Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Multiple socioeconomic circumstances and health : associations and explanations among Finnish and British public sector employees

Socioeconomic health inequalities have been widely documented, with a lower social position being associated with poorer physical and general health and higher mortality. For mental health the results have been more varied. However, the mechanisms by which the various dimensions of socioeconomic circumstances are associated with different domains of health are not yet fully understood. This is related to a lack of studies tackling the interrelations and pathways between multiple dimensions of socioeconomic circumstances and domains of health. In particular, evidence from comparative studies of populations from different national contexts that consider the complexity of the causes of socioeconomic health inequalities is needed. The aim of this study was to examine the associations of multiple socioeconomic circumstances with physical and mental health, more specifically physical functioning and common mental disorders. This was done in a comparative setting of two cohorts of white-collar public sector employees, one from Finland and one from Britain. The study also sought to find explanations for the observed associations between economic difficulties and health by analysing the contribution of health behaviours, living arrangements and work-family conflicts. The survey data were derived from the Finnish Helsinki Health Study baseline surveys in 2000-2002 among the City of Helsinki employees aged 40-60 years, and from the fifth phase of the London-based Whitehall II study (1997-9) which is a prospective study of civil servants aged 35-55 years at the time of recruitment. The data collection in the two countries was harmonised to safeguard maximal comparability. Physical functioning was measured with the Short Form (SF-36) physical component summary and common mental disorders with the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12). Socioeconomic circumstances were parental education, childhood economic difficulties, own education, occupational class, household income, housing tenure, and current economic difficulties. Further explanatory factors were health behaviours, living arrangements and work-family conflicts. The main statistical method used was logistic regression analysis. Analyses were conducted separately for the two sexes and two cohorts. Childhood and current economic difficulties were associated with poorer physical functioning and common mental disorders generally in both cohorts and sexes. Conventional dimensions of socioeconomic circumstances i.e. education, occupational class and income were associated with physical functioning and mediated each other’s effects, but in different ways in the two cohorts: education was more important in Helsinki and occupational class in London. The associations of economic difficulties with health were partly explained by work-family conflicts and other socioeconomic circumstances in both cohorts and sexes. In conclusion, this study on two country-specific cohorts confirms that different dimensions of socioeconomic circumstances are related but not interchangeable. They are also somewhat differently associated with physical and mental domains of health. In addition to conventionally measured dimensions of past and present socioeconomic circumstances, economic difficulties should be taken into account in studies and attempts to reduce health inequalities. Further explanatory factors, particularly conflicts between work and family, should also be considered when aiming to reduce inequalities and maintain the health of employees.

The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their opponents. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War. The political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide General Denikin s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government. The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia. Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events. It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin s army in a far more favourable position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all political mistakes of Denikin s movement and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British aid, but rather in spite of it.