration were evaluated, taking into account a number of limitations regarding data and resources availability. Next, this dissertation evaluates how upcoming agricultural expansion, together with climate change, will affect the natural resources in the Taita Hills up to the year 2030. The driving forces of agricultural expansion in the region were identified as aiming to delineate future landscape scenarios and evaluate potential impacts from the soil and water conservation point of view. In order to investigate these issues and answer the research questions, this dissertation combined state of the art modelling tools with renowned statistical methods. The results indicate that, if current trends persist, agricultural areas will occupy roughly 60% of the study area by 2030. Although the simulated land use changes will certainly increase soil erosion figures, new croplands are likely to come up predominantly in the lowlands, which comprise areas with lower soil erosion potential. By 2030, rainfall erosivity is likely to increase during April and November due to climate change. Finally, this thesis addressed the potential impacts of agricultural expansion and climate changes on Irrigation Water Requirements (IWR), which is considered another major issue in the context of the relations between land use and climate. Although the simulations indicate that climate change will likely increase annual volumes of rainfall during the following decades, IWR will continue to increase due to agricultural expansion. By 2030, new cropland areas may cause an increase of approximately 40% in the annual volume of water necessary for irrigation.